Kara- "NO" - Ke As lawsuits mount, and concern grows in Beijing over the future of intellectual property in China, it would appear that the jig may soon be up for China's copyright shy KTV booths. According to announcements from the Chinese Ministry of Culture, Beijing is about to embark on on a number of 'field trials' of an experimental “unified karaoke royalty fee system”, designed to ensure that KTV bars pay to use copyrighted material. Today? As things stand, most of China's KTV bars maintain their own music libraries, and can simply extend them indefinitely by purchasing new Karaoke VCDs, or downloading pirate tracks from the internet. Making it very difficult to police them, and almost impossible to ensure that they pay copyright fees. What payment schemes exist largely focus on charging a flat fee based on the size a bar, and do not unnecessarily reflect its actual use of copyrighted material. Particularly if it is unusually busy. Tomorrow? However, under the proposed system, KTV bars will no longer be allowed to maintain their own music libraries. Instead, they will required to subscribe to a centralized catalog of Karaoke tracks, and to participate in a copyright fee recovery scheme that charges them a more representative fee.   "The system contains a list of songs that are copyright approved and it can record how many times a song is ordered, indicating how much copyright-holders should be paid," Liang Gang, Ministry of Culture, China   The system will not only ensure that artists and record labels are compensated by KTV bars that use their songs, but also that unscrupulous KTV bars cannot 'muddy the waters' honest bars, by refusing to pay for the music that they play.   "We've been looking forward to having a legal organization collect the copyright fee for all the music users. Without it, there have always been law cases going on between clubs and record companies. We really hope this new system will charge reasonably while having no effect on consumers." Zhu Jun, Deputy Secretary General, Shanghai Culture and Entertainment Industry Association (and a KTV bar owner), China   According to Xinhua, the system will initially be trialled the scheme in three metropolitan cities; Wuhan, Zhengzhou and Qingdao. If proves to be effective, it is hoped that it will then be extended nationwide.   "We'll select about 20 clubs from the over 600 ones in Wuhan for trial and cover them all by early next year." Wang Guohua, Director, Cultural Market Development Center   As yet, it remains unclear how the sceme will cope with foreign owned KTV tracks. Issues? Though welcomed by the music industry, a number of questions have been raised about the scheme, both in its operations, and its feasibility. Cashing In Although the scheme should guarantee that payments are made for the use of songs, there are, at present, two competing payment structures. The first of these structures proposes that KTV establishments pay a pre-determined fee – Based on their capacity and volume of trade (number of rooms booked per night) - that will grant them unlimited access to all songs on the catalog on an equal basis with revenue being divided among the artist on the catalog. This scheme is backed by China's National copyright Association and would be the simplest to put in place. However, it would not significantly distinguish between popular and unpopular artists or allow a precise distribution of revenue to the artists included in the catalog. The second of these structures is supported directly by the Chinese Ministry of Culture, and proposes that KTV establishments should be given free access to the catalog, but should pay a fixed fee for each individual song played.   “The NCA insists bar operators should pay on the basis of business volume, while the Ministry wants operators to pay according to the number of times a song is ordered” Wang Huapeng, Spokesperson, China Audio-Video Management Collective, China.   Although the MoC scheme would be far more difficult to implement, it would distinguish between the songs being played, and would allow copyright fees to be distributed to artists and label based on their individual popularity. Allowing the most popular artists a fairer share of the profits. It would also allow independent charging to be put in place for foreign KTV tracks which, potentially, have uch higher copyright fees than domestic Chinese tracks. Yesterdays News? The second of the big questions question regarding the system's feasibility revolves around its potential to become outdated. With new songs being released on a daily basis, questions being asked about how quickly the a centralized KTV system would be updated to include the latest tracks, and whether each individual KTV would be expected to add the tracks to their internal systems themselves, or have them distributed directly to them by Beijing.   "In terms of protecting copyrights, it's not completely senseless ... But it's difficult to put it into practice. How can they make sure they have the latest hits in the database?" Miao Di, Professor, Communication University of China, Beijing   Tojan Horse? Although the KTV scheme is being billed as a copyright protection initiative, and has many supporter within the music industry, news that Beijing is taking an interest in KTV bars been greeted with extreme suspicion by some. As such, China watchers have expressed alarm, though not surprise, at the news that the catalog of songs at the heart of the system will be subject to state censorship.   "[To ensure that standards are maintained] the songs in the database for use by karaoke parlours and consumers need to be censored" Liang Gang, Ministry of Culture, China   In this light, China watchers have voiced that experimental KTV fee system may actually serve a duel purpose: 1) To regulate payments for songs played in KTV bar 2) To regulate the songs themselves.   "They say it's for intellectual property rights protection, but it could be censorship in another form. Zhang Xingshui, Director, Beijing Kingdom law firm, China   Unusually, China watchers views appear to be backed up by statements made by the Chinee government, which seem to list copyright protection as a secondary issue to direct media censorship.   "This action is aimed at preventing unhealthy songs from becoming karaoke and will gradually solve the copyright contradictions between record companies, artists and karaoke operators," Ministry of Culture, China   Beijing already employs heavy censorship on all forms of media in China and has, over the last 5 years, enacted numerous laws and scheme in order to reduce the risk of Chinese citizens being exposed to ideas, images, and concepts, that have not been approved by the state. Hidden Goalposts? While Chinese officials have publicly confirmed that the list of songs available to the Karaoke bar will be subject to state censorship, Beijing has not to reveal the benchmarks that it will use to choose which songs will be included, and which songs will be excluded, from the list. Instead, Beijing reviled only that the list of approved music would not contain songs that it considered to be "unhealthy". Such a response is traditional for the Chinese Government. Though the criteria for the approved song list have not been made public, China watches and media analysts have put forward a number of categories of song which would likely to be excluded from the list of approved songs. Including: Songs that contain sexually suggestive or explicit lyrics Songs sung to sexually suggestive or explicit videos Songs containing political or semi-political lyrics or themes Songs advocating an increase in personal freedom or decrying a loss of personal freedom Songs advocating or supporting civil/social change or disobediences of parent, schools or other authority figures Songs referring or alluding to homosexuality Songs containing slang terms and phrases taken from regional Chinese dialects Songs containing slang terms and phrases taken from foreign languages The list is based on known patterns of censorship for DVDs, music, radio shows and television programs over the last year in China. Non-Disclosure? As in many previous cases, Beijing has refused to make public the ground on which it will include/exclude tracks from its list of approved songs. This is a known tactic of the Chinese government, which commonly regards its censorship benchmarks as states secret, and have acted to jail those who reveal the This is done for several reasons 1) To prevent the public from scrutinizing Beijing's methods and motives 2) To create an 'air of ignorance' in which people will simply presume that Beijing is correct in its actions 3) To prevent appeal or outcries from being launched based on technicalities and 'second guessing' of Beijing's decisions 4) To prevent the act of censorship becoming a viable topic for discussion 5) To allow Beijing to censor for reasons that would not be publicly understood or accepted 6) To allow the censorship of things that Beijing wishes to promote as never having existed in the first place (for example, separatism and homosexuality), in situations where knowing that the topic was being censored would draw attention to the fact that said topic does, in fact, exist. 