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Bitting the Bullet (Train)
Beijing reacted angrily this week to suggestions that outgoing Japanese Prime minister 小泉純一郎 (Koizumi Junichiro) might attend the opening of the high speed rail link connecting Taipei and Kaohsiung, at the invitation of Taiwanese President 陳水扁 (Chen Shui Bian), accusing 陳(Chen) of extending the invitation as a political rouse.
Tow the Line
During an official press conference this Thursday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang issued a firm statement denouncing Chen's invitation to 小泉(Koizumi) as a thinly veiled move to draw Japan in between China and the disputed island of Chinese-Taiwan.
Qin also called on Tokyo to obey the “One China” Principle, and to be on guard for any overtures from from Mainland China's unwilling sibling that could be construed as secessionist.
| | “We firmly oppose any secessionist activities in the international community by the Taiwan Authorities under any name or any pretext.”
Qin Gang, Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China | |
Qin stopped short of saying what impact it would have on Sino-Japanese relations should the former Prime Minster choose to attend.
Officially 陳(Chen)'s invitation was extended in recognition of the former Japanese Prime Minister's efforts to reform the Japanese economy and to build deeper ties between Japan and the disputed island.
It is not clear whether he will attend the rail line.
A Matter of Face
It is not yet known whether Beijing has made formal representations to Tokyo over the issue. However, past precedent suggest that this is unlikely.
Beijing traditionally prefers to make such announcements to or through the media, rather than through diplomatic channels. Were Japan to ignore a request made through diplomatic channels, it would loose China considerably more face than if Japan were to disregard a statement made to the media.
In 2004, Tokyo humiliated Beijing when it refused state level demands to bar former Taiwanese Premier 李登輝 (Lee Teng Hui) from entering Japan on a tourist visa.
| | "Japan's agreeing to allow him to visit is itself a challenge to China's unification efforts and is a type of support for and indulgence of Taiwan's 'independence forces'."
Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry China (December 2004) | |
According to Japanese officials, the visit was 'purely personal' and there were no reasons for them to deny him a Visa, or to remove it after it had been issued.
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2008: A Mandate for Madness
In China, maintaining the right image is often everything, and nowhere is this more true, at this time, than in Beijing.
As the host city of the 2008 Olympic Games, Chinese authorities are going to great lengths to ensure that the city presents the the right image for the millions of foreign and domestic tourists who are expected to arrive. As such, authorities have embarked on a pronounced scheme of city beautification; planting trees, renovating buildings, and even signing far reaching ordinances banning multistory cranes from the cities skylines months prior to the opening of the Games.
Of course, these efforts have not been without controversy. There have been complaints over compulsory land requisitions and demolitions, the displacement of citizens to make way for public amenities, and the upgrading of facilities to such an extent that some have now left the price range of the average man on the street. There have even been accusations that city authorities might be on the verge of expelling hundreds of thousands of migrant workers for the duration of the games in case 'they make Beijing look untidy'. However, amidst all of this, a new controversy has now emerged.
According to reports, Beijing city authorities are planning to launch a crackdown on those suffering from mental illnesses and psychological conditions, in order to prevent them from causing 'harm to society' during the 2008. A euphemisms taken to mean 'portraying a side of Beijing that authorities would rather keep from tourists'.
It is currently unclear what kind of form such a crackdown would take, although the Chinese media has suggested that it may take the form of enforced institutionalization for the duration of the Games for people with a wide variety of disorders. It may also take the form of official orders forcing relatives of the mentally ill to confine them during certain hours, or forbidding them from entering certain regions of the city.
According to city officials, individual municipal authorities will be in charge of the crackdown.
| | “The city government plans to ask the municipal (council) to make a law about psychiatric health regulations aimed at providing mental health treatment and preventing mentally ill people from damaging the public interest.”
Zhou Jidong, Head of legal Affairs, Beijing City Government | |
Understandably, the prospect of a street sweeping exercise to remove the mentally ill from public view during the games, has has not been well received by mental health charities and human rights interests.
Based on past initiatives, it is unlikely that any crackdown will include a sustained treatment or rehabilitation program to care for the mentally ill once the games are over.
Secondary Agenda?
While Beijing has concerns over the effect that 'wondering mentally ill' may have on the image of the 2008 games, and mental health groups have concerns over the effect that a street sweeping exercise might have on the human rights of some of China's most vulnerable people, some China watchers have questioned whether Beijing might have more in mind that detaining.
In addition to detaining old people with dementia and young people with emotional difficulties, China watchers have questioned whether Beijing might be planning to use mental health laws as a means of detaining dissidents in order to prevent them from mounting public protests during the 2008 games, or from using the Games as a opportunity to meet with foreign journalists.
