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Revealing State Secrets: China's Justice system goes under the microscope
If you are accused of a crime in China, and you desire to maintain your freedom, there are a number of things that you can do.
You
can hire a slick lawyer. You can offer to make a large cash donation to
the judge. You can even sit back and trust in the Chinese justice
system (no laughing, please). All of which might of which might help if
you are charged with an 'ordinary' crime, like petty theft, murder, or
committing genocide in a foreign country.
However, if you are
charged with "endangering state security", it is likely that there will
be little that you can do, or say, to change the outcome. At least
according to John Kamm, the head of the US based pressure group 對話基礎會
(the Dui Hua Foundation).
An Enviable Conviction Rate?
Speaking
before the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents club, Kamm accused China of
being a 'serial jailer of dissidents' with a policy of 'arbitrary
guilt' when it came to state security conviction.
The
accusation came during a speech titled: “Crimes Without Victims,
Prisoners Without Names”, made last Tuesday. In which Kama pointedly
noted that somebody accused of "endangering state security" in China,
one of the charges commonly leveled against dissidents, has only a 1
in100 chance of escaping conviction.
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“99
percent of all people tried for endangering state security [in China]
are found guilty. In 2004, only five people were acquitted. This is the
highest conviction rate of all crimes tried by Chinese courts.”
John Kamm, 對話基礎會(the Dui Hua Foundation), US |
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Kamm, whose foundation regularly
reports on human right abuses in China, also lambasted Beijing for the
harsh sentencing of dissidents. Voicing that somebody convicted by
Beijing, for "endangering state security", had almost a 70 percent
chance of received a sentence of 5 or more years.
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“These are the longest sentences for any of the broad categories of crime for which statistics are available. “
John Kama |
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Statistically, approximately 25 percent of non-security related convictions in China result in a penally of 5 or more years.
Endangering State Security?
Officially the crime of “endangering state security” is defined by five clauses under Article 4 of China's “State Security law”.
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Article 4)
Any
organization or individual that has committed any act endangering the
State security of the People's Republic of China shall be prosecuted
according to law.
"Act endangering State security" as referred
to in this Law means any of the following acts endangering the State
security of the People's Republic of China committed by institutions,
organizations or individuals outside the territory of the People's
Republic of China, or, by other persons under the instigation or
financial support of the afore-mentioned institutions, organizations or
individuals, or, by organizations or individuals within the territory
in collusion with institutions, organizations or individuals outside
the territory:
(1) plotting to subvert the government, dismember the State or overthrow the socialist system;
(2) joining an espionage organization or accepting a mission assigned by an espionage organization or by its agent;
(3) stealing, secretly gathering, buying, or unlawfully providing State secrets;
(4) instigating, luring or bribing a State functionary to turn traitor; or
(5) committing any other act of sabotage endangering State security.
State Security Law of the People's Republic of China |
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Although totalling 5 clauses, a
significant number convictions for “endangering state security” are
made under just two; Clause 1 or 3. Many are made under both.
Common charges of “endangering state security”, made under article 4, include:
- Subversion
- Inciting others to commit subversions
- Separatism - Often the advocacy of independence for Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong or East Turkestan (新疆/Xinjiang)
Clause 1
Under
Beijing's current interpretations of this law, any individual who
disagrees with the government's handling of an incident, or calls on
the government to amend any of its practices or procedures, can be
detained under Clause 1 on charges of 'Subversion'.
An
individual can also be sentenced under Clause 1 for highlighting
differences of opinion about events, or for contradicting the
governments account of an event, regardless of whether they actively
call for any changes to be made in the Chinese system, or to the state
line on that event. This is often demarcated as 'Inciting Subversion'.
In
broad terms, clause 1 can be applied to any individual who advocates
any social, historical, or political view which differs from that of
the state, or who calls for any kind of reform.
Those sentenced under Clause 1 include
- Freelance Journalist Wang
Jinbo: sentenced to 4 years for 'attempting to subvert the power of the
state' after writing an article explaining why he felt that the 1989
student demonstrations 'were not counterrevolutionary'.
- Freelance Journalist Lu
Xinhua: Sentenced to 4 years 'attempting to subvert the power of the
state' after revealing official corruption and calling on Beijing to
tackle it.
- Freelance Journalist Zhang
Honghai: Sentenced to 8 years for 'attempting to subvert the power of
the state' after allowing two essays, "Be a New Citizen, Reform China"
and "What's to Be Done?", to be posted on his internet discussion
forum. Both documents called for official reforms.
Clause 3
While
current interpretations of Clause 1 allow anybody who disagrees with
the state to be sentenced under the accusation that they are
committing, or inciting, subversion, Clause 3 allows any individual to
be imprisoned for revealing or possessing any information that has
previously been censored or withheld from viewing by the state. Or for
revealing accurate information about any event or incident which has
been distorted by the state.
