angrychineseblogger - @ 20six.co.uk

A statement made through Chinese embassies on 10 May 2006, in an attempt to discredit the FLG spiritual movement, and to justify justify it's banning.

Statement on the evil essence of [FLG]:
Why did China ban it? (10-05-2006)

The evil essence of [FLG] roots in its cult doctrine, which preaches the Falun Dafa (the Basic Law of Wheel of the Universe) that laymen can, through psychological meditation, form invisible magic wheels inside their bodies, and with the wheels revolving, cure their illness without medical treatment, eventually be converted into some kinds of supermen, obtaining the supernatural powers of telepathy, teleportation and so on.

Tragedies have happened that ruined plenty of people's life and caused serious social disorder, as obsessed practitioners deserted their jobs and families, died of illness by rejecting medical treatment but hoping for the Wheel's salvation, committed suicide by cutting open their abdomens to see whether the Wheels were formed or burning themselves in order to "be raised to nirvana", and even murdered their families who tried to persuade them to go back to normalcy. The victims of the Divine Wheel amount to nearly two thousand.

Those appalling consequences caused by absolutely mind control, strongly demonstrate [FLG]'s anti-social and antihuman characteristics, and should beyond doubt result in personal criminal liabilities and organization disbandment according to criminal law of every single modern society.

The statements comes in direct contradiction to the Chinese constitution

"中华人民共和国公民有宗教信仰自由。任何国家机关、社会团体和个人不得强制公民信仰宗教或者不信仰宗教，不得歧视信仰宗教的公民和不信仰宗教的公民。
国家保护正常的宗教活动。任何人不得利用宗教进行破坏社会秩序、损害公民身体健康、妨碍国家教育制度的活动。宗教团体和宗教事务不受外国势力的支配。"

"Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order,
impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to
any foreign domination."

Section 2, Article 36, Constitution, China

Original Article: Talking Point: Chinese statement on the banning of the FLG spiritual movement

2.6.06 15:32

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The History of the Tiananmen Square Massacre - in 3 Minutes (Video)

“4 June 1989 “ is a date that must never be forgotten.

It is the day that the Government of the People's Republic of China
ordered armed soldiers to march against peaceful protesters, leaving
hundreds, possibly thousands, dead, in one of the most infamous events
of modern times. The Tiananmen Square Massacre.

For your education and viewing pleasure, a brief video explaining the events that lead to the massacre, and depicting the horror that unfolded as the tanks rolled in, in a way that is still forbidden in Mainland China.

Be sure to have your speakers turned up “good and loud“ for the finale.

Be sad
Be Angry
Even Be in Denial

But Never Forget.

Original Article: The History of the Tiananmen Square Massacre - in 3 Minutes (Video)

2.6.06 15:32

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Banned on the Mainland:

It looks as if one of 2006's most controversial films is set to follow in the footsteps such memorable productions as “Memoirs of a Geisha” and “Seven Years in Tibet”, by becoming one of the myriad of films and books to be “Banned on the Mainland”.

In an unusual move, Beijing has, this week, sent out an official order to theatres, ordering them to cease screening the controversial film "The Da Vinci Code", and to hand over their master reals to authorized agents post haste.

"All copies [of the Da Vinci Code] have been retrieved. We have not been told of the reason"

Official, Shanghai Film Art Center.

The order, which took effect on 9 June, came as a complete surprise to many theatre owners, and came without any official explanation.

Unusual Disappearances?

Although it is common common for both domestic and foreign films to be banned in China for 'political reasons', this weeks banning of “Da Vinci” has created a particular stir among China watchers because the films had previously been granted it permission to be screened.

The issue is made all the more perplexing, by the fact that the film wasn't new to China. Indeed, it had been on general release for three weeks.

The banning is also made all the more unusual by the fact that “Da Vinci” passed through state censors without a single scene being cut. A feat which it did not achieve in many more liberal countries.

The Film That Did Not Exist?

In addition to ordering the film to be removed from theatres, Beijing also issued a compulsory banning notice prohibiting media groups from acknowledging the existence in any film in any way, shape or forms. Effectively erasing the film from existence in China except outside of press releases distributed by Xinhua, China's state controlled media agency..

"The notice ordered us not to comment, discuss the film or even mention the name of the movie in any form in print"

Media Spokesperson, China

Such action is standard practice in China, which commonly acts to ensure that anything that is banned films cannot be discussed.

Often this is to prevent the issues raised in a banned production from being discussed, or to prevent the reasons/legitimacy of their banning being debated.

At this point, it remains unclear how far the ban will extend, and whether it will apply to existing postings Chinese language message board. It also remains unclear whether the ban will be permanent, or if it is in relation to a transitory.

Conspiracy?

While no formal reason has been issued for the banning of “Da Vinci”, a number of hypothesis have emerged, including suggestions that Beijing might be responding to a call for the films removal that was made by China's state controlled Christian churches.

However China watchers have voiced that it would be 'highly unusual' for the state to act on a request from the church. Usually, the flow of influence run in the opposite direction.

Another idea put forward was that Beijing might have become 'concerned' that “Da Vinci” could cause Chinese to become more interested in the its subject matter, namely Christianity, or that that the conspiratorially nature of the film might inspire Chinese to become more inquisitive about the nature of what they have been told by the government.

Other, more conventional, suggestions have been put forward too. Including that Beijing might have had reservations over the film's depiction of self-torture and 'romantic interludes', in which case a censored version of the film may be released at a later date, or that that the banning order might be in relation to a disagreement over copyright fees or distribution rights.

As yet, little firm evidence exists to support any of these ideas.

The Numbers Game

Before it's banning, “Da Vinci” was expected to bring in between 40 and 60 Million Yuan in ticket sales.

"The Da Vinci Code," a Hollywood blockbuster adapted from Dan Brown's best-seller, has swept Chinese audience over its opening weekend.

Insiders said that box office revenue might have hit nearly 40 million yuan (5 million U.S. dollars) on the Chinese mainland since its release on Friday.”

Xinhua English Language Service (22 May 2006). Link

To date, over 500,000 copies of the book have been sold in China.

Original Article: Banned on the Mainland: "The Da Vinci Code"

8.6.06 20:53

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"Japanese sons of B*tches"

Although it is a taboo that it is not often spoken of in public, or at least in the presence of foreigners, one of the key dynamics in the turbulent Sino-Japanese relationship has always been Japan's close post-war relationship with the US.

When it comes to this particular point of international affairs, the Chinese people have express a full range of emotions, including:

Consternation - that American troops sit on Japanese islands, ready to interviene in any future conflict over the disputed island of Chinese-Taiwan.

Confusion - as to why Washington is, today, more concerned with China's current misdeeds than Japan's past crimes.

Anger - that Washington chose to side with Tokyo; its mortal wartime enemy, over Beijing; its former ally.