Extra Judicial Detention
Beijing has a known history of using 'mental illness' as a political tool to silence protesters, and has frequently acted to imprison persistent demonstrators using open ended mental health legislation, and of using the label of mental illness as a weapon to discredit its critics.
In one past case, human rights activist Wang Wanxing was detained on the June 3 1992, after he attempted to meet foreign journalist at Tiananmen Square, in order to discuss the massacre that took place there three years earlier.
Wang was committed to a mental institution run by the Chinese security forces in Beijing's Fangshan District, where he was detained until August 1999, when he was released on a trial basis. However, in December Wang requested permission to discuss his confinement with the media, at which point he was re-detained, finally being released in 2005. As a mental health prisoner, Wang was outside of the legal system, had no access to a lawyer, and his detention was not subject to judicial review. He was also detained on an open sentence, meaning that his incarceration had no upper time limit.
Officially, Wang was recorded as suffering from a condition known as "political monomania"; a mental illness under which sufferers experience dangerously obsessive paranoid delusions relating to political issues. This condition is not recognized as a mental disorder by the WHO.
According to an assessment made by Chinese psychologists, shortly before his release, Wang remained dangerously mentally ill, and required both detention and medication.
| | "[Wang] displays impairments of thought association and of mental logic. His systematic delusions have shown no conspicuous improvement since he was first admitted to the hospital, and his [mental] activities are still characterized by delusions of grandeur, litigation mania, and a conspicuously enhanced pathological will.
Psychological report, Fall 2005 | |
However, after his release in 2005, an independent team of experts, including European experts on mental illness and psychosis concluded that Wang was suffering from no detectable form of mental or physical illness other than those naturally associated with the stress of such an extended detention.
| | "There was no reason that Mr. Wang had to be locked up in a special forensic psychiatric hospital or to be admitted to any psychiatric facility.... We were not able to reveal any form of mental disorder: no signs of depression, psychosis or organic disorder."
Independent psychiatric report | |
Other cases include those of Liu Xinjuan and Hu Jia, both high profile activists.
In January 2006, Chinese security forces seized land rights activist Liu Xinjuan from Jing’an park, Shanghai, as she prepared to take a petition to the People’s Congress. After being interrogated at a Minhang District police station, she was transfered to the Beiqiao Psychiatric Hospital after authorities ruled that her protest were a sign that she was 'mentally unsound'. It was the fifth time in three years that authorities had detained Liu in a mental institution because eof her protests against forced evictions and abuse of land rights.
In mid 2004, Chinese security forces demanded that the family of AIDS activist Hu Jia commit him to a mental institution 'for evaluation', on the grounds that his health and human rights campaigning was a sign of mental illness. When Hu's family declined, he was involuntarily committed.
An unknown number, rumored to be several thousand, followers of the FLG spiritual movement, have also been forcefully institutionalized.
According to Human Rights Watch, as much as 15 percent of institutionalized Chinese have been detained for political reasons, rather than genuine mental health reasons. It is not clear if this figure includes FLG members, who are commonly detained under separate laws permitting them to be detained for up to two years 'reeducation' without trial or charge.
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The North Korea Question
When Chinese premier Hu Jintao came to power, Beijing promised that China was on a path to liberalization, and that it would allow increased freedom of speech. However, in the years that followed, Beijing has increased its efforts to crackdown on dissent, and has put in place one of the most sophisticatedly Internet blocking and policing systems in the world.
Later, when China was awarded the 2008 Olympic games, Beijing promise unprecedented openness and access for foreign media. It then redoubled efforts against dissidents to ensure that there is nothing for the foreign press to see when they arrive.
This month a Chinese spokesperson has announced that Beijing is 'absolutely against' the prospect of a nuclear armed North Korea and that it would do all that it could to draw Pyongyang onto the non-proliferation path. Given Beijing's past record, should we take this statement at face value?
Unusually, in this instance at least, the answer might just be yes. A key sign of this is appointment of Liu Xiaoming as the Chinese ambassador to the isolated Asian state.
Unlike China's previous representatives to North Korea Liu little experience with Sino-Asian affairs. He has also not played any significant part in the Sino-North Korean relationship, and he has no personal stakes sino-North Korean politics. Making him among the least pro-north Korean ambassador that china has yet appoint, and the most likely, so far, to take serious steps towards reigning North Korean activities.
As well as being an experience diplomat, Liu is also an expert in US relations, with experience in communications and fence mending between Beijing and Washington.