7) To force people to censor themselves for fear of attracting the attention of the censors through ignorance of the rules or censorship. Additional Fears? While concern have been raised the experimental KTV system may be used as a back door for censorship, they are not the only concerns that have been raised. Indeed, observers have raised a number of additional fears. Most of which revolve around the possibility that the approved song as the heart of the system might be misused to the advantage/disadvantage of certain groups, or be used in ways that ' distort' the Mainland music market. Such fears largely fall into three categories. Corruption Observers have warned that, unless sufficient safeguards are put in place, the list of songs approved for KTV bars could an easy target for unscrupulous official. Specifically, that a corrupt element might demand money from a label to ensure that their artists are included on the list, or that they might accept bribes form record labels to keep rivals off of the list. Self Cenorship Observers have voiced concern that an approved song list may be used by the state as a tool keep artists in line 'at all times', and have cautioned that artists may removal from the list if they expresses sentiment, or preform an action, that is not looked on favorably by the authorities. Even that sentiment or action is not mirrored in their songs. This comes tied into the concern that the list might be used to enforce a ' collective reprisal'. Meaning that an artist who 'falls foul' of authorities might risk having all of their songs removed from the list becaus eof a single song or sentiment, or that a label might have all of its artist removed from the list becaus eof the actions of a single artist. Similar tactics have been used against Chinese writers for years. With many authors finding that all of the works have been banned from publication because they have expressed an certain opinion, or solidarity with a certain cause, outside of their witting, or because a single piece that they wrote clashed with government ideologies. Artificial Market Bias In addition to fears over corruption and self cenorship, analysts have cautioned that an approved song list could be used by the state to manipulate the music market for or against certain groups it. For example, the approved song list might be used as a weapon against foreign artists (specifically those from Japan and America), or artists from Chinese-Taiwan and Hong Kong, to reduce their ability to compete effectively against Mainland Chinese artists. in much the same way as the ' approved film list' is cutrrently being used limit the entry of foreign films into cinemas. Similarly, concerns have been raised that this tactic could also be deployed against artist from China's ethnic groups, or artists who put ethnic traits into their music. So as to ' encourage' singers to promote only Han culture. Maintaining a Healthy Industry? Though the prospect of having a government approved list of songs at the heart of KTV has been sharply criticized by some, the prospect that Beijing might act to impose nationwide standards on the songs available in Karaoke booths has not met with universal alarm. Indeed, some observers have voice that the application of state mandated KTV standards could be an important step in maintaining KTV as a ' healthy' industry. Most of these fields of though come on three fronts: 1) It would serve to better protect China's youth from 'undesirable influence' brought in by irresponsible musicians. Including elements that promote sex, drugs and violence, as well as lax foreign mores that have no place in modern Chinese society 2) It would help to prevent the dilution of China's dominant culture by foreign or ethnic music influences 3) It could be used to provide a 'more even playing field' for China's emerging artists and record labels. Allowing them to compete more effectively against establish foreign artists and multi-national music labels that have large budgets for promotion and distribution. Such views are not unique to China, and echo views in more liberal western countries. Many of whom have faced calls for government intervention in at least one of these areas. Examples of countries facing such calls include France: where there are calls for the music industry to promote 'an unbastardized form of the French language', and the US: were pro-family and conservative groups have long protested for official intervention to protect children from 'harmful messages' in Rap and Hip-Hop music (Among other musical forms). Which are stereotypically viewed as promoting promiscuity, drugs and violence against women.   "In many popular rap songs men glorify the life of pimps, refer to all women as they think a pimp would to a prostitute, and promote violence against women for 'disobeying.'" The Exploitation of Women in Hip-hop Culture   As ever, opinions remain divided. The numbers? Although originally from Japan, Karaoke is one of the most popular pastimes in China. There are an estimated estimate 100,000 KTV bars in China, and the domestic industry is worth approximately $US5 Billion. According to figures published by Xinhua, China's state controlled media agency, Chinese KTV have a total annual revenue of $US1.25 billion, and so should be paying at least $US1 Million in copyright fees.   Original Article: Kara- "NO" - Ke

8.8.06 17:42 Permalink / comment

Loyalty For Sale?: The Convoluted World of 'One China' Politics Things do not appear to be going Chinese-Taiwan's way this week, with the announcement that disputed Pacific island's government has been 'forced' to break diplomatic ties with the African state of Chad, after the Chadian government moved to formally recognize Mainland China as 'the One True China'    "To safeguard national dignity, sovereignty, the government of the Republic of China decided to cut off diplomatic ties with Chad and immediately” Foreign Ministry, Chinese-Taiwan   In a statement broadcast on Sunday, officials speaking on behalf of the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry, blamed “evil force” for Chad's apparent defection, and accused China of using a mixture of diplomatic black-mail and economic bribery to pressure Chad into choosing Beijing over Taipei.      "Knuckling under China's huge pressure, Chad has decided to restore diplomatic ties with Beijing" Lu Ching-lung (Also known as “Michel” Lu), Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, Chinese-Taiwan   Knuckling Under? Chad's decision to ' switch loyalties' apparently comes after Beijing went against the wishes of the World Bank, and offered Chad 'unconditional' support in building up its domestic infrastructure. In the past, China has made a number of deals, most notable with Zimbabwe, in which it has offered to assist countries in developing their agricultural and industrial sectors in exchange for political support and access to domestic markets and natural resources. In Chad's case, access to its oil sector would likely be a condition of Chinese aid. According to western media reports, the Taiwanese ambassador was told that Chad's decision had been made “in the interest of the [Chadian] state”. This statement was not immediately elaborated upon. A Game That Two Can Play? Taipei's claims that Chad's loyalty had been brought are not without president. Though knowledge of this fact does not go entierly in Taipei's favor. In October 2004, it was alleged that Taipei extended $US10.3 in aid to Chad after the Chadian government threatened to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. These alligationa were supported by elements within the Taiwanese government of the day. Chad denied that they had pressed Taipei for money in exchange for support.   "The Chad government has never asked for NT$350 million [US$10.36 million] in aid from Taiwan........we are very sad to see this allegation." Hissein Brahim Taha, Ambassador to Chinese-Taiwan, Chad   Embarrassment? Though Chad's switching of diplomatic is damaging to Chinese-Taiwan's effort to maintain international support in the face of China's growing political and economic influence, it also comes at a particularly embarrassing time for Taipei. Until this weekend's announcement, Taiwanese Premier Su Tseng-chang had been due to attend a confirmation ceremony for thee term Chadian President Idriss Deby. Su's presence at the ceremony, as a representative of Chinese-Taiwan, would have served as a firm reminder of the disputed island state's continued existence as a sovereign entity. However, with the breaking of diplomatic relations, Su's visit has now been cancelled, and his place is likely to be taken by a representative from Mainland China. Handing the Mainland the recognition that would have been given to it's unwilling neighbor. Some observers have voiced that the tightness of these events 'might not be coincidental' and have proffered that Beijing may have engineered them so as to cause maximum loss of Face for Taipei. Had Chad not switched recognition, Su's delegation to Chad would have departed today. ' Coincidentally', Ahmat Allami, Foreign Minister happened to be visiting Beijing at the time of the announcement. Putting him in a position to announce Chad's decision 'in person' to Chinese officials. Aid? In addition to breaking off diplomatic relations with Chad, Taiwanese officials also announced that they would be suspending development and humanitarian co-operation with Chadian authorities. Effectively cutting Chad off from all Taiwanese aid.   "The Taiwan government terminates diplomatic ties with Chad and halts all aid programmes because Chad has decided to recognize China” Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Ching-lung (Michel Lu)   At present, it is not clear what impact the withdrawal of Taiwanese aid will have on Chad, though it is likely that Beijing has offered to 'compensate' Chad for its losses, in return for recognition. At present, it is not clear what form such compensation could take in the long term, though some observers have speculated that a portion of this aid will be military in nature. Commercial Realities? Despite the breaking of diplomatic ties, and the cancellation of aid deals, it has been authorities have confirmed that the two parties, Chad and Chinese-Taiwan are to continue their commercial relationship. At present, this relationship is not very deep, but it includes a notable oil deal between Chad and between Taiwanese oil interest 中油 (Chinese Petroleum Corp), which will be permitted to continue.    “CPC has drilled for oil in countries which did not have diplomatic ties with Taiwan, so our oil exploration in Chad will continue” Kuo Pao-long, Manager, CPC   Taipei based 中油 (Chinese Petroleum Corp) is a state owned enterprise. Chad? Chad, a French colony until 1960, first moved to recognize Chinese-Taiwan as a sovereign state in 1962 under the rule of President Francois Tombalbaye. However Tombalbaye later switched diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Mainland in 1972. Chad, Under President Félix Malloum, again moved to recognize Chinese-Taiwan in 1977. Resulting in the Mainland breaking off diplomatic relations. Chad is the 7th state since 2000 (including Nauru, which has since reverted to recognizing Taiwanese sovereignty) to change its diplomatic recognition to the Mainland. “One China” ..... and One Taiwan (Just don't tell Anybody) Although Chad's defection to the 160 strong ' One China' camp, leaves the disputed island with only 24 nations recognizing it's sovereignty, Chinese-Taiwan is far from isolates, and enjoys levels of international co-operation and recognition far higher than many undisputed nations. As such most significant members of the international community pay only lip-service to their respective 'One-China' agreements, and maintain near full, though informal, diplomatic ties with the disputed island. Usually, these ties are through a series of de facto embassies and agencies, including the 'Taipei Economic and Cultural Office'; which has a presence in many countries, including the US and Japan, the 'Taipei Representative Office'; Chinese-Taiwan's de facto consular presence in Britain, and the 'American Institute in Taiwan'; which serves as America's de facto embassy to Chinese-Taiwan. Similarly, most significant nations maintain a two-tier system for matters trade, travel and diplomatic policy which clearly distinguishes between Mainland China and Chinese-Taiwan, and which treat the island as if it were a sovereign state. Example's of this two-tier system include Japanese visa regulations that permit any Taiwanese passport holders unlimited visaless entry to Japan for up to 90 days (Corresponding measures measures with the Mainland permit only Chinese Students to enter Japan without a visa, and limit them to 30 days travel which must be for educational purposes). Obtaining a business, spouse or tourism visa/permit to a many Western countries is also a notably simpler and more expedient process for a Taiwanese passport holder than a Mainland passport holder. Additionally, because of their distinctly different governments and reputations, most nations also treat Mainland China and Chinese-Taiwan as distinct sovereign states for purposes of exports, particularly where said exports are of a sensitive nature.     “Trade with China is routinely viewed through the prism of Chinese military capabilities” James A. Lewis, Center for Strategic and International Studies   Example's of this include an EU arms export ban that applies exclusively to the Mainland, and the fact that, while the US maintains ' special export restrictions' on sensitive or 'duel use' technology destined for the Mainland, Chinese-Taiwan is covered only by standard export regulation. At present, Beijing is fully aware of these disparities, but largely tolerates then in exchange for the Face and diplomatic capital that it gains from being ' formally' recognized as 'the One True China'. Due to tight state control over the media, most Chinese citizens are unaware of the full extent of this two-tier system, or the disparities in world diplomacy that exist between Mainland China and Chinese-Taiwan. Recognition? Countries that currently recognize Chinese Taiwan are (In order of recognition) The Vatican (1942) Panama (1954) Haiti (1956) Dominican Republic (1957) Paraguay (1957) Costa Rica (1959) Guatemala (1960) Salvador (1961) Honduras (1965) Malawi (1966) Swaziland (1968) Tuvalu (1979) Nauru (1980, re-recognized in 2005) Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (1981) Saint Kitts and Nevis (1983) The Solomon Islands (1983) Belize (1989) Nicaragua (1990) Burkina Faso (1994) The Gambia (1995) Sao Tome and Príncipe (1997) Marshall Islands (1998) Palau (1999) Kiribati (2003) Change of Recognition? Although most significant changes of recognition occurred during the 1970s, including those of the US, Japan and the UN, Chad is the 7th state to switch recognition since 2000. The other 6 states were: Dominican Republic Grenada Liberia Macedonia Nauru Senegal Despite dropping recognition of Chinese-Taiwan, in favor of Mainland China, Nauru reestablished diplomatic ties with Chinese-Taiwan in 2005.   Original Article:  Loyalty For Sale?: The Convoluted World of 'One China' Politics

6.8.06 15:39 Permalink / comment