Envy - over the prosperity and international acceptance that its relationship with America has brought Japan

And even sadness - over the fact that Japan, China's estranged Asian brother, still remains partially under America's very western heal.

However, the relationship between Washington and Tokyo has not always been as close as many Chinese believe, and Japan's post-war policies have not always been as America-lead as Chinese history records.

A Difference of Opinions

Historically, there have long been a great many 'differences of opinion' between Tokyo and Washington over the former's policies which, at best, could be described as enmity, and at worst, as open hostility.

Unsurprisingly, the focus of these has often been Japanese ties with China.

Surprisingly though, and in contrary to what many people might expect, many of these 'differences of opinion' have not been about Japan's poor relationship with China. Quite the opposite in fact.

Indeed, one of the most serious historical US-Japanese political splits was brought about by Japanese efforts to normalize relations with China. At a time when it was US policy to isolate the Communist Government on Mainland China, in favor of the pro-capitalist, yet undemocratic, pseudo-military government on Chinese-Taiwan.

The latter of which states Washington maintained was 'the only true China'.

Dirty Laundry

Though they feature little in today's political cimate, the existence of these 'differences of opinion' over China were brought into the sharp focus late last month, with the release of a catalog of previously classified transcripts transcripts in which one of America's most senior officials - US National Security Advisor Heinz “Henry” Kissinger - which reveal that, as far as he was concerned, the Japanese were a pack of 'treacherous pro-Chinese dogs and liars' who were bent both on humiliating him, and 'collapsing US Asia Pacific policy' for their own ends.

"Of all the treacherous sons of bitches, the Japs take the cake"

Heinz “Henry” Kissinger, National Security Advisor (1969-1974), US

According to records, Kissinger's outburst was made in mid 1972, when it was revealed to him that Japanese Prime Minister 田中角栄 (Tanaka Kakuei) was about to actively defy US foreign policy - which Japan had closely followed since its unconditional surrender to the US in 1945 - by entering into direct talks with Beijing over the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Describing Japanese reconciliation efforts as being conducted with 'indecently hasty', a term taken to mean that they were conducted 'without consultation, or permission, form Washington', Kissinger is also reported to have expressed extreme consternation that Japanese representatives initially wished their meeting with China to take place on “National Day”.

"It's not just their indecent haste in normalizing relations with China, but they even picked National Day as their preference to go there”

Heinz “Henry” Kissinger

National Day is synonymous with the Communist takeover of Mainland China.

As a result of this announcement, Kissinger refused to consult with Japanese officials over the agenda for 田中 (Tanaka)'s meeting. A decision which served to further limit US influence in the Sino-Japanese reconciliation process.

Had he not refused, it is possible that Kissinger may have been able to persuade Japan to reconsider, or tone down their offer to China. In which case Japan may not have normalized relations with at that juncture, and may have followed the US in maintaining an anti-China stance.

History - Japan?

Although America made early moves to reconcile with China in February 1972, US approaches stopped short of offering any permanent solutions to Sino-US issues, and did not include an acceptable offer of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Washington had banked on Japan following behind the US, lending strength to the US position. Allowing it to more readily pressure China into making compromises.

However, the US position was significantly undermined when, in August 1972, Japanese Prime Minister 田中角栄 (Tanaka Kakuei) unilaterally moved to offer China significantly more than the US. Including transferring full diplomatic recognition from Taipei; the capitol of Chinese-Taiwan, to Beijing; the capitol of Mainland China, and a commitment to recognize Chinese-Taiwan as an 'inalienable component of greater China'.

"一: 日本国と中華人民共和国との間のこれまでの不正常な状態は、この共同声明が発出される日に終了する

二: 日本国政府は、中華人民共和国政府が中国の唯一の合法政府であることを承認する

三: 中華人民共和国政府は、台湾が中華人民共和国の領土の不可分の一部であることを重ねて表明する。日本国政府は、この中華人民共和国政府の立場を十分理解し、尊重し、ポツダム宣言第八項に基づく立場を堅持する

四: 日本国政府及び中華人民共和国政府は、千九百七十二年九月二十九日から外交関係を樹立することを決定した。両政府は、国際法及び国際慣行に従い、それぞれの首都における他方の大使館の設置及びその任務遂行のために必要なすべての措置をとり、また、できるだけすみやかに大使を交換することを決定した

1) The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communique is issued.

2) The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

3) The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation.

4) The Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible."

Clause 1-4, Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China 日本国政府と中華人民共和国政府の共同声明/中华人民共和国政府与日本政府的联合声明, 29 September, 1972

By moving independently of the US, and in direct contradiction to the US posture, Japan effectively derailed American attempts to negotiate with China on behalf of both countries, seriously damaging America's authority in the region, and reducing its position of strength in negotiations..

Japan's normalization of relations later lead to the the signing of agreements for the provision of war reparations, known as ODA, to Mainland China. Providing Beijing with additional capitol to construct and maintain the industry and infrastructure on which its present day economic success, and ability to compete directly with the US, is built, and creating further enmity in the US-Japanese relationship.

History – America?

Despite its greatly weakened position, the US held out on recognition of Mainland Chia until international realities, and fears that political opponents would preempt official government action, forced Washington in to signing a 'One China' agreement, and following Japan in switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.

On 15 December 1978, the US and China to the “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations”, a document which was ratified, by mutual agreement, on 1 January 1979.

“1) The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

2) The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

3) The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and emphasize once again that:

4) Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.

5) Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

6) Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

7) The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

8) Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.”

Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. Signed 15 December 1978, ratified 1 January 1979.

Response?

After the less than favorable quotations appeared in the Japanese media, Kissinger was forced to issue a statement confirming that he had made the remarks, but denying that they represented his opinions of Japan as a whole. Instead, voicing that they only represented opinions over Japan's unilateral attempts at rapprochement with Mainland China.

"They certainly do not reflect a principled hostility to Japan, a country for which I have always entertained the most sincere respect"

Heinz “Henry” Kissinger, May 2006

Despite being one of the principle figures in the US-Japanese equation, Kissinger has often been accused of having a 'poor knowledge' of Japanese culture, and of using 'inappropriate Western benchmarks' when dealing with US-Japanese issues.

Further Embarrassment

Though an embarrassing loss of face for Kissinger, and highly humiliating for the current US administration - which has recently been at odds with Japan over a number of issues, including US troop deployments on Japanese soil, and Japan's participation in the unconstitutional war of overseas aggression against Iraq – this is not the first time that damaging transcripts of Kissinger have come to light in regards to his dealings with China.

In 2002, declassified documents showed that Kissinger had purposefully mislead the American and Taiwanese people about the now infamous meeting held between himself and the Chinese leadership in July 1971.