This has lead some China watchers to speculate that Beijing might now be willing to take a more direct approach to the US-North Korean situation, and to have specifically appointed Liu so that he could advise North Korea on how to correctly read and respond to US rhetoric, and on how to conduct their affairs without upsetting the US any more than strictly necessary.
When pressed on the topic, Beijing denied suggestions that Liu's history in Sino-US relations meant that he would be actively advising North Korea on how best to manage its relationship with America. Saying instead that Liu would work with North Korea on China's behalf, but that he wouldn't be exerting any influence beyond of his role as ambassador.
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“Ambassador Liu Xiaoming has long worked on China-US relations and once posted in the US. But if your conclusion is drawn on this basis, I am afraid it is not accurate”
Qin Gang, Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China. | |
Even if Liu is will not be actively involved in US-North Korean affairs, his experience in Sino-US diplomacy is likely to be an asset to China in multi-party negotiations.
| | "Liu's experience will be helpful in enhancing the triangle communications among China, North Korea and the US"
Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Relations, People's University, Beijing. | |
Liu Xiaoming?
Born in 1956, Liu and is a conservative who is affiliated with nationalist elements in Beijing. He is the former deputy director-general of Ministry of Foreign Affair's “North American and Oceania Affairs department” and has held two senior positions at China's US embassy.
Nuclear Concerns?
Although China has offered North Korea a great deal of political and economic support since its inception, and has frequently defied US foreign policy in its dealing with its fellow communist state, many analysts see it as being highly unlikely that Beijing would welcome the prospect of a nuclear armed North Korea, and even more unlikely that it would actively assist the North in developing either nuclear weapons, or the launch platforms necessary to carry them beyond Korea's borders, because of the 'difficulties' that a nuclear armed North Korea could cause for China.
A nuclear armed North Korea would draw 'unnecessary attention' to the Asia Pacific region, and could potentially instigate an arms race, particularly if it tipped the political balance in non-nuclear Japan: pushing it to begin its own nuclear program, or if it encouraged South Korea and Japan to invest heavily in anti-missile defenses systems.
Prospects?
While the prospect of a nuclear North Korea poses many long term problems, Beijing attention is likely to be focused on the two key periods either side of North Korea's nuclear boundary; the point at which it is confirmed that North Korea has nuclear capabilities.
Recriminations?
The first of these periods of concern is most worrying from a political perspective, and is the time immediately after the detonation of North Korea's first bomb.
During this time, the level of fear will be at its highest, and so will the risk that members of the international community could be panicked into making rash decisions. Equal to this is the fear that overseas conservative elements could hijacked the situation and use the resulting international confusion to:
1) Gain popular domestic support by branding their less conservative rivals as being weak on non-proliferation
2) Accuse countries that have urged a more moderate approach towards North Korea of 'allowing' North Korea to develop nuclear capabilities by persistently blocking conservative efforts to restrain the Pyongyang.
3) Accuse rival states of supplying North Korea with nuclear technology
4) Accuse rival states of trying to buy North Korean nuclear technology
As one of North Korea's key allies, China is likely to take the brunt of conservative accusations.
From Beijing's perspective, any accusations, or increased conservative power in foreign governments, could substantially 'muddy' the political water for China. Leading to increased Sino-global tension that would make it far hard harder for China to maintain a favorable international image, and potentially even to the imposition of sanctions or trade restrictions by conservative administrations.
Primarily, such concerns revolve around the already conservative government in Washington, which is host to a number of powerful China-hostile elements, and the moderate government in Japan, which is facing renewed threats from conservatives with a history of using the so-called China Threat as a recruiting tool.
There are also concerns over the reaction of the South Korean government and, to a lesser extent, the governments the European nations.
Drastic Measures?
The second of these times is most worrying from a military perspective, and is any period in which it appears as if North Korea is on the verge of perfecting a workable nuclear weapon, but has not yet done so.
During such a time there is likely to be a strong call from overseas conservative elements for distinct action to be taken to prevent North Korea from developing the Bomb.
These calls would likely include demands for a preemptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities. Any strike against North Korea would, at best, destabilize the region and, at worst, lead to a full scale nuclear war on China's border.
Deadlock
Ongoing 6 nation Non-proliferation, aimed at drawing North Korea away from a nuclear path became deadlocked in November 2005, due to a disagreements over the scope of discussions.
North Korea refused to participate further unless the scope of negotiations was widened to include other, non-nuclear, topics. Including the issue of sanctions that have been laid against international groups who have defied the US by trading with the isolated Asian state. While the US has refused to link the issue of third party sanctions to nuclear negotiations, and declined to offer the North any solid incentives to give up its nuclear program. Instead offering further sanctions if the North did not comply.