One China, Two Opinions In a move that has come as 'no surprise' to observer, Beijing has once again hit out at a twice yearly report, commissioned by the British government, on the progress of Hong Kong since its return to Mainland Chinese rule. As with previous reports, the latest edition, the 19th such report since the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, criticized China for its slow progress towards Democracy in Hong Kong -Saying that “little or no visible progress” had been made – and called on Beijing to introduce a 'fair and representative' democratic system with the minimum of delay.   “We believe Hong Kong should advance to a system of universal suffrage, as envisioned in the Basic Law, as soon as possible.” Margaret Becket, Foreign Secretary, Britain   Business as Usual As expected, the report provoked outrage in Beijing, and prompted a strong rebuke from Chinese authorities. Denouncing the report as being an interference in its internal affairs, Beijing denied the validity of calls made on it and, in turn, called on Britain to cease making what it referred to as “Random comments” about domestic Chinese issues.   "Hong Kong affairs are China's domestic affairs, and foreign governments should not make random comments about them" Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China   No Comment However, as is traditional for China's current regime, rather than answering the criticizms made against it, Beijing responded issuing a blanket statement of dismissal that denied the existence of the issues raised by the British report. In response to British calls for China to honor earlier agreements to introduce local rule and free elections in Hong Kong, Beijing denied that there were any problems or inadaquacies with Hong Kong's system that needed to be addressed, instead voicing that the people of Hong Kong had a high level of local democracy, and that this democracy was well protected by Hong Kong law.   "The people of Hong Kong are enjoying unprecedented democratic rights legally granted to them". Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China   Chinese officials however declined to elaborate on any of the factors behind their dismissal of Britain's report, and were unwilling to provide examples to counter Britain's claims. State of play When Hong Kong was returned to the Mainland in 1997, it had been envisaged that the territory would have a functioning democratic government in place for the 10 year anniversary in 2007. However, this has since proven impossible. Although China has long maintained that it intends to honor earlier agreements to introduce full democratic rule in Hong Kong, Beijing has, on many occasions, actively interfered in Hong Kong's domestic affairs in order to prevent it from changing to a democratic system of government, and to ensure that the democratic elements of Hong Kong's current administration cannot wield greater power than the elements that are appointed by the Mainland government. An Example this interference includes an earlier decision by Beijing to 'fix' the ratio of elected and appointed officials in Hong Kong at 50/50, and the additional mandate that any increase in the number of elected representatives being met by a corresponding rise in the number of unelected representatives. A move which means that democratically elected representative cannot force legislation through against Beijing's wishes unless appointed members also rebel against will of the Mainland government. An event which can best be described as being 'highly uncommon'. Additionally, in 2004, Beijing also announced that it any changes to Hong Kong's laws to facilitate Universal Suffrage, or to prepare for its introduction at a future date, required direct approval from Beijing before they could be signed into law. To date, no approval has been given for any such changes to be made, and no timetable has yet been set for approval to be given. Reasoning Officially, Beijing maintains that these state mandated obstacles to Universal Suffrage, and the accompanying slow progress towards direct democratic elections, is part of a measured approach to ensure regional economic and social stability is maintained. However, many observers have voiced that Beijing is instead more likely to be afraid that greater democracy in Hong Kong would provoke calls for greater democracy on the Mainland. An eventuality which Beijing has repeatedly acted to suppress. Sometimes through military force. Double Standards? While China has, so far, ruled out the permitting Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong for the foreseeable future, a number of observers responded to Britain's critisizm of China, with critisizm of their own that goes above and beyond the rebuke issued by Beijing. Accusing Britain of crass hypocrisy, and voicing that the former colonial power has little or no right to lecture China on democracy in Hong Kong, such observers have pointedly noted that Britain, itself, failed to establish even 'a token democratically elected government' in Hong Kong. Instead, choosing to rule over it through a series of politically appointed Governor until it was time to transfered to back to the Mainland. Dismissal? Accusations of 'double standards' by Britain have, however, been dismissed by a number of China watchers, who have decried them as being 'ill informed comments' made by 'ill informed people'. Though not necissarily agreeing with Britain's stance, China watchers have laid several counter defenses of British actions, including the fact that, for the last 50 years of British Rule, Britain was largely unable to introduce democracy to its colony because of the risk involved. Specifically, because of the risk of a military threat to a democratic Hong Kong from Communist China. Resumption of Sovereignty? In the decades prior to the handover, Beijing issued numerous pointed 'reminders' to Britain that it 'reserved the right' to nullify all prior agreements and treaties regarding the handover of Hong Kong and “Resume Sovereignty Early” in the event of Universal Suffrage being introduced. "Resuming Sovereignty Early" was a veiled reference to seizing Hong Kong by military force. It was commonly used to 'discourage' Britain from changing Hong Kong's status quo in any way that was not to Beijing's liking. At the time, Britain considered Hong Kong to be 'undefendable' from a Mainland attack, because of the ease at which even a small Chinese force could cut off its supplies of food and water.    "It must be fully obvious .... that Hong Kong is indefensible by conventional means and that in the event of a Chinese attack, nuclear strikes against China would be the only alternative to complete abandonment of the colony. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Foreign Secretary, Britain (1961)   History? Historically, Hong Kong had 30 appointed governors prior to its handover in 1997. 28 of whom were foreigners, of British origin, who were appointed by Britain without consulting the Hong Kong public. The remaining 2 were Japanese, and were appointed by Japan during the occupation of Hong Kong. For obvious reasons, they are not officially recorded as being legitimate governors.   Original Article: One China, Two Opinions

4.8.06 10:53 Permalink / 2 Comments / comment

One China, Two Opinions In a move that has come as 'no surprise' to observer, Beijing has once again hit out at a twice yearly report, commissioned by the British government, on the progress of Hong Kong since its return to Mainland Chinese rule. As with previous reports, the latest edition, the 19th such report since the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, criticized China for its slow progress towards Democracy in Hong Kong -Saying that “little or no visible progress” had been made – and called on Beijing to introduce a 'fair and representative' democratic system with the minimum of delay.   “We believe Hong Kong should advance to a system of universal suffrage, as envisioned in the Basic Law, as soon as possible.” Margaret Becket, Foreign Secretary, Britain   Business as Usual As expected, the report provoked outrage in Beijing, and prompted a strong rebuke from Chinese authorities. Denouncing the report as being an interference in its internal affairs, Beijing denied the validity of calls made on it and, in turn, called on Britain to cease making what it referred to as “Random comments” about domestic Chinese issues.   "Hong Kong affairs are China's domestic affairs, and foreign governments should not make random comments about them" Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China   No Comment However, as is traditional for China's current regime, rather than answering the criticizms made against it, Beijing responded issuing a blanket statement of dismissal that denied the existence of the issues raised by the British report. In response to British calls for China to honor earlier agreements to introduce local rule and free elections in Hong Kong, Beijing denied that there were any problems or inadaquacies with Hong Kong's system that needed to be addressed, instead voicing that the people of Hong Kong had a high level of local democracy, and that this democracy was well protected by Hong Kong law.   "The people of Hong Kong are enjoying unprecedented democratic rights legally granted to them". Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China   Chinese officials however declined to elaborate on any of the factors behind their dismissal of Britain's report, and were unwilling to provide examples to counter Britain's claims. State of play When Hong Kong was returned to the Mainland in 1997, it had been envisaged that the territory would have a functioning democratic government in place for the 10 year anniversary in 2007. However, this has since proven impossible. Although China has long maintained that it intends to honor earlier agreements to introduce full democratic rule in Hong Kong, Beijing has, on many occasions, actively interfered in Hong Kong's domestic affairs in order to prevent it from changing to a democratic system of government, and to ensure that the democratic elements of Hong Kong's current administration cannot wield greater power than the elements that are appointed by the Mainland government. An Example this interference includes an earlier decision by Beijing to 'fix' the ratio of elected and appointed officials in Hong Kong at 50/50, and the additional mandate that any increase in the number of elected representatives being met by a corresponding rise in the number of unelected representatives. A move which means that democratically elected representative cannot force legislation through against Beijing's wishes unless appointed members also rebel against will of the Mainland government. An event which can best be described as being 'highly uncommon'. Additionally, in 2004, Beijing also announced that it any changes to Hong Kong's laws to facilitate Universal Suffrage, or to prepare for its introduction at a future date, required direct approval from Beijing before they could be signed into law. To date, no approval has been given for any such changes to be made, and no timetable has yet been set for approval to be given. Reasoning Officially, Beijing maintains that these state mandated obstacles to Universal Suffrage, and the accompanying slow progress towards direct democratic elections, is part of a measured approach to ensure regional economic and social stability is maintained. However, many observers have voiced that Beijing is instead more likely to be afraid that greater democracy in Hong Kong would provoke calls for greater democracy on the Mainland. An eventuality which Beijing has repeatedly acted to suppress. Sometimes through military force. Double Standards? While China has, so far, ruled out the permitting Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong for the foreseeable future, a number of observers responded to Britain's critisizm of China, with critisizm of their own that goes above and beyond the rebuke issued by Beijing. Accusing Britain of crass hypocrisy, and voicing that the former colonial power has little or no right to lecture China on democracy in Hong Kong, such observers have pointedly noted that Britain, itself, failed to establish even 'a token democratically elected government' in Hong Kong. Instead, choosing to rule over it through a series of politically appointed Governor until it was time to transfered to back to the Mainland. Dismissal? Accusations of 'double standards' by Britain have, however, been dismissed by a number of China watchers, who have decried them as being 'ill informed comments' made by 'ill informed people'. Though not necissarily agreeing with Britain's stance, China watchers have laid several counter defenses of British actions, including the fact that, for the last 50 years of British Rule, Britain was largely unable to introduce democracy to its colony because of the risk involved. Specifically, because of the risk of a military threat to a democratic Hong Kong from Communist China. Resumption of Sovereignty? In the decades prior to the handover, Beijing issued numerous pointed 'reminders' to Britain that it 'reserved the right' to nullify all prior agreements and treaties regarding the handover of Hong Kong and “Resume Sovereignty Early” in the event of Universal Suffrage being introduced. "Resuming Sovereignty Early" was a veiled reference to seizing Hong Kong by military force. It was commonly used to 'discourage' Britain from changing Hong Kong's status quo in any way that was not to Beijing's liking. At the time, Britain considered Hong Kong to be 'undefendable' from a Mainland attack, because of the ease at which even a small Chinese force could cut off its supplies of food and water.    "It must be fully obvious .... that Hong Kong is indefensible by conventional means and that in the event of a Chinese attack, nuclear strikes against China would be the only alternative to complete abandonment of the colony. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Foreign Secretary, Britain (1961)   History? Historically, Hong Kong had 30 appointed governors prior to its handover in 1997. 28 of whom were foreigners, of British origin, who were appointed by Britain without consulting the Hong Kong public. The remaining 2 were Japanese, and were appointed by Japan during the occupation of Hong Kong. For obvious reasons, they are not officially recorded as being legitimate governors.   Original Article: One China, Two Opinions

4.8.06 10:52 Permalink / comment

The Yasukuni Memos: Bringing the Past to Light One of the many complexities of the Sino-Japanese relationship can be said to be the difference in attitudes between the respective cultures of China and Japan and their attitude to wartime contrition. With China holding the view that 'a defeat, concession or confession must be made openly', and Japan holding the view that 'what is left unsaid is often said the loudest'. A cultural factor which has oft been blamed for much of the dire relations between these two Asian neighbors. However, as anybody who reads the Japanese newspapers will also know, one of the many things that has been left unsaid for nearly 30 years, has just been said. Much to the delight, or horror, of 'interested parties' in both China and Japan. Confirmation In a radical new development of an old argument, the Japanese daily Nihon Keizai Shimbun has, this week, published extracts from a series of official memos - taken by a senior member of the Imperial Household - which finally confirm that the late Emperor Hirohito choose to boycott the controversial Yasukuni Jinja in disgust, after it was revealed to him that shrine officials had secretly allowed 14 Class-A war criminals to be interned at the site. "At some point, Class-A criminals became enshrined.... That's why I have not visited the shrine since. This is my heart." Emperor Showa (As recorded by Tomita Tomohiko) Before the release of the memos, it was well known that Hirohito, or Emperor Showa, as he has been formally known since his death, had visited Yasukuni a total of 8 times since the end of WWII, and that these visits had abruptly stopped at around the time that news of the war criminals prescience became public knowledge. However, while it had been widely speculated that his refusal to attend Yasakuni was directly liked to this revelation, neither Hirohito, nor his staff, had ever fully explained the facts of the matter. Making the recently published memos the first official document ever to publicly confirm his personal views on this topic. Hirohito's son, the reigning Emperor Akihito, has also refused to attend Yasukuni, either as part of his official duties, or in a personal capacity, since the presence of the war criminals was revealed. His actions, and past statement, indicate that his reasons are the same as those of his father. Though his status as a constitutional monarch prevents him from speaking out in any real capacity. Tomita Tomohiko? The newly published memos come from a set of 20 notebooks, kept by Tomita Tomohiko in which they recorded conversation held by the late Emperor. Tomita was a senior member of the Imperial Household, becoming its Deputy Head in 1974, before rising to the rank of Grand Steward in 1978. A position which they held for 10 years, and which granted Tomita close access to the reclusive Emperor. Tomita passed away in 2003, and the notebooks records were provided to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun by family members. Vindication Though the full implications of Tomita's memos are not yet known, they have been seized upon by elements within both moderate and liberal Japan – which makes up the vast bulk of Japanese civil society - who have used them to bolster their call for Yasukuni to either be sidelined through the construction of a alternative monument that does not name Class-A war criminals, or for the controversial shrine to be forced to comply with demands that it remove the names from its monuments. Both as a means of allowing Japanese to refelect properly on the wrongness of war, and as a means of showing neighboring China and Korea the 'true face' of a repentant Japan that is strongly comitted to turning its back on nationalism and militarism. “It is obvious that the nation needs a new facility where anybody can pray for the war victims. Editorial, Asahi