According to Kissinger's original version of events, the issue of Chinese-Taiwan was 'barely mentioned' during the meeting between himself and the Chinese Premier 周恩來 (Zhou Enlai).

However records of the meeting, released under the Freedom of Information Act, revealed that approximately 9 out of 37 page of transcript material, or approximates 1/4 of the total meeting, were devoted near exclusively to the issues.

"The document proves that what Kissinger writes in his memoirs about Taiwan being barely discussed is breathtakingly not true"

James Mann, Senior Writer in Residence, Center for Strategic and International Studies, US

According to official US transcripts, issues that were discussed included:

The possibility of the US signing a 'One China' accord
US support for Taiwanese independence
The reversal of US troop deployments in Taiwan,
Chinese concerns that the US might be purposefully positioning the Japanese Self Defense forces to break the constitution by stepping in as a proxy to American forces in order to deny China control of the disputed island.

“With respect to the Taiwan independence movement, we will give no support either direct or indirect. If you have any reliable information to the contrary, get it to me and I will see that whatever is going on is stopped.”

Heinz “Henry” Kissinger, Speaking to Chinese Premier 周恩來 (Zhou enlai), July 1971

A Full uncensored and unedited transcript of the meeting is available for download HERE (PDF).

Please note, the front 'cover sheet' was added at a later date, and that all times are recorded in local format. Placing the meeting on 10 July Chinese time, and 9 July US time.

Please also note that US documents are Romanized using the Wade-Giles system. Rendering 周恩來 (Zhou Enlai) as Chou En-Lai. Premier is also rendered as 'Prime-Minister'.

The Kissinger Transcripts?

Kissinger remarks on Japan's attempts to normalize relations with China are contained in “The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of US Diplomacy, 1969-1977", a collection of over 2000 memos and transcripts relating to the former Secretary of State, which were compiled by The National Security Archive

The National Security Archive is a non-profit organization, which is dedicated to cataloging and releasing state record that have been declassified under the Freedom of Information Act. It is based in George Washington University, and was founded on 1985.

9.6.06 15:04

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Banned on the Mainland:

After much speculation, Beijing has, this Friday issued a formal statement over the 'banning' of the controversial film "The Da Vinci Code", stating that it has not been 'banned', as initial reports indicated, but that it has merely been 'removed from public' view.

The film was ordered off of theatre screens earlier this week. At the time, no official explanation was given.

"This is such short notice from the film's distributor. They will stop showing it from tomorrow, I don't know the reason either. We just do what we are told to do"

Wu Hehu, Spokesperson, United Cinema, Shanghai

It is believed to be the first instance in which a foreign film had been removed from theatres after having been cleared from screening by Chinese censors.

Reasons?

According to the Chinese State Administration of Radio, Film and Television -the politically controlled body which overseas audio and video censorship in China - "Da Vinci" was pulled form theatres in order to 'allow more screen time' to be allocated to domestic Chinese productions over the screening period 10 June - 10 July 2006.

"We're making room for the next month when dozens of home-made films will show across the country."

Weng Li, Deputy Manager, Exhibition and Distribution, China Film Group Corporation

The China Film Group Corporation owns the Chinese distribution rights to “Da Vinci”.

“Da Vinci's” removal apparently comes in response to requests, from some of China's most influential cinema groups, that they be given a higher screen priority over the summer.

Reports indicate that the main complainants were:

The Chinese Movie Distributors Association
The Chinese Movie Producers Association
The Chinese Urban Movie Theatres Association

Speculation?

Despite Beijing's statement of reassurance over the reasons for the pulling of "Da Vinci", observers have questioned both Beijing's motives, and the integrity of its statement.

As such, China watchers drawing attention to the fact that the pulling of "Da Vinci" - in order to 'make way for domestic films' - comes despite the fact that Chinese theatres continue to screen two less popular wester films - “Ice Age 2”; a computer animated slapstick children adventure, and “The Poseidon Adventure”; an expensive, but insubstantial, remake of a 1972 oceanic disaster movie.

Owing to this apparent ambiguity of purpose, some sources have speculated that the film may have been withdrawn because it was in danger of becoming 'too successful'. Leading Chinese officials to fear that it could both overshadow domestic productions in popularity, and drain vital box-office revenue away from Chinese films.

"possible explanation is that officials do not want the film to do well in China"

Min Lee, Correspondent, The Scotsman International (HK)

Though not commenting directly on the issue, Chinese press releases would appear to confirm this supposition, at least in part..

"We made a purely commercial decision. No single film could monopolize the market for one or two months, not even in the United States"

Weng Li, China Film Group Corporation (distribution right owner)

Suspicion?

Beijing's assertions over the reasons for the films removal also come in contradiction to statements from within China's media industry, claiming that the order to remove "Da Vinci" from screens was also accompanied by an official banning order. A legally enforced notice that forbids media groups from independently reviewing, discussing, debating, publicizing or commenting on the film in any way, while, at the same time, compelling them to carry officially sanctioned press releases promoting the state line on the film.

Such tactics are common when Beijing wishes to

A) Remove a troublesome production from public view. Effectively erasing it from the media
B) Ensure that only the official account of the film is know
C) Prevent the issues behind a film, or the issues of film censorship, from being openly debated

Such statements were however contradicted by the Chinese press, which indicated that "Da Vinci" could, but isn't, being screened.

"We are not against foreign films ...My company will continue to arrange their screenings in China according to market demand."

Weng Li, China Film Group Corporation (distribution right owner)

Accounts in the Chinese state media gave no explanation as to why film reals were 'retrieved'. An action which effectively renders the film 'banned'.

"All copies [of the Da Vinci Code] have been retrieved. We have not been told of the reason"

Official, Shanghai Film Art Center.

Some commercial reasons for their collection do exist.

It has yet to be seen if "Da Vinci" will return to theatres in a limited form.

In addition to speculation that the film might have been removed form public viewing for commercial reasons, a number of sources have questioned whether Chinese officials pulled "Da Vinci" for religious reasons. Including anger from Chinese Christians over the films distortion of accepted religious history.

In response to Beijing's moves against the film, longstanding BBC China correspondent Quentin Sommerville went on record to voice the possibility that Chinese officials might have reacted out of the fear that “Da Vinci” might provoke a resurgence of interest in Christianity and Christian history.

"there had been speculation that the film was proving too popular with Chinese Christians."

Quentin Sommerville (attrib, "Chinese ban Da Vinci Code movie"

Christianity is permitted in China, but only within the confines the two branches of the state approved Church. Members are, however, discouraged form independently exploring the roots of Christianity, or its place in the world.

Beijing commonly acts to discourage curiosity in a number of areas, including recent domestic history, domestic politics and perceived slights against the Chinese people by foreigners.

Sony Pictures?