Missed Opportunity?
Prior to the breakdown of talks, North Korea offered to suspend a number of its nuclear/missile related activities in exchange for a mutual non aggression pact with the US.
Such a pact would have removed the threat to the US from North Korea's weapon, but would also have made it legally impossible for the Washington to launch any form of preemptive strike against North Korea, and would have prevented it from engineer regime change as it has previously done in states such as Iraq and Guatemala.
At the time that the offer was made, North Korea's nuclear program and missile capabilities were less advanced than they are today, and they were not considered to pose such a threat to the US. Leading Washington to turned the North down.
(Un)willing Partner?
At present, China is bound by a “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” with North Korea. Signed in 1961 this treaty compels China to act in North Korea's defense if it is threatened by an outside force.
Beijing recently reaffirmed its commitment to upholding the treaty.
| | “This year marks the 45th anniversary of Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and the DPRK. The treaty has played an important role in promoting friendship and cooperation between China and the DPRK. China will continue to work with the DPRK in the treaty's spirit to put forward the development of bilateral good-neighborly and friendly cooperation and safeguard regional peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula is the departure point from which China handles the issues on the Korean Peninsula. China is ready to make concerted effort with other parties.”
Qin Gang (5 September 2006) | | Original Article: The North Korea Question
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Less than Nobel Actions: Beijing Attacks the Peace Prize
In a controversial move that is not likely to win Beijing any sympathy in the international community, Beijing has this week launched a furious statement on the Nobel Peace Prize, attacking both a noted nominee for this years award, and the system used to select her.
In a statement released this Tuesday, Beijing accused exiled Nobel Preace Prize nominee Rebiya Kadeer of being a separatist, a supporter of terrorism, and a member of the internationally prescribed East Turkestan Islamic Movement - an Islamic body opposed to Han Chinese rule in Kadeer's homeland.
| | "she connives with terrorist forces abroad and engages in anti-Chinese secessionist movements that are attempting to separate Xinjiang from China."
Qin Gang, Sokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China | |
Controversially, Beijing used its statement against Kabeer to attacked the Nobel nomination process. calling into question the motives of those who nominated her and implying that they harbored an alternative – Anti-China - agenda in doing so.
| | "I would like to ask the intention of those who nominate her as a candidate."
Qin Gang | |
According to Annelie Enochson, a member of the Swedish national parliament, Kadeer was nominated for her work to raise to protect human rights in East Turkestan.
| | "[She] has shown unparalleled courage in opposing the Chinese authorities' repressive policies...... Her fight has been like that of Dalai Lama and I know no other person now more worthy of the prize."
Annelie Enochson, Member of Parliament, Sweden | |
From Rags to Riches to Prison Overalls
Despite being born into a poor family, Kadeer rose to become one of East Turkistan's wealthiest business people after she started a laundry service and used the profits to form the Akida Trading Company and to build the Rebiya Kadeer department store in Urumqi. In 1994 Forbes magazine listed her as being the 11th richest person in China.
She served as the Vice Chairperson of the Xinjiang (East Turkestan) Region Chamber of Commerce and the Vice President of the Xinjiang (East Turkestan) Women Entrepreneurs Association. She also founded the 1,000 Families Mothers Project, a not-for-profit initiative designed to enable ethnic Uyghur women to start their own local businesses.
Kadeer served on the 中国人民政治协商会 (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) as a representative for Xinjiang (East Turkestan), but was forced out in 1998 after she refused to condemn her husband, living in exile in the US, after he made statements that were critical of the Chinese government.
In 1999, she was detained under article 4 of China's state security laws and, in 2000, she was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment for "illegally providing intelligence to a foreign organization in an attempt to divide and overthrow the state."
| | "She was arrested for endangering national security and sentenced"
Qin Gang | |
The charges against her related to a series of articles that she had cut from Chinese newspapers and posted to her exiled husband.
Kadeer was freed in March 2005 and sent into exile in the US. Officially, her release was on medical grounds and is in relation to a heart condition that she was suffering from. Her release came after a period of pressure from the US, which threatened to table a motion against China at the UN Human Rights Commission.
After her release, the US dropped the motion.
At the time of her detention, Kadeer had been attempting to meet with an American delegation investigating the treatment of Xinjiang (East Turkestan) by Han authorities.
Kadeer was awarded the Rafto Human Rights Award in 2004 for her work to publicize the names of prisoners who who received politically motivated death sentences. She shares her Nobel nomination with 161 others.