Shimbun, Japan A Kick in the Backside Though well received by most, not everybody, however, has greeted Tomita's memos with jubilation. Indeed, their very existence come as a great humiliation to extremist on both sides of the Sino-Japanese divide. Japan? Many members of Japan's discredited and isolated nationalist minority claim fealty to the Emperor and former Emperor but, until now, have been at a loss to publicly explain when both Hirohito and Akihito have denied their cause even the slightest gratification, by refusing to visit Yasukuni. As such, these nationalist elements have commonly used Hirohito and Akihito's refusal to make their personal views public, as is traditional in Japan, as a conduit through which to spread speculation and doubt about their reason, and to maintain the argument that it was possible that they had some other mysterious reason to avoid the shrine. A reason other than as a protest against the presence of Class-A war criminals. Thanks to Tomita's memos, such nationalist denials are no longer possible. "Regarding the reasons the emperor stopped visiting the shrine, there has been little evidence from those who were close to the emperor. Therefore, arguments were often premised on speculation. But, the newly discovered memo now provides crucial evidence that Emperor Showa felt displeasure.” Hata Ikuhiko, Lecturer in Contemporary History, Nippon University, Japan China? Just as the memos been damaging to Japanese nationalists - by removing their ability to claim the silent support of Emperor Showa - so have they been damaging to China's young angry nationalists, as they finally put pay to Chinese claims that Emperor Showa remained without remorse until the time of his death. Tomita's memos also resoundingly contradict any claims, by nationalist elements on either side, that Hirohito secretly supported the internment of Class-A war criminals in Yasukuni. Showing clearly and definitively that he felt deeply enough about the presence of those who had ravaged China and its neighbors to boycott one of Japan's most important shrines. Side Story As an unusual side story, it was also revealed that the memos of the late Emperor included a strong criticism of Matsudaira Nagayoshi - the Chief Priest of Yasukuni who had allowed Class-A war criminals to be interned at the shrine - in which Hirohito accused him of going against the principles set by his own father, and by his predecessors, by allowing war criminals to be enshrined in a place of peace and remembrance. "I wonder what was on the mind of Matsudaira's child..... I thought Matsudaira [senior] had strong aspirations for peace." Emperor Showa (As recorded by Tomita Tomohiko) Matsudaira Nagayoshi's father was Matsudaira Yoshitami. A former minister of the Imperial Household during the post war years. He sought peace and reconciliation. Prior to Matsudaira Nagayoshi's appointment, Chief Priest Fujimaro Tsukuba, had refused 'point blank' to allow Class-A war criminals names to be included in the shrine. He swore that he would fight their enshrinement so long as he was alive. Fujimaro kept this promise until the time of his death. “Enshrinement [of Class-A war criminals] will probably be impossible as long as I’m alive” Fujimaro Tsukuba, Former Chief Priest, Yasukuni Jinja Powerless? Though neither widely known nor accepted in China, Japan's post war constitution actively imposes a barrier of nullification between the Japanese government and the various religious groups operating within the country. This clause was imposed by the US in 1946, and was originally intended to serve a number of purposes, including: A) To prevent the state from promoting religion B) To prevent the state from persecuting religious groups C) To prevent religion being used to promote the ideals of the state Unfortunately, because the controversial shrine is maintained as a religious site - and so falls under religious jurisdiction - this clause now acts to prevents the state from imposing a solution on Yasukuni, or leveling sanctions against it if it refuses to remove class-A war criminals of its own accord. Effectively rendering Tokyo powerless to act against Yasukuni, even if it is in the nations best interests, or if it is the will of the wider Japanese people. A similar clause exists within the constitutions of a number of countries and states, including that of the US - on which the Japanese constitution is based. Like Japan, the governments of such countries are also powerless to prevent religious groups, or nationalists using the cover of religious protection, from honoring war criminals. Yasukuni - The Bare Facts (Including the Good, the bad, and the down right Ugly) The name 'Yasukuni' literally meaning "Peaceful Garden" It was founded by the Meiji Emperor in 1869, in commemoration of the Boshin War of 1868 to 1869 It remembers around 2 and a half million dead from a total of 11 wars. Many of which were internal to Japan and did not involve aggression against foreign states Contrary to some misconceptions, the shrine is Shinto and not Buddhist Among the dead remembered at Yasukuni are Chinese, Taiwanese and Koreans citizens, as well as Japanese civilians Around 57,000 of the names at Yasukuni are of women, 460 of whom were students who volunteered as feild nurses. Most these nurses were killed during the invasion of Okinawa Included among the civilian names are 700 elementry school children who were killed when their evacuation ship was torpedoed by western forces Yasukuni also contains a shrine to the western victims of Japanese aggression, though it has been off limits to the public since 'threats' were made against it. Contention exists as to whether these threats were real, or whether they were fabricated 1,068 of the dead named in Yasukuni have been convicted of some form of war crimes, ranging from complicity or failure to prevent event, through to the purposeful murder of civilians 14 of the dead in Yasukuni have been classified as Class-A (the worst of the worst) war criminals. Their crimes include mass murder and facilitation of atrocities such as the Nanking massacre Although most of the Class-A war criminals were executed in 1948, or died in prison during the 1950s, they were not enshrined at Yasukuni until 1978. Due to the controversy surrounding it, their enshrinement was kept secret, both from the Emperor and the population at large. It did not become public knowledge until 6 months later, at which point it provoked outrage among the Japanese people. The 14 Class-A war criminals named at Yasukuni are as follows (name position, sentence): Tojo Hideki - General, Prime Minister (Hung by the neck until dead) Seishiro Itagaki- Officer, Architect of the "Manchurian Incident" (Hung by the neck until dead) Kimura Heitaro - Head of the Guandong Army, Architect of the Burma-Thai Railway (Hung by the neck until dead) Doihara Kenji - Officer, Intelligence operative, key architect of the "Manchurian Incident" (Hung by the neck until dead) Matsui Iwane - General, Officer held most responsible for the Nanking atrocities (Hung by the neck until dead) Muto Akira - Commander of the 2nd Imperial Guards (Hung by the neck until dead) Hirota Koki - Foreign Minister, Prime Minister (Hung by the neck until dead) Umezu Yoshijiro - Commander in Chief of the Japanese Army (Imprisoned until Death) Koiso Kuniaki - Governor General to Korea, Prime Minster (Imprisoned until Death) Hiranuma Ki'ichiro - Right Wing leader (Imprisoned until Death) Toshio Shiratori - Ambassador to Italy, adviser to the Foreign Minister (Imprisoned until Death) Togo Shigenori - Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister for Colonization (20 Years Imprisonment) Nagano Osami - Chief of Naval General Staff, Office held most responsible for Pearl Harbor (Death by heart attack before sentencing) Yosuke Matsuoka - Minister of Foreign Affair (Death by natural causes before sentencing) Bringing honour out of Dishonor Many Japanese opposed the war, but were silenced by the government of the time, who regarded them as being seditionist and traitors. Other's remained silent, but later came out to bear witness to what they saw, or to confess to the crimes that they either committed or failed to prevent. Such people include the late Azuma Shiro and Shinozuka Yoshio Azuma Shiro? Azuma Shiro, also known as the conscience of Japan, was present during some of Japan's worst atrocities, but did little to prevent them. After the war, he was driven by guilt and grief to publish "My Nanking Platoon", a collection of memoirs that recounted what he had seen, and