Officials at Sony Pictures , the company behind the “Da Vinci's” global release, were notified of its removal from theatres on the day that the official order was issued. They were not notified as to the reasons why.

"We're obviously disappointed by this decision ... [but we] were not informed as to why the film was pulled"

Jeff Blake, Head, Worldwide Marketing and Distribution Division, Sony Pictures

When questioned, they were not hopeful that the film would be reinstated in any meaningful way, and voiced that they would likely not be given the opportunity for official recourse.

"We'll wait and see what happens, but we don't expect the opportunity to appeal to the government of China"

Jeff Blake, Head, Worldwide Marketing and Distribution Division, Sony Pictures

The Numbers?

According to Xinhua, China's state controlled media Agency, "Da Vinci" was, at the time of its removal from theatres, the third highest grossing foreign film of all time on Mainland China.

Number 1: The Titanic (359 Million Yuan)
Number 2: Peral Harbor (105 Million Yuan)
Number 3: The Da Vinci Code (104 Million Yuan)

392 reals of “Da vinci” were distributed across China, making it the largest ever single release of any single foreign film. Drawing ahead of the 2005 remake of King Kong, which distributed 380 film reals nationwide.

Its removal from theatres would, hypothetically speaking, release a substantial amount of screen time for a number of Chinese films which, traditionally, tend to run in far fewer theatres.

Restrictions?

Under Current regulations, Chinese censors permit a maximum of 20 foreign films to be released per year, and restricts them 1/3 of screen time.

"[State] regulations require that foreign films occupy less than one third of the total screen time in cinemas. Even where foreign blockbusters are allowed into China under the film quota system, the screen quota then mandates that the distributor restrict the number of prints available to cinemas."

SPECIAL 301, International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2006

Controversially, most Hong Kong films are classified as being 'Foreign' despite them being produced within the bounds of Chinese territory, and must compete with western films, and films from sovereign Asian nations, for screen time.

10.6.06 11:30

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Trade V Security: The Great China Question

Although America has faced a great many challenges over the last 50 years, both from within and without, one of the most constant of these problems has always been finding a way to balance the needs of National Security against the needs of the economy. A struggle which has pitted some of America's most powerful, and influential, groups against each other for decades.

The Teams

On one side of this debate is big business. With campaigners arguing that they require a free hand to sell their products on the international market, and to do business with as wide a range of people as possible, in order to remain competitive in todays global environment.

However, on the other side of the debate is America's abundance of Neo-conservative lobbyists groups and Think Tanks, not to mention the military and intelligence communities. Who hold true to the argument that, regardless of how much money you can make, there are some very good reasons not to sell missile guidance chips to people who might want to kill you.

Unsurprisingly, not to mention increasingly, much of the focus of this debate, in recent years at least, has been centered on US trade with China. A country which is not only one of America's largest strategic competitors, but is also potentially one of the word's fastest growing export markets.

Renewed Concern

Although Security V Trade has long been an issue in the Sino-US relationship, it was brought into the headlines this May, with the release of the “Enhancing Dialogue, Moving Forward” - A White Paper from the Chinese branch of the American Chamber of Commerce, known as AmCham.

As part of the wider issue of Sino-US trade, the influential NGO used its yearly report on Sino-US trade issues to launch a blistering attack on restrictions imposed on the export on non-military goods to China; Branding them as being overzealous, unclear, and harmful to America's ability to compete for China's import markets.

“AmCham fully supports a targeted and efficient export controls program that keeps American military technology safe; however, the current program is neither sufficiently targeted nor efficient.”

“Enhancing Dialogue, Moving Forward”, AmCham, (2006)

Status Quo - The China Threat

As far as China is concerned, Washington has traditionally always erred on the side of caution, and has put into place several layers of regulations restricting exports to China; covering everything from industrial chemicals and consumers microchips, to guided missiles and air defense radars.

In the largest part, these restrictions are designed not only to prevent the sale of weapons to China, but also to prevent the transference of precision mechanical and electronics devices/components to China that could be used to produce anything that could threaten the security of America and its allies.

“The risk of transferring US commercial technology has been a staple of the larger US debate over China policy for many years. Trade with China is routinely viewed through the prism of Chinese military capabilities”

James A. Lewis, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Put simply, and in in the voice of a conservative, Washington has been acting in order to prevent China from acquiring ' more efficient means to kill US citizens'.

However, AmCham's report has not only moved to highlight the economic damage that is being caused by such restrictions, but also to dispute many of the grounds on which many of them are being enforced. Particularly when the regulations serve to place restrictions on non-sensitive technology that posses little or no threat to the US.

As such, AmCham have voiced that many of these restrictions serve only to make the US less competitive in the international market by

Burdening US companies with red tape that foreign competitors do not have to deal with,
Creating entire market sectors that are virtually closed to the US - but which remain open to foreign competitors
Forcing American industry to maintain a 'blacklist' of willing customers with who they cannot trade, but their overseas rivals can, based on their connections to restricted Chinese groups.

“unilateral restrictions on exports to China of non-sensitive technology only benefits foreign competitors.”

“Enhancing Dialogue, Moving Forward”, AmCham, (2006)

Even where no foreign competition exists, such restrictions, AmCham have argued, represent opportunities to expand Sino-US trade that are 'needlessly lost ' because of 'unnecessarily heightened concerns' over National Security.

Too Restrictive?

While it did acknowledge the need to maintain a strong export control system -to ensure that dangerous or sensitive technology did not fall into the wrong hands - AmCham's report highlighted significant differences of opinion between the business and defense communities, as to exactly what should be considered a 'dangerous' or 'sensitive' technology, and exactly what US companies should be allowed to freely export to China.

Describing them as having 'an unrealistically narrow focus', AmCham laid down a strong critique of the framework behind US export controls, and accused them of focussing solely on whether or not an exported item had the 'capacity' to be used for military purposes, rather than the 'likelihood' that the item would be used in this way, or the potential threat level involved if it was.

“an effective export control policy is an important objective of the U.S. Government, but we feel that such a policy should be targeted towards issues that truly represent national security challenges.”

“Enhancing Dialogue, Moving Forward”, AmCham, (2006)

Chief among AmCham's concerns was the accusation that the current US security regime has lead to export permits being refused needlessly due unrealistic concerns over security, and to safe items being forced to wait unacceptable amounts of time for export permits.

Both of which, it voiced, were damaging the US economy, but doing little or nothing to protect National Security as most potential export were non-military, and fell into three categories

Items which pose no actual threat in Chinese hands.

Items that could potentially be used by the military, but were being exported for other purposes. For example lightweight aerospace composites that could be used to build fighter aircraft, but which are destined for use on passenger aircraft.

Items that could potentially be used by the Chinese military, but which would not increase China's capabilities beyond their current threat level. Including outdated technologies, technologies that China already manufactures for export, and technologies that other countries do not classify as harboring a potential threat, and so willingly sell to China on a regular basis.