State Security Law of the People's Republic of China?
| | Article 4)
Any organization or individual that has committed any act endangering the State security of the People's Republic of China shall be prosecuted according to law.
"Act endangering State security" as referred to in this Law means any of the following acts endangering the State security of the People's Republic of China committed by institutions, organizations or individuals outside the territory of the People's Republic of China, or, by other persons under the instigation or financial support of the afore-mentioned institutions, organizations or individuals, or, by organizations or individuals within the territory in collusion with institutions, organizations or individuals outside the territory:
(1) plotting to subvert the government, dismember the State or overthrow the socialist system;
(2) joining an espionage organization or accepting a mission assigned by an espionage organization or by its agent;
(3) stealing, secretly gathering, buying, or unlawfully providing State secrets;
(4) instigating, luring or bribing a State functionary to turn traitor; or
(5) committing any other act of sabotage endangering State security.
State Security Law of the People's Republic of China | |
Chinese laws allows Beijing to classify publicly available information, including information previously released by the state or published in newspapers, as being a state secret. Original Article: Less than Nobel Actions: Beijing Attacks the Peace Prize
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Cannes, it rhymes with Bans.
Once again it's that time of year (OK, so its a bit after that time of year). Bringing with it the three familiar certainties the Cannes film festival: Good movies, star studded parties and retribution from the Chinese government.
This year it is director Lou Ye's turn to face Beijing's wrath.
High Treason
For the crime of submitting his latest film "Summer Palace" to Cannes, without approval from the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television - the government run agency that is in charge of audio and video censorship in China - Renowned Chinese director Lou Ye has been banned from film making in for 5 years.
Nai An, "Summer Palace"'s producer, has also been banned from making films for the same length of time.
Prior to its release, it was reported that Summer Palace would not be screening at Cannes because Lou did not wish to harm his chances of releasing the movie domestically.
Summer Palace
Sumer Palace is a complex love story about a young country girl name Yu Hong who enters into an intense relationship with a fellow student during a time of great social and political upheaval in Mainland China.
| | "I opened my photo album today.
I saw a picture of Zhou Wei.
My heart raced again.
One look at him
and I felt the joy and the pain.
Staring at his face
I asked myself,
On such a calm and open face,
all rectitude and resolution,
how is it that I couldn't see a trace,
not a shadow, that could make me doubt?
Why is it that no matter what this man had said to me, or what he had done to me, I do not really care, my heart still belongs to him?"
Summer Palace | |
According to Lou, the film was partly autobiographical, and reflects on his own experiences as a student in Beijing during the time which Summer Palace is set.
| | "I wanted to tell this story, because in 1989 I was myself a student at Peking University and was involved in a romance"
Lou Ye, Director, China | |
Explanations?
Officially, Chinese authorities maintain the Lou was banned from film making for disseminating a movie that had not been granted official approval for distribution, while Chinese censors maintain that they refused to allow the film to be submitted to Cannes on the grounds that Lou had used an experimental soft lens technique which Beijing did not believe met quality requirements for a film representing China.
Unofficially, however, observers believe that the ban may have more to do with the fact that Summer Palace was set against the backdrop of the pro-democracy and pro-reform movements of the 1980s, which culminated in the government backed extermination of student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.
The film also included a number of 'intimate' scenes, which would not have helped matters.
Technicalities?
According to media reports, Summer Palace was submitted twice to Chinese censors. Both times the film was rejected on technical grounds. The first time the film was rejected after claims were made against its technical quality, and the second time censors refused to view it because it was not submitted on the correct type of physical medium.
Total Censorship
As is traditional, Lou's punishment received little recognition in China, where the government frequently acts to suppress news about banned movies or directors in case that news encourages people to discuss the film, or to question why it was banned.
In accordance with this ban, Chinese stores have been warned ' not to stock' Summer Palace, and media outlets were restricted to only printing approved versions of events and approved reviews of the film.
Take 2
Lou was previously banned from film making for 2 years in 2000, after his film Suzhou River angered Chinese authorities.
Suzhou River was screened at the 1999 Rotterdam International Film Festival, where it won the Tiger award and at the 2000 Paris Film Festival, where it won the Grand Prix award. Original Article: Cannes, it rhymes with Bans.
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Rhetoric, Red faces and Retribution
Like it or not, China is now a significant world power.
Years of double digit economic growth, a policy of investment and expansion 'without conscience', not to mention a penchant for buying US dept, now mean that China now commands a fair amount of influence, an dis capable of bribing or bullying a lot of countries into doing a lot of things.