An individual can be sentenced for
“revealing state secrets' under clause 3 regardless of whether they
were aware that the information was secret, or whether the information
was considered to be secret at the time that the individual revealed it
(it can be applied retrospectively).
Controversially, such
information does not have to be related to security, and can include
anything that has been deemed to be 'secret' by the state under Article
of “Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets”
Non
security related items that have been classified as secret, in the
past, include the number of casualties from natural disasters and the
planned retirement of Jiang Zemin, (for which New York Times worker
was, ZhaoYan was reportedly detained).
Those sentenced under Clause 3 include
- Journalist Shi Tao: Sentenced
to 10 years after emailing a foreign acquaintance the abstract form an
official briefing document which instructed newspaper staff to
manipulate public opinion in certain key areas, and to spy on colleague
that maintained ties to foreign media outlets.
- East Turkestan Information
Center journalist Abdulghani Memetemin: Sentenced to 10 years after
translating news stories between Chinese and Uighur, and for providing
a foreign agency with information on human rights abuses committed by
Han forces occupying East Turkestan (新疆/Xinjiang).
What is a State Secrets?
The
nature of a 'state secret is defined under Article 8, Clauses 1-7, of
the “Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets”.
Readers should note that Clause 7 is a catchall.
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Article 8)
In accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of this Law, state secrets shall include the following:
(1) secrets concerning major policy decisions on state affairs;
(2) secrets in the building of national defence and in the activities of the armed forces;
(3)
secrets in diplomatic activities and in activities related to foreign
countries as well as secrets to be maintained as commitments to foreign
countries;
(4) secrets in national economic and social development;
(5) secrets concerning science and technology;
(6) secrets concerning activities for safeguarding state security and the investigation of criminal offences; and
(7) other matters that are classified as state secrets by the state secret-guarding department.
Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets |
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Unusually, in China, state secrets can also include publicly available information taken from books or newspapers.
As
such, in 1999, Rebiya Kadeer, an ethnic Uighur, was detained under
Article 4, Clause 3, for attempting to mail several local newspaper
articles, on Uighur issues, to her husband in the US.
Currently,
there are believed to be approximately 3,500 dissidents in Chinese
jails, who were sentenced for in China under charges of “endangering
state security”.
A Wider Trend?
Although
some would argue that it is a separate issue, it has been pointed out
that China's high trial- conviction ratio for “endangering state
security” is not an anomaly, at least as far as the Chinese justice
system is concerned. In reality, it is generally consistent with the
rest of the Chinese legal system, a fact which Kamm neglected to
include in his address.
Indeed, the overall trial-conviction
rate in China is, on average, over 95 percent for most charges.
Regardless of their relation to state security.
Further more,
the actual arrest ratio, given China's broad interpretation of
“endangering state security”, is fortunately very low. With only a
fraction of so-called dissidents ever being identified and brought to
trial.
In this light, critics have also pointed out that China's
trial-conviction ration, both for civil and security issues, is roughly
in line with that of its neighbors. With critics voicing that both
Japan and Korea having similar trial-conviction rates to China in their
criminal and security courts, and arguing that, while some considerable
flaws are known to exist in the Chinese system; including the fact that
70 percent of trials are conducted without defense lawyers present, a
high conviction rate isn't always an indicator of an 'bad' system.
Defense?
Proponents
of the Chinese, Japanese and Korean systems often put this high
conviction rate down to a combination of a lower rate of criminality
among the population; which makes for fewer court cases and for simpler
convictions for those cases that do occur, and reliable investigation
and 'pre trial screening'; by which fewer innocent people are brought
to trial unnecessarily.
More over, they have leveled that these
countries have a more 'robust' approach to justice that ensures fewer
criminals escape justice, when they are brought to trial, than in 'more
liberal' western countries.
As such, proponents of the Asian
justice system have accused western countries, particularly the US, of
taking the maxim 'let the guilty go free, rather than convict the
innocent' to an extreme level that denies justice to many victims, and
of having 'sloppy systems' that allow criminals, with slick lawyer, to
escape punishment based on legal technicalities, and to abuse
'reasonable doubt' clauses so as to confuse juries. With critics citing
cases in the west were murderer cannot be tried because the body of
their victim was never found, even though ample motive, intent and
opportunity are present, and cases where vital evidence was ruled
'inadmissible' because of 'over protective' privacy laws or procedural
barriers that 'put the rights of the accused on too high a pedestal'.
Thus pushing down western conviction rates, particularly for sexual
crimes.
Outside of this though, it has been statistically shown
that high trial-conviction rates are common in courts that apply “civil
law” (trial by magistrate) such as those in China, but lower in those
that apply “Common Law” (Trial by Jury) such as those in the US.
A
fact which is true regardless of the legal system behind them, and
which can be noted in countries such as America and Britain, which use
both systems in tandem for their civil and criminal justice systems.
This
alone accounts for much of China's conviction rate. A fact compounded
significantly by the flaws that do exist in the Chinese system.