The export of engine parts and commercial aviation technology, where cited as being particularly problematic by AmCham.

Under the current regime, engine components for heavy truck are considered to be a duel use technology because of their potential to be used in military transport vehicles and their export can be time consuming and problematic, with the risk of Washington stepping in to veto any orders made at any point in the export process. This comes despite the fact China already has the capacity not only to manufacture such engine components for its own military, but also that it is well known as an exporter heavy trucks for other countries.

Similarly, aircraft navigation equipment is considered to be a threat to national security because security sources warn that it has the potential to be retrofitted to guided missiles. This comes despite conflicting data from the aircraft industry that holds that most airline navigation equipment lacks the accuracy of existing Chinese missile guidance systems, and that attempts to remove or refit guidance chips would likely render them unusable.

“We feel it would be appropriate for Congress and the executive branch to review the conceptual framework and terms of reference of our export control regime in light of these concerns.......A more complete, dynamic national security analysis would also take into account the damage an overly restrictive export control policy has on the economic viability of U.S. companies”

“Enhancing Dialogue, Moving Forward”, AmCham, (2006)

American engine and navigation components are however known to be of a constantly high quality, and are coveted by civilian industry in China for their reliability and their capacity to enhance the safety margins of civilian aircraft.

Less diplomatic sources have previously described the ethos behind US export restrictions against China as being 'If it can be used as a weapon, then it will be used as a weapon', and have accused Washington of restricting the sale of items to the Mainland that pose 'more of a danger to US citizens when thrown, than when installed'.

Small Players

In addition to criticizing, export restrictions for being 'overzealous' AmCham's white paper also criticized them for being highly 'ambiguous'. Particularly where products themselves might pose no threat, but could still be banned from export on the grounds that one of their components - for example, a specialist microchip – could be harvested by the Chinese military.

According to AmCham, this ambiguity often forces US companies to either 'run the gauntlet' of the US export regime, or to preemptively design 'China specific' versions of their product using only components that are known to be safe for export - but which may be of a lower quality, be more difficult to integrate into a product, or which might simply delay the manufacturing processes unduly - rather than risk having their product refused permission for export.

“Unclear rules can also add additional costs in the design stage, as products destined for the Chinese market may or may not be approved for export and thus certain technologies must be designed out of products regardless of whether they would actually be restricted.”

“Enhancing Dialogue, Moving Forward”, AmCham, (2006)

AmCham noted that such ambiguities are of particular concern to small businesses and specialist manufacturers, many of whom are seeking to expand into China's growing market, but who lack experience exporting to so-called 'problem' countries.

“Small and medium sized firms in particular, which are unable to hire specialized personnel with export control experience, find compliance with export controls especially challenging and burdensome.”

“Enhancing Dialogue, Moving Forward”, AmCham, (2006)

Many of America's cuting edge science and technology innovators are Small-Medium sized firms with little or no import/export experience. Included among these are some of the top contributors to America's space program, which frequently sources equipment through the use of private sector grants, and someof its fastest rising niche electronics companies.

Protecting America?

As a key point in its argument against the current regime, AmCham laid down several strong criticisms of the use of 'National Security' as the foundation for export restrictions, among which was the standard argument that 'if China can't buy it from the US, it simply goes elsewhere'.

"The loss in export sales does not bring about a corresponding gain in America's security because the technology that U.S. exporters cannot bring into China is being brought in by other trading nations, most often by one of America's allies”

“Enhancing Dialogue, Moving Forward”, AmCham, (2006)

This argument has often been applied directly to weapons sales, but in AmCham's case, largely refers to 'duel use' components and materials. Including the aforementioned aerospace components.

Proponents of the current regime have however traditionally dismissed this argument as being akin to saying 'If American's are going to die anyway, we might as well make sure that we're the ones turning a profit on it'.

Economic Benefits?

Historically, both American exporters and the Chinese government have often cited US restriction on trade with China as being a contributing factor to the trade deficit, and have called for the lowering of barriers as a way of decreasing the Sino-US import/export imbalance. However, the exact economic impact of a lowering of barriers is still being debated.

During 2005, US firms only applied for permission to export approximately $US1 Billion in potentially sensitive components and finished goods to China. However observers have voiced that this figure is misleading, and should not be taken as representative of the potential level exports, which could in fact be far higher.

Unknown Calculated Factors?

Observers hold that current figures for sensitive exports cannot be used as a benchmark for the benefits of reducing restrictions because they cannot be used to calculate the level of trade that is lost through Chinese companies being unwilling to take the risk of having an order vetoed by Washington, or unable to afford the possibility that problems in the approvals process might delay the order of vital components for their product lines.

“Many Chinese companies have said to AmCham members that they never bother to begin negotiations with American firms for purchase of high-tech goods because of the uncertainty surrounding the
approval and licensing programs.”

“Enhancing Dialogue, Moving Forward”, AmCham, (2006)

Similarly, observers have voiced that current figures cannot be used to determine the total export revenue lost to the US by American companies deciding that current restrictions make trading with China too difficult or too risky, to bother with, and so deciding to concentrate on domestic markets or less lucrative foreign markets.

Observers have also voiced that sensitive export figures cannot be take as being representatives of the market as a whole because they do not include US exports made through third parties, so as to avoid Federal export restrictions.

Less Regulations, More Trade?

According to some sources, a relaxation in regulations could lead to a many fold increase in Sino-US trade, possibly running into several hundred million dollars..

[The trade increase could potentially run into] hundreds of millions of dollars”

David McCormick, Undersecretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, US

Not everybody however agrees that lowering export restrictions would increase trade by any significant amount.

Reasons for this belief include the fact that China's currency remains low against the dollar, making the import of US goods expensive for Chinese customers, and the fact that Chinese markets for expensive finished industrial products, one area in which America still leads China, remain small.

According the National Foreign Trade Council, a Washington based group which represents 300 US companies in free trade issues, the current trade deficit is so large that even a near total relaxation on non-military sales would be so small that it would have little impact on the current Sino-US trade deficit.

“[The Sino-US trade gap is] not going to be overcome by increasing shipments of high-tech products. You can’t even make enough airplanes, which are the biggest-ticket item we’ve got, to cover that gap”

William Reinsch, President, National Foreign Trade Council, US

During 2005, America imported $US 243.4 billion of Chinese goods, while sending back only $US41.8 Billion worth of exports. Approximately $US12 billion of this is classified as being High Technology.

Loosing Streak?

Despite the case being put forward for by AmCham, many China watchers feel that the current level of tension between the US and China make any meaningful relaxation of trade restrictions 'unlikely' in the near term.