However, there appears to be one small area in which China is all but powerless. One area in which it has no influence, no matter how hard it tries. This being the area of the Dali Lama.
In recent years, China has warned everybody, from established power like as America and Britain, to emerging nations like Lithuania, to 'refrain' from having any dealings with the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader. Much to China's chagrin, most countries have resolutely ignored these warning.
The latest country to ignore Chinese demands is Mongolia, which is currently hosting the Dali Lama.
Arrival?
The Dali Lama arrived in Mongolia this Monday, and kicked off his visit, by speaking at Gandantegchenlin, Mongolia's largest monastery, where he was greeted by a crowd of several thousand Mongolian supporters.
According to his retinue, the Dali Lama's visit is purely religious in nature, and will not be used to further the cause of Tibetan independence.
| | "There is no political agenda to this visit. He's a Buddhist. He's going to give Buddhist teachings. The Chinese are welcome to come to Mongolia and look at the visit themselves"
Tenzin Takla, Spokesperson, Retinue of the Dalai Lama. | |
It has been estimated that around 90 percent of Mongolia's population follow Tibetan Buddhism.
His visit, the seventh since 1979, is expected to last for a week. Due to the sensitive nature of the exiled leader, details of his arrival and itinerary were kept secret until a matter of days before the event.
Chinese Fury
As has now become traditional, Beijing quickly responded to international reports on the Dali Lama's visit by issuing a statement calling on other countries to refrain from hosting the Dali Lama, or engaging with him in any other way.
| | "[We are] resolutely opposed to any country offering [the Dali Lama] a stage"
Foreign Ministry, China | |
Beijing's statement was highly critical of the exiled Tibetan, and denounced him as a separatist who was seeking to destabilize and divide China.
| | "The Dali Lama is not merely a religious figure, but a political exile who over a lengthy period has engaged in splittist activities and hurt national unity"
Foreign Ministry, China | |
As is also traditional, Beijing statement was made to the international press but was purposefully kept out of much of China's domestic media.
This is standard practice in China, were the state often acts to suppress stories that show foreign governments openly defying Beijing where such defiance might cause Chinese citizens to ask questions that the government does not want to answer, or where it would loose the government face to admint that such defiance existed.
Retribution?
Although officials in Beijing reacted with unconcealed anger to the Lama's visit, the response from the Chinese embassy in Mongolia was somewhat calmer.
When questioned about the Lama's visit, embassy officials appeared to conquer with reassurances from Tibet and Mongolia, that the visit was 'non-political' in nature, and voiced that they had no plans to add to previous Tibetan or Mongolian statements on the issue, and no plans to lodge an official protest with Mongolian authorities over the visit.
| | "We do not have any additional statements or comments on the issue at present"
Spokesperson, Chinese Embassy, Mongolia | |
However, embassy officials neither confirmed nor denied that Beijing planned to take retaliatory measures against Mongolia for openly defying China by allowing the visit to go ahead.
During the Dali Lama's last visit to Mongolia, in November 2002, China responded by temporarily closing its borders. Briefly halting trade and disrupting transportation links between the two countries. China later confirmed that a number of trains had been delayed at the border, but denied that it had closed the border.
| | "The border has not been closed. There is no such case. I don't know where you get this report"
Kong Quan, Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China (2002) | |
According to Chinese border officials, the trains had been delayed due to 'maintenance work' that was being carried out. These 'Delays' lasted for two days.
'Coincidentally', it has been reported that Air China flights between Beijing and the Mongolian capital Ulan Bator (Ulaanbaatar), were temporarily suspended yesterday. With the morning service not leaving until late evening
Officially, this was due to adverse weather conditions. However, weather reports indicate that the route was free from bad weather and there were clear skies between the two cities.
Separatism?
In contradiction to statements from Beijing, the Dali Lama no longer advocates separatism, and has not done so for many years. Instead, he has stated the belief that Tibet's interests would be best served by being an autonomous state within 'Greater China', rather than an independent state outside of China.
| | "I am not seeking independence. I am seeking self-rule. I think that benefits both Chinese and Tibetan people"
Dali Lama | |
This is commonly known as 'the middle way'.
Autonomy?