what he had been made party to, during the war. Azuma visited China many times after the war, including visits to the Nanking, where he met with survivors and their decedents in an effort to make peace. "I used to hate the Japanese so much .... But when I saw the old Azuma in tears, bowing and kneeling before us in repentance, I couldn't hold back my tears" Jiang Fugen, Survivor, Nanking Massacre Azuma died on 3 January 2006. His passing war mourned by both China and Japan. "He was a warrior fighting for justice. He was a sincere friend of Chinese people" Jing Shenghong, Professor of History, Nanjing University See Also: Azuma Shiro Shinozuka Yoshio? During the war, Shinozuka was a member of Unit 731, a WMD development development unit that conducted chemical and biological weapons trials on human subjects in China. "[Unit 731] cruelly murdered human beings, first by caging them and then by killing them." Shinozuka Yoshio, Former Member of Unit 731 Unlike other members of the unit, who sought to make atonement for their crimes in private, Shinozuka fought to raise public awareness of the war crimes and atrocities committed by Unit 731. including the deliverance of key testimonies in support of 180 Chinese survives, and their families. He and was instrumental in a 2002 verdict, by Japanese courts, which denounced Unit 731, and indelibly recorded their actions as being "clearly inhumane" and the suffering that it caused as being "immense". "I was doing what I was told. And I might very well have been killed had I disobeyed. But what we did was so terrible that I should have refused, even if that meant my own death." Shinozuka Yoshio After the war, many member of Unit 731 were granted amnesty by the West in return for divulging data that they had gathered while conducting experiments on Chinese civilians. At the time, much of this data was at the cutting edge of the WMD industry. Original Entry: The Yasukuni Memos: Bringing the Past to Light

27.7.06 19:00 Permalink / comment

China – The worst in Asia Once again the figures are in and, once again, China rates as the largest single offender in Asia and the second largest offender in the world. According to newly released figures, China ranks just below the United States, is than twice as bad an offender as its nearest Asian Rival - South Korea - and is somewhere in the region of ten times worse than either Japan or the disputed island of Chinese-Taiwan. “But what exactly is China the worst in Asia at?” You might well ask. “The denial of history?”, “the censorship of the press?”, “the lack of transparency in its program of military modernization?”. Well... yes ...all of these are somewhat true, but they are not the particular topic which is being referred to on this occasion. According to a report released by the British based internet security firm Sophos, China ranks the largest single source of email spam in Asia. Throwing out a gargantuan 20 Percent of all global spam, and only narrowly avoiding the top spot; currently occupied by the US, which produces 23.2 Percent of the world's email spam. 1. United States 23.2% 2. China 20.0% 3. South Korea 7.5% 4. France 5.2% 5. Spain 4.8% 6. Poland 3.6% 7. Brazil 3.1% 8. Italy 3.0% 9. Germany 2.5% 10. United Kingdom 1.8% 11. Taiwan 1.7% 12. Japan 1.6% Victim or Aggressor? While Sophos's statistics appear pretty conclusive in labeling China as a threat to the global operation of the internet, experts with the firm have been quick to point out that while 20 percent of the world's spam is transmitted from computers within China, much of it does not actually originate from China. Instead, this spam is often foreign in origin, and is being relayed through Chinese computers by overseas 'Spam Gangs' who have used a variety malicious computer programs to compromise computers in Chinese homes, businesses and schools and to turn them into 'relay stations' for the propagation of commercially written spam.    “The vast majority of this spam is relayed by 'zombies', also known as botnet computers, hijacked by Trojan horses, worms and viruses under the control of hackers.” Sophos   A similar situation exists in Asia's number two Spammer, south Korea, where the number of 'always on' broadband connections, a lack of awareness of the need for firewall and virus protection, and the proliferation of 'unpatched' PCs – personal computers which have not been upgraded to include the latest security updates – are thought to be significantly to blame for much of the spam being sent out by the countries computers.   “Sophos recommends that computer users ensure they keep their security software up-to-date, as well as using a properly configured firewall and installing the latest operating system security patches.” Sophos   Ignoring and Ignorance Unlike the US, which has enacted 'aggressive' legislation allowing the prosecution of domestic companies that advertize through spam, that gather gather/sell email lists for spam, or who attempt to compromise personal computers for the purpose of using them to send spam, China enacted very few regulations and taken very little action against domestic individuals or entities involved in spam. It has also done little to educate users about the need to protect their personal computers from the viruses and 'Trogan Horse' computer programs that relay spam. Instead, much of China's internet legislation and enforcement efforts have been devoted towards online media censorship.   Original Article:  China – The worst in Asia

25.7.06 10:18 Permalink / comment

Global Freedom, or Giant Farce?: Legislating against the Censors Anybody who has even a passing interest in freedom of speech and China should well remember the rash of headlines that arose early in 2006, in which US companies stood accused of being complicit in acts of censorship overseas, and the embarrassment that was caused when it was admitted that the allegation were not only true, but that also that Congress was powerless to act against those involved. However, if outspoken Republican Representative Christopher Smith has anything to say about it, such headlines will soon be a thing of the past, and such companies will soon be able to be held accountable. Movement Since February 2006, Smith has been fighting hard for the approval of H.R.4780 - better known as “The Global Online Freedom Act”. A bill which is designed to prevent US companies from aiding repressive governments in internet censorship. Though not yet law, the bill, this Thursday, passed the first hurdle when it was given a unanimous green light by House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations. It is now waiting to passed up the chain to full committee level. Where its sponsors hope it will be cleared for a smooth passage onto the law books. Intent? If signed into law, the bill will set down a list of regulations governing the conduct of US internet and technology companies operating in China, and other environments where strict online censorship regimes exist, in order to ensure that they are 'part of the solution' and not 'part of the problem'. It is hoped that the bill will further the development of democracy and human rights, and frustrate countries that persist in censoring the internet, by depriving them of US technology and expertise. Forcing them to rely on more expensive solutions or lower grade domestic capabilities, and allowing their citizens increase access to information. Mixed Reception? Although the act is seen by its supporters as 'a brave new tool to further the cause of global freedom of speech', and has been welcomed by China watchers and human rights groups alike, some concerns have been raised about not only the bill, but also about its purpose. Unhelpful? Among those expressing concern have been industry watchers and corporations with interests in China's booming online market. Both of whom have expressed apprehension over the bill's potential to harm American company's ability to do business in/with China, by tying them down with regulation and restrictions that do not apply to their foreign competitors.    "If Yahoo isn't doing business in China, someone else will ...[further regulations are] putting American businesses at a disadvantage in the world marketplace." Sonia Arrison, Director of Technology Studies, Free-Market Pacific Research Institute   Other's who viewed the bill have expressed concern that it might force US companies to leave China, thus reducing any benefits that their presence might have held for the Chinese people, or that it could potentially provoke Beijing into putting in place further rounds of internet restrictions.    "[The approach taken by the Global Online Freedom Act] could provoke greater restrictions, or even the withdrawal of Internet services in China, which would leave the Chinese people with even less ability to access information and communicate with others." Jack Krumholz, Managing Director of Federal Government Affairs, Microsoft   Weak? While industry has criticized the proposed bill for being overly restrictive, some observers have voiced the opposite, and issued the criticizm that the bill doe not go far enough, and that it has been 'watered down'. In this light, it was duly noted that the bill no longer includes a clause that would provide US companies with a firm list of 'protected words and phrases' that could not be censored or filtered out, under, under any conditions of circumstances. Nevertheless, the bill has still been seen as an important step   "[Even though compromises have been made] we believe it's going to help make the Internet freer and help protect the privacy of users in repressive countries" Lucie Morillon, Spokesperson, Reporters Without Borders (RSF)   Hidden Agenda? In addition to criticism for being too strong or too weak, some observers have also expressed concern over the 'true motives' of the bill, and have voiced alarm that certain passages and sections appear to be aimed less at 'ensuring freedom of speech' and more at 'ensuring the promulgation of American Ideologies is not blocked by American companies'.    “This censorship by the Chinese Government promotes, perpetuates, and exacerbates a xenophobic--and at times particularly anti-American--Chinese nationalism, the long-term effect of which will be deleterious to United States efforts to prevent the relationship between the United States and China from becoming hostile.” Section 2, Article 12, H.R.4780   H.R.4780 - the Global Online Freedom Act? The Global Online Freedom Act is split into 4 distinct sections Section 1 contains official findings and definitions. Title I contains policy information and proposals to create a supervisors and regulatory body under which H.R.4780 will operate. Title II contains the the text of the bill (discussed below). Title II contains mandates on export controls relating to censorship. Below is a review and commentary on Title's II and III, which contain the main body of regulations that would be brought in under H.R.4780. Section 201 – Jurisdiction When found to be enforcing censorship or handing over user data to the Chinese government, both of which run counter to western ethics, one of the primary defenses offered by companies such as Google and Yahoo has been that they were required to do so by local law, and so had no choice but to comply.    "We are mindful that governments wherever we do business around the world impose restrictions on access to information and of course we are obliged by law to follow them." Debbie Frost, Spokesperson, Google   Section 201 aims to counter this defense by prohibiting US companies from running their services within Chinese legal jurisdiction.    "Any United States business that creates, provides, or hosts any Internet search engine or maintains an Internet content hosting service may not locate, within a designated Internet-restricting country, any computer hardware used to house, store, serve, or maintain files or other data involved in providing such search engine or content hosting service.” SEC. 201. PROTECTION OF SEARCH ENGINES AND CONTENT SERVICES.   Such legislation would legally prohibit US companies from operating ... A blog hosting service A web page hosting service An email service A message board service A file storage service .... inside Mainland China This would effectively prevent any US company from being forced to comply with local Chinese laws by preventing them from entering Chinese jurisdiction, but may force many companies not only to pull their operations centers out of Chinese territory, but also to pull their services out of the Chinese market. Under Chinese law, many services are prohibited from operating in 'an official capacity' in China, unless they maintain their hosting services in Mainland China, and are liable to be blocked for 'operating without authorization'; A euphemisms that commonly means 'operating without restrictions' Most services that have fallen foul of this are blogging services that offer free Chinese language accounts and search engines with Chinese language interfaces which are not subject to censorship. Skype, the internet telephony service, was also blocked in China for this reason. Such blocks are commonly put in place soon after a domestic Chinese competitor has been launched.   "For those foreign companies, if they are going to operate in China they have to abide by Chinese laws." Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson, foreign Ministry, China   Ironically, the list of ' Internet-restricting country', the countries to whom section 201 applies, does not include western nations such as France or Germany. Both of these countries require that web services operating in their territory to comply with strict regulations that bar the promotion, retail, or open discussion of a variety of elements relating to WWII and the Nazi. All of which are officially recognized as protected forms of speech and expression under the US constitution. This has lead some critics to voice that the bill appears only to be concerned with protecting type of free speech that 'harm or contradict' America's overseas economic and political rivals, rather than protecting 'the greater principles of free speech', as it constitutionally bound to do inside US territory. Section 202 – Search Engines While Section 201 was added in order to counter the 'local law' defense offered by the likes of Google and Yahoo - and applies to many companies in a variety of web based interests, including email and FTP service providers - Section 202 was added to deal directly with the problem of US search engines manipulating their search results to exclude sensitive topics at the bequest of governments like Beijing.    “Any United States business that creates, provides, or hosts any Internet search engine may not alter the operation of such search engine with respect to protected filter terms either-- (1) at the request of, or by reason of any other direct or indirect communication by, of a foreign official of an Internet-restricting country; or (2) in a manner intended or likely to produce different search engine results for users accessing the search engine from within an Internet-restricting country as compared to users elsewhere.” SEC. 202. INTEGRITY OF SEARCH ENGINES.   Under Section 202, companies may not Exclude protected words and phrases (for example, democracy or 'land rights') from their searches on request of a restrictive foreign government Amend their search engine to give preference to pages that show that government, their country, or any issues relating to them, a favorable light Award a lower preference to pages that show the above in an unfavorable light. This section would, for example, prevent Beijing from ordering a search engine to prevent users from locating pages documenting the Tiananmen Square Massacre, or from ensuring that the first X pages that the user found were tourist pages that excluded information in regards to the massacre.    “American IT companies who thrive on sharing information and ideas should not be complicit in aiding the repressive Chinese government in censoring and suppressing dissent” Chris Smith, Architect, H.R.4780   However, it is not yet clear exactly how Section 202 will deal with 'legitimate' acts of censorship for non political reasons. Under a 'strict interpretation' of section 202, a US search engine operating in China could be legally prohibited from honoring a request from Beijing to prohibit users from sexually explicit imagery, images of animal cruelty, or sites that openly encouraged, or celebrated, the murder of Chinese citizens. At this stage, it can be presumed that US federal law will be applied in situations where conflicts exist, though it has been acknowledge that federal law does permit numerous items that are prohibited, for legitimate and non political reasons, in more conservative countries. Including adult images and items of 'hate speech'. Section 203 – Public Record of Censorship Section 203 mandates that companies are no longer able to keep secret the censorship agreements that they make with 'Internet-restricting countries', and that they must report back to Washington on any agreements that they make to censo