“Right now, on balance, I’d say that there’s enough reservation and concern about the relationship that [the pro-relaxation camp] doesn’t have the momentum it needs to see serious movement.”

William Dobson, Managing Editor of Foreign Policy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Indeed, some China watchers are even warning that the situation is likely to get worse, with Congress placing more items on the list of restricted exports, and introducing a tougher screening program, as concern grow over the prospect China's current program of military modernization might soon enable it to withstand a direct attack from US forces in the event of an open conflict breaking out over the disputed island of Chinese Taiwan.

There is however some hope that the export process may soon become more easier in some areas. With Washington announcing, in June of this year, several new initiatives aimed at expediting the export of components from sectors that are 'critical' to Sino-US trade and to areas China's industries that either supply or feed off of US industries. Including the consumer electronics industry; which that is supplying the US retail sector with cheap electronics, and the comercial aviation industry; which with which the US is facing strong competition exporting to from the EU.

However, Washington has firmly stated that such relaxations would only occur if China agrees to open up its internal structure to greater US scrutiny, so as to ensure that duel use items end up being used for civilian purposes.

"This process will require unprecedented openness and cooperation on the part of Chinese companies. And it will create incentives for them to demonstrate good faith and sound practices.”

David McCormick

Unsurprisingly, as the Chinese system is notoriously opaque, not to mention adverse to scrutiny from regimes that frequently make hostile gestures towards it, this is seen as being a sticking point.

Keeping China Down?

As a side issue, China watchers have previously expressed concern that many US export restrictions appear to have a duel purpose in themselves, and have voiced that many restrictions might be less about protecting American citizens from an active military threat, and more about protecting America, as a whole, from a rising China, by ensuring that China's rise occurs as slowly as possible.

As such, some China watchers have accused Washington of using 'the China threat' as a pretext to prevent US companies form exporting items to China that would allow China to compete more effectively with the US.

Accusations include that Washington has:

Purposefully created an air of 'uncertainty and doubt' over the issuance of export permits, to dissuade companies from trading or co-operating with China.

Knowingly placed restrictions on precision technologies that would enable China to improve the efficiency of its industry and infrastructure; Allowing it to compete on a more even level with the US.

Placed unnecessarily strict restrictions on the export of heavy vehicle components and aerospace technology in order to retard the growth of China's internal transport infrastructure. Thus restricting its capacity to develop the internal logistics and supply chains that are vital for domestic economic growth and rationalization.

Placed restrictions on advanced computational equipment and semi conductors in order to retard China's ability to develop a commercial satellite and supper computer industry that is capable of competing with America's own industries.

Placed restrictions on entry Visas for Chinese businessmen, in order to 'push business deal onto Chinese soil', where there is less legal protection, and more uncertainty, for foreign companies. Thus making US companies less willing to commit.

Accusations have also been made that 'vested interests', within the US system, have been using the threat of 'enhanced scrutiny', from federal agencies, to discourage companies from trading with China - lest it create 'problems' for their business in the future - and of acting to brand companies that sold high technology components to China as being 'disloyal' and 'Un-American' for trading with a nation that is being promoted as harboring anti-American sentiment.

It should be noted that such concerns have been expressed independently, and did not form part of the AmCham report.

Original Article: Trade V Security: The Great China Question

14.6.06 13:00

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Global Freedom, or Giant Farce?: Legislating against the Censors

Anybody who has even a passing interest in freedom of speech and China should well remember the rash of headlines that arose early in 2006, in which US companies stood accused of being complicit in acts of censorship overseas, and the embarrassment that was caused when it was admitted that the allegation were not only true, but that also that Congress was powerless to act against those involved.

However, if outspoken Republican Representative Christopher Smith has anything to say about it, such headlines will soon be a thing of the past, and such companies will soon be able to be held accountable.

Movement

Since February 2006, Smith has been fighting hard for the approval of H.R.4780 - better known as “The Global Online Freedom Act”. A bill which is designed to prevent US companies from aiding repressive governments in internet censorship.

Though not yet law, the bill, this Thursday, passed the first hurdle when it was given a unanimous green light by House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations. It is now waiting to passed up the chain to full committee level. Where its sponsors hope it will be cleared for a smooth passage onto the law books.

Intent?

If signed into law, the bill will set down a list of regulations governing the conduct of US internet and technology companies operating in China, and other environments where strict online censorship regimes exist, in order to ensure that they are 'part of the solution' and not 'part of the problem'.

It is hoped that the bill will further the development of democracy and human rights, and frustrate countries that persist in censoring the internet, by depriving them of US technology and expertise. Forcing them to rely on more expensive solutions or lower grade domestic capabilities, and allowing their citizens increase access to information.

Mixed Reception?

Although the act is seen by its supporters as 'a brave new tool to further the cause of global freedom of speech', and has been welcomed by China watchers and human rights groups alike, some concerns have been raised about not only the bill, but also about its purpose.

Unhelpful?

Among those expressing concern have been industry watchers and corporations with interests in China's booming online market. Both of whom have expressed apprehension over the bill's potential to harm American company's ability to do business in/with China, by tying them down with regulation and restrictions that do not apply to their foreign competitors.

"If Yahoo isn't doing business in China, someone else will ...[further regulations are] putting American businesses at a disadvantage in the world marketplace."

Sonia Arrison, Director of Technology Studies, Free-Market Pacific Research Institute

Other's who viewed the bill have expressed concern that it might force US companies to leave China, thus reducing any benefits that their presence might have held for the Chinese people, or that it could potentially provoke Beijing into putting in place further rounds of internet restrictions.

"[The approach taken by the Global Online Freedom Act] could provoke greater restrictions, or even the withdrawal of Internet services in China, which would leave the Chinese people with even less ability to access information and communicate with others."

Jack Krumholz, Managing Director of Federal Government Affairs, Microsoft

Weak?

While industry has criticized the proposed bill for being overly restrictive, some observers have voiced the opposite, and issued the criticizm that the bill doe not go far enough, and that it has been 'watered down'.

In this light, it was duly noted that the bill no longer includes a clause that would provide US companies with a firm list of 'protected words and phrases' that could not be censored or filtered out, under, under any conditions of circumstances.

Nevertheless, the bill has still been seen as an important step

"[Even though compromises have been made] we believe it's going to help make the Internet freer and help protect the privacy of users in repressive countries"

Lucie Morillon, Spokesperson, Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

Hidden Agenda?

In addition to criticism for being too strong or too weak, some observers have also expressed concern over the 'true motives' of the bill, and have voiced alarm that certain passages and sections appear to be aimed less at 'ensuring freedom of speech' and more at 'ensuring the promulgation of American Ideologies is not blocked by American companies'.

“This censorship by the Chinese Government promotes, perpetuates, and exacerbates a xenophobic--and at times particularly anti-American--Chinese nationalism, the long-term effect of which will be deleterious to United States efforts to prevent the relationship between the United States and China from becoming hostile.”