Despite allowing them to save face and to retain China's current borders, the idea of Tibet having autonomy within China is largely viewed as being 'unacceptable' by Chinese officials, and Beijing has publicly dismissed such overtures and compromises from the Lama as being a 'smokescreen for independence' that would see Tibet claiming Chinese land to form a Tibetan state that 'has no basis in history'.
| | "Knowing that his separatist stance has no place in the world today where peace and development prevail, the Dalai Lama now adopts a new strategy of playing down separatist sentiments while trumpeting the highest degree of autonomy of the so-called 'greater Tibet'..... The Dalai Lama's concept of 'greater Tibet' which includes other areas inside the Chinese territory inhabited by Tibetans, has never been formed in history"
Legqog, Regional Chairman, Tibet (Speaking in regard to the Dali Lama's visit to Mongolia in 2002) | |
Were Beijing to grant Tibet 'true' autonomy within China, it would mean granting Tibet the right to retain its own culture, traditions and national identity. Something which Beijing refuses to do at present because all of the above are distinctly different from China's dominant Han culture, and demonstrate the fact that a high level of separation exists between the two regions.
State of Play
Officially, Tibet is guaranteed a high level of independence under Section 6 of Chinese constitution. Which provides the sub state with the legal right to maintain its own cultural and religious identity under the auspices of their respective regional governments.
| | 民族自治地方的自治机关自主地管理本地方的教育、科学、文化、卫生、体育事业，保护和整理民族的文化遗产，发展和繁荣民族文化。
第一百一十九条, 第六节, 中华人民共和国宪法
The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas independently administer educational, scientific, cultural, public health and physical culture affairs in their respective areas, sort out and protect the cultural legacy of the nationalities and work for the development and prosperity of their cultures.
Article 119, Section 6, Constitution, China | |
To date, Beijing maintains that Tibetan culture and traditions have been fully respected and supported by the local admnistration and by Beijing.
| | "In the past 40 years or so, Tibet has inherited and developed its cultural heritage, Tibetan customs and religions have been fully respected, and people have enjoyed full freedom of religious faith"
Xinhua, State Controlled media agency, China | |
However, despite reassurances over Tibet, it is the position of the Chinese government and the government of Tibet, which is directly appointed by the Chinese government, that many elements of Tibetan culture and religion are 'dangerous symbols of Tibetan nationalism' and should be either be irradiated or re molded into a more 'acceptable' form.
As such Beijing has long acted to push Tibetans into taking on Han traits imported from China proper. Claiming that they are 'encouraging' Tibetans to advance by discarding their own 'outdated cultural epitaphs' in favor of 'more advanced' Chinese practices.
To assist in this effort, Beijing routinely bans any aspects of Tibet’s indigenous culture that separates Tibetan and Chinese identities, or which Beijing fears could be used to encourage Tibetan nationalism. Such restrictions include a blanket prohibition on the possession of images of the Dali Lama, or a recording of his voice.
In reality, the only aspects of traditional Tibetan culture which are allowed to be practiced freely in Tibet are often those which can be used to:
A) Promote tourism
B) Propagate the idea that Tibetan traditions are ‘relics of the past’ that belong in museums and bare no relevance to the people. Original Article: Rhetoric, Red faces and Retribution
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Silent Witness
After a brief lull, it would appear that the ongoing problem of Western companies aiding in Chinese internet censorship is, one again, back in the news. This time, care of a newly released report denouncing a number of companies who have ditched democratic ideals in favor of the dollar.
However, while reports of this nature are nothing new, what makes this latest instance unusual, is that it neither originate from anti-China elements in Washington, nor from a Western Human Rights organisations.
Instead, it comes directly from the highest levels of the British Government.
| “We conclude that the collaboration of Western internet companies in the censorship and policing of the internet for political purposes is morally unacceptable.”
Foreign Affairs Select Committee (HC-860-I), 13 August 2006 |
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HC-860-I?
Although it was not aimed exclusively at China, or at censorship, the report, released this Sunday by Britain's Foreign Affairs Select Committee, blasted China for its suppression of freedom of speech on the web, and drew attention to a number of high profile cases in which Western technology companies had collaborated with Beijing, by censoring their services in ways that either prevent users from speaking out against the Chinese Government, or prevented them from discovering that others had done so.
| “several Western internet companies have recently adapted their products in order to gain access to the Chinese market,by developing technology which censors their web-browsers in accordance with government diktat.”
Foreign Affairs Select Committee (HC-860-I), 13 August 2006 |
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Additionally the report highlighted instances in which Western companies, such as Yahoo, had handed over the personal details dissidents to Beijing. Thus allowing the Chinese government to prosecute them.
| “[Yahoo provided Beijing with details on the] journalist Shi Tao at the request of the Chinese authorities, leading to his arrest and sentencing for posting on the internet an internal Communist Party minute”
Foreign Affairs Select Committee (HC-860-I), 13 August 2006 |
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A full version of the report can be downloaded HERE
Exclusions?