Section 2, Article 12, H.R.4780

H.R.4780 - the Global Online Freedom Act?

The Global Online Freedom Act is split into 4 distinct sections

Section 1 contains official findings and definitions.

Title I contains policy information and proposals to create a supervisors and regulatory body under which H.R.4780 will operate.

Title II contains the the text of the bill (discussed below).

Title II contains mandates on export controls relating to censorship.

Below is a review and commentary on Title's II and III, which contain the main body of regulations that would be brought in under H.R.4780.

Section 201 – Jurisdiction

When found to be enforcing censorship or handing over user data to the Chinese government, both of which run counter to western ethics, one of the primary defenses offered by companies such as Google and Yahoo has been that they were required to do so by local law, and so had no choice but to comply.

"We are mindful that governments wherever we do business around the world impose restrictions on access to information and of course we are obliged by law to follow them."

Debbie Frost, Spokesperson, Google

Section 201 aims to counter this defense by prohibiting US companies from running their services within Chinese legal jurisdiction.

"Any United States business that creates, provides, or hosts any Internet search engine or maintains an Internet content hosting service may not locate, within a designated Internet-restricting country, any computer hardware used to house, store, serve, or maintain files or other data involved in providing such search engine or content hosting service.”

SEC. 201. PROTECTION OF SEARCH ENGINES AND CONTENT SERVICES.

Such legislation would legally prohibit US companies from operating ...

A blog hosting service
A web page hosting service
An email service
A message board service
A file storage service

.... inside Mainland China

This would effectively prevent any US company from being forced to comply with local Chinese laws by preventing them from entering Chinese jurisdiction, but may force many companies not only to pull their operations centers out of Chinese territory, but also to pull their services out of the Chinese market.

Under Chinese law, many services are prohibited from operating in 'an official capacity' in China, unless they maintain their hosting services in Mainland China, and are liable to be blocked for 'operating without authorization'; A euphemisms that commonly means 'operating without restrictions'

Most services that have fallen foul of this are blogging services that offer free Chinese language accounts and search engines with Chinese language interfaces which are not subject to censorship. Skype, the internet telephony service, was also blocked in China for this reason.

Such blocks are commonly put in place soon after a domestic Chinese competitor has been launched.

"For those foreign companies, if they are going to operate in China they have to abide by Chinese laws."

Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson, foreign Ministry, China

Ironically, the list of ' Internet-restricting country', the countries to whom section 201 applies, does not include western nations such as France or Germany. Both of these countries require that web services operating in their territory to comply with strict regulations that bar the promotion, retail, or open discussion of a variety of elements relating to WWII and the Nazi. All of which are officially recognized as protected forms of speech and expression under the US constitution.

This has lead some critics to voice that the bill appears only to be concerned with protecting type of free speech that 'harm or contradict' America's overseas economic and political rivals, rather than protecting 'the greater principles of free speech', as it constitutionally bound to do inside US territory.

Section 202 – Search Engines

While Section 201 was added in order to counter the 'local law' defense offered by the likes of Google and Yahoo - and applies to many companies in a variety of web based interests, including email and FTP service providers - Section 202 was added to deal directly with the problem of US search engines manipulating their search results to exclude sensitive topics at the bequest of governments like Beijing.

“Any United States business that creates, provides, or hosts any Internet search engine may not alter the operation of such search engine with respect to protected filter terms either--

(1) at the request of, or by reason of any other direct or indirect communication by, of a foreign official of an Internet-restricting country; or

(2) in a manner intended or likely to produce different search engine results for users accessing the search engine from within an Internet-restricting country as compared to users elsewhere.”

SEC. 202. INTEGRITY OF SEARCH ENGINES.

Under Section 202, companies may not

Exclude protected words and phrases (for example, democracy or 'land rights') from their searches on request of a restrictive foreign government
Amend their search engine to give preference to pages that show that government, their country, or any issues relating to them, a favorable light
Award a lower preference to pages that show the above in an unfavorable light.

This section would, for example, prevent Beijing from ordering a search engine to prevent users from locating pages documenting the Tiananmen Square Massacre, or from ensuring that the first X pages that the user found were tourist pages that excluded information in regards to the massacre.

“American IT companies who thrive on sharing information and ideas should not be complicit in aiding the repressive Chinese government in censoring and suppressing dissent”

Chris Smith, Architect, H.R.4780

However, it is not yet clear exactly how Section 202 will deal with 'legitimate' acts of censorship for non political reasons.

Under a 'strict interpretation' of section 202, a US search engine operating in China could be legally prohibited from honoring a request from Beijing to prohibit users from sexually explicit imagery, images of animal cruelty, or sites that openly encouraged, or celebrated, the murder of Chinese citizens.

At this stage, it can be presumed that US federal law will be applied in situations where conflicts exist, though it has been acknowledge that federal law does permit numerous items that are prohibited, for legitimate and non political reasons, in more conservative countries. Including adult images and items of 'hate speech'.

Section 203 – Public Record of Censorship

Section 203 mandates that companies are no longer able to keep secret the censorship agreements that they make with 'Internet-restricting countries', and that they must report back to Washington on any agreements that they make to censor or restrict their services.

“Any United States business that creates, provides, or hosts an Internet search engine shall provide the Office of Global Internet Freedom, in a format and with a frequency to be specified by the Office, with all terms and parameters submitted, entered, or otherwise provided by any foreign official of an Internet-restricting country, that are used to filter, limit, or otherwise affect the results provided by the search engine when used by other users.”

SEC. 203. TRANSPARENCY REGARDING SEARCH ENGINE FILTERING.

Section 203 has been welcomed by anti-censorship activists, and it holds a two fold purpose.

1) A company that must reveal the extent of its censorship is less likely to engage in censorship because of the damage that it would do to its reputation if the full extent of its actions became public knowledge.

2) A government that can no longer make secret demands for censorship is less likely to issue demands for censorship because the act of asking will, itself, draw attention to the issue.

Despite being welcomed, some controversy exists over Section 203 because so little protection is given to any data that is gathered. Leaving records open to potential misuse by Washington or groups close to Washington.

As such, observers have voice fears that such data could be used to 'tune' inflammatory or potentially inflammatory websites and information campaigns so that they could either pass though Chinese filters, or be targeted at issues that have newly become sensitive. A situation that could provoke foreign censors into putting in place tigter restrictions or to crack down harder the domestic web users.

Concerns have also been raised over the fact that Section 203 mandates that US companies must also report back to Washington on any demands for censorship that are made on them, by prescribed governments, regardless of whether or not the company acquiesced to them.

In China requests for censorship are often considered to be 'state secrets' in China, and revealing that such requests had been made could put US companies in breach of domestic Chinese law.