While the report was notable for the including such criticism, it was, however, also notable for what it excluded.
Not only did the report failed to address the growing problem of 'homegrown' China's efforts censor the internet, it also failed, almost completely, to even acknowledge that they existence.
Creating the impression, to the uninitiated at least, that domestic Chinese censorship efforts either did not exist, or were not considered important enough to warrant British concerns.
Efforts that were not in the report included
- Legislation mandating that all Chinese must register their full name and address, along with relevant URLs, if they maintain a blog or other website
- The creation of a mandatory ID card based system that automatically ties the content viewed in web cafes to their real world identity
- The state mandated deletion of message board content that conflict with the state line on history, society or politics
- The employment of specialist operative to seed message boards with comments that support the government and denounce those who do not
- Legislation making intent cafe owners and message board administrators responsible for the online actions of their customers if they go against the state.
Notably, the report also concentrated exclusively on software and service providers. Ignoring the fact that much of China's censorship, particularly censorship involving the blocking of website, is actually hardware based.
As such, it failed to name companies such as Cisco Systems, which have provided both the advanced router technology used by Beijing to block website, and the training necessary to use it effectively.
Coincidentally, all of the companies specifically as being offenders, were American owned. No European companies were named as being guilty or complicit.
Words?
Although the HC-860-I recommended that the Blair administration put pressure on China to reduce the number of restrictions placed on its web users, it did not recommend a more thought follow-up investigation. It also stopped short of suggesting that legislation be tabled to penalize British companies if they were found to be complicit in Chinese internet censorship.
| “We recommend that the Government put pressure on the Chinese government to relax its censorship of the internet and its requirement for foreign companies to restrict the political content of their pages. We further recommend that the Government represent to the Chinese authorities the damage which is done to economic growth by continued restriction of the free flow of information.”
Foreign Affairs Select Committee (HC-860-I), 13 August 2006 |
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Historically, Britain has always taken a 'moderate approach' to China. Preferring political engagement and inclusionism ove legislation and confrontation. Making the prospect of Britain passing any substantive measures against China, or against companies who are complicit in Chinese censorship, remote at best.
As things stand, Britain has little diplomatic or economic influence over China. Giving it few tools with which to “put pressure on the Chinese government“, and observers have voiced the opinion that 'Pointing out the errors of its ways' has never been an effective tool where China is concerned.
Traditionally, China responds to such measures by means of a statement. calling on foreign governments to 'cease meddling in China's internal affairds'.
Deeds?
While the British Foreign Affairs Select Committee offered strong criticism of collaborating companies, but little more, moves are already underway in the US to introduce more concrete measures to combat Western complicity in Chinese online censorship.
These moves include the tabling of HR 4780 - The Global Online Freedom Act of 2006 - which was successfully launched to committee level in February 2006
The bill was tabled by Republican representative for New Jersey Christopher Smith and, if successful, will allow Washington to levy heavy fiscal sanctions against any US company involved in overseas censorship.
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“To promote freedom of expression on the Internet, to protect United States businesses from coercion to participate in repression by authoritarian foreign governments, and for other purposes.“
Objective, Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, (HR 4780) |
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Though welcomed by some, HR 4780 has been critisized by human rights interests for being a 'compromise deal', and by industry for industry groups as being 'yet more legislation that serves to make US businesses less effective in the face of foreign competition'
| "If Yahoo isn't doing business in China, someone else will ...[further regulations are] putting American businesses at a disadvantage in the world marketplace."
Sonia Arrison, Director of Technology Studies, Free-Market Pacific Research Institute |
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For a detailed breakdown of HR 4780, please click HERE :
The Foreign Affairs Select Committee?
The Foreign Affairs Select Committee is a 14 person committee operating under the auspices of the 'House of Commons'; The lower house of the British Parliament.
It is responsible for reporting back to the government on external issues, including Britain's foreign policy and on international human rights.
All of its members are appointed by the Government. However, a person must have first been elected as a Member of Parliament, through direct elections, before they can join the committee.
Current members of the committee are
- Mike Gapes - Chairman (Labour)
- Fabian Hamilton (Labour)
- Andrew Mackinlay (Labour)
- Sandra Osborne (Labour)
- Greg Pope (Labour)
- Eric Illsley (Labour)
- Ken Purchase (Labour)
- Gisela Stuart (Labour)
- John Horam (Conservative)
- John Maples (Conservative)
- Sir John Stanley (Conservative)
- Andrew MacKay (Conservative)
- Paul Keetch (Liberal Democrat)
- Richard Younger-Ross (Liberal Democrat)
Original Article: Silent Witness
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