Reveiling requests could also open US companies up to increased federal scrutiny, especially if a company resieved more requests for censorship than its rivals.

Section 204 – Protecting Propaganda?

Though most sections of the proposed bill have raised mixed feelings among observers, and have variously been criticized for being too strong, too weak, to vague, or too specific, the section that has raise the most concern among some observers is Section 204.

Section 204 specifically, and exclusively, exists to protect websites originating from, or close to, Washington, and applies regardless of their content, merit or legitimacy.

"A United States business that maintains an Internet content hosting service may not conduct Internet jamming of a United States-supported website or United States-supported content in an Internet restricting country."

SEC. 204. PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES-SUPPORTED ONLINE CONTENT.

While the inclusion of this section would prevent the blocking of US government websites, including those maintained by NASA, the FBI and the Library of Congress, critics have voiced concern because the bill also offers 'specific and individual protection' to website that fall outside of the 'normal remit' of a state government. Including those that actively interfere in the internal affairs of other countries by encouraging the over throw of their governments or systems.

Section 204 would offer full legal protection from blocking to state run sites like “Voice of America” and “Radio Free Asia” which are not independent, operate based on US foreign policy, and are known to be actively hostile to both the Chinese government and its system of governance to the point of acting to encouraging 'regime change'.

Outside of the political sphere, Section 204 would also offer full protection to Washington sponsored/backed sites that go against legitimate domestics policies of the Chinese government. Including sites that contain false or misleading data in relation to abortions and contraception, and sites that whitewash genuine scientific data on issues such as climate change.

Section 205 – Enhanced protection from blocking or deletion

Section 205 carries a similar purpose to Section 203, and differers only in that it applies to actual content, rather than the ability to locate content through a search engine.

“Any United States business that maintains an Internet content hosting service shall provide the Office of Global Internet Freedom, in a format and with a frequency to be specified by the Office, with copies of all data and content that such business has, at the request of, or by reason of any other direct or indirect communication by, any foreign official of an Internet-restricting country--

(1) removed from the content hosting service of such business;

(2) blocked from availability on the Internet; or

(3) blocked from transmission via the Internet into or within an Internet-restricting country.”

SEC. 205. TRANSPARENCY REGARDING INTERNET CENSORSHIP.

Under section 205, a US company operating in China must inform Washington of all content (including, but not limited to, websites and blogs), that it deletes from its hosting services, or which it blocks access to through its network or network hardware. It must also inform Washington of any requests that it receives for such actions, regardless of whether it has complied with them.

Owing to its similarity to Section 203, most of the same benefits and concerns exist.

With this said, the one area in which Section 205 stretches substantially beyond Section 203, is that Section 205 applies not only to service host and providers, but also to ISPs and infrastructure providers.

As such, Section 205 compels all US ISPs operating in China to provide Washington with a list of all sites which they

A) bar access to on Beijing's request
B) have been asked to bar access to on Beijing's request.

The reasons for this are the same as for Section 203 (See Section 203 – Public Record of Censorship, points 1 and 2).

While welcomed as a means to protect private web users from having their individual content blocked, some concerns exist as the wording of the legislation could be used to compel a web company to provide Washington with information on deleted content, but also the content itself.

Additionally there are concerns that Section 205 could be used to compel hardware providers to hand over similar information to service providers.

At present, the depth of the information that would be by Washington is unclear, as is the extend to which Washington would hold a company responsible if their product was used in censorship , or if they provided training that was later used by Chinese censors (See Section 301 for further information).

Section 206 – Personal Privacy

Section 206 is designed to prevent US companies from handing over information on users and account holders to restrictive governments who wish to prosecute them for breaching on online publishing.

It was written specifically to ensure that US companies are prevented from naming or identifying dissidents who speak out against their governments, or who call for greater human rights.

This clause comes in the wake of a number of incidents in which Chinese activists have been sentences for “sedition” “inciting Sedition” or “revealing State Secrets” after their personal details were surrendered by online service providers.

(a) User Protection- Any United States business that maintains an Internet content hosting service may not provide to any foreign official of an Internet-restricting country information that personally identifies a particular user of such content hosting service, except for legitimate foreign law enforcement purposes as determined by the Department of Justice.

(b) Private Right of Action- Any person aggrieved by a violation of this section may bring an action for damages, including punitive damages, or other appropriate relief in the appropriate district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy, and without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

SEC. 206. INTEGRITY OF USER IDENTIFYING INFORMATION.

However, observers have noted that this might be 'legally difficult' to implement Section 206 in regards to China, and could even be rendered completely useless because of conflicts and vagaries in its wording.

A case in point is the journalist 師濤 (Shi Tao), who was sentenced to 10 years in Prison in April 2005 for 'endangering national security' by 'revealing state secrets'.

師濤 (Shi Tao) was detained on 24 November 2004 after he transmitted the abstract of an official document to a foreign sources. Later, Yahoo provided Beijing with information from his “Yahoo mail” account that helped Beijing to personally identify him as being the sender of the abstract. According to Yahoo, it had no choice but to comply with Chinese law (Some arguments of jurisdiction exist but will be put aside for the purposes of simplicity).

"Just like any other global company, Yahoo! must ensure that its local country sites must operate within the laws, regulations and customs of the country in which they are based,"

Mary Osako, Spokesperson, Yahoo (Hong Kong)

This data was used as a keystone in his conviction, but may not be protected by H.R.4780.

H.R.4780 specifically states that any action that it data may only be handed over for if required for 'legitimate foreign law enforcement purposes'. Which it defines as being ...

(A) IN GENERAL- The term `legitimate foreign law enforcement purposes' means for purposes of enforcement, investigation, or prosecution by a foreign official based on a publicly promulgated law of reasonable specificity that proximately relates to the protection or promotion of the health, safety, or morals of the citizens of that jurisdiction.

(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION- For purposes of this Act, the control, suppression, or punishment of peaceful expression of political or religious opinion, which is protected by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, does not constitute a legitimate foreign law enforcement purpose.

Title 1, Section 3, Article 8, LEGITIMATE FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES

In turn, this definition gives reference to Article 19 of “The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”. Which is where things become difficult.

Article 19 specifically and irrevocably excludes activities that conflict with the 'national security' of a state, from legal protection.

“The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”

Article 19, Section 3, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

師濤 (Shi Tao) knowingly transmitted a document that he had been informed was classified, and was specifically ordered not to transmit or reveal, to a foreign source. This put him in breach of Article 4, clause 3 of the “State Security Law of the People's Republic of China”, which classifies “stealing, secretly gathering, buying, or unlawfully providing State secrets” as being an infringement of national security. Thus protecting it as a legitimate act of law enforcement under Chinese law.

Whether a US court would rule in favor of Yahoo, in this case, remains a matter of debat