Comparison?
In
comparison to Chinese courts which have a 95 percent plus conviction
rate (raising to 99 percent in some jurisdictions), many US criminal
courts have a 90 percent conviction rate. Though this is often due to
“plea Bargaining” where a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser crime in
order to avoid conviction for a more serious crime, or in order to
receive a lesser sentence; A practice which has often been criticized
for 'funnelling the innocent into a guilty plea rather than risk
conviction for a more serious offense', but which provides one of the
foundations of the US justice system and has been credited with
speeding up the progression of cases through the courts.
Similarly,
many of the charges that do not end in convictions in the US relate to
'conspiracy' (conspiracy to aid, commit or conceal a crime, in
conjunction with the primary defendant). A common charge in the US ,
which is difficult to prove. Often results in multiple charges being
laid, but fewer convictions being reached. Particularly in incidents
where a 'not guilt' plea is entered, necessitating a jury trials.
In
the past, US 'Conspiracy' laws (which exists in only in a very limited
form in China, Japan and Korea) have been accused of being a tool to
compel witnesses to testify against friends and family, lest they be
charged as accomplices to their crimes.
As of 2003, US conviction rates for jury trials without plea bargains were:
- 46% Rape
- 69% Murder
- 54% All other criminal felonies.
Original Articles: Revealing State Secrets: China's Justice system goes under the microscope
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5.3.06 08:30
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Independence or Bust: Brinkmanship across the Taiwan Striates
In
a move that is sure to raise tempers in Beijing, Chen Shui-Bian, the
democratically elected President of Chinese-Taiwan, has announced that
he plans to terminate the Sino-Taiwanese 國家統一委員會 (National
Reunification Council), a body set up in 1990, to promote reunification
between the disputed island and the mainland.
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"The National Unification Council will cease functioning and the budget no longer be appropriated," he told reporters.
Chen Shui-bian, President, Chinese Taiwan |
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In a speech made earlier today, Chen decried the
body as an affront to Taiwanese democracy, which was concerned with
nothing more than imposing an undemocratic solution on the people by
taking decisions about their future out of their hands.
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"It deprives the Taiwan people's rights to freely decide on cross-strait relations and the future direction of our country,"
President Chen |
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Describing them as being "[an] absurd products of an
absurd era", Chen also announced that he would be scrapping 國家統一綱領 (The
Guidelines for National Reunification), which were adopted in 1991, a
year after the 國家統一委員會 (National Reunification Council) was set up to
direct reunification efforts.
Breach of Promise
Chen's
announcement comes after a pledge, know as 四不一沒有 (The Four Noes and One
Without), that he made shortly after taking office in 2000.
Under
四不一沒有 (The Four Noes and One Without), Chen pledged that, so long as
China did not use military force against the island, he would not:
- Cede from the Mainland
- Change Chinese-Taiwan's official title from "the Republic of China" to "the Republic of Taiwan",
- Change the relationship between Chinese-Taiwan and the Mainland to a “State-State relationship"
- Engage in the promotion of a referendum on reunification or independence
- Nullify either the 國家統一委員會 (National Reunification Council) or the 國家統一綱領 (The Guidelines for National Reunification)
Beijing?
While the full repercussions of Chen's moves, to terminate the council,
are not yet clear, China has already acted to denounce Chen. With the
Taiwan Affairs Office, Beijing's de facto ambassadorial agent for the
disputed island, branding his moves as being a dangerous “secessionist
push” which is certain to “trigger a serious crisis across the Taiwan
Straits”.
Wider Reach?
On top of the
rise in tension between China and it's unwilling diplomatic dancing
partner, Chen's announcement is sure to cause ripples among the other
Asia Pacific stakeholders, particularly the Bush administration in
Washington, and the 小泉 (Koizumi) administration in Tokyo.
At
Present, Washington has substantial commitments to defend
Chinese-Taiwan, in the event of military action from China, and has
strong concerns that it would be impossible for it to escape
involvement in any regional conflict. A fear that has been made all the
more real by recent advances in Chinese military technology and
training, which have brought China's armed forces up to a level where
they could pose a serious challenge to US military supremacy in the
region.
For this reason, Washington has been making increasingly
strong diplomatic representations to Chen, over the past few months,
requesting that he reduce his level of rhetoric for the sake of
regional stability.
Similarly, Tokyo has strong concerns over the the possibility that it may be drawn into a regional conflict.
Such
concerns stem, not only from Japan's proximity to the two protagonists,
but also from the fact that America has a substantial military presence
on Japanese-Okinawa and the home islands. A presence which would likely be the target first/retaliatory strikes by China in the event of a reagional conflict..
Independence or Bust
Although
little more than speculation at this point, many China watchers have
voiced the fear that Chen's increasingly aggressive anti-reunification
stance may mean that he is planning to use the 2008 Olympic games,
which are to be held in Beijing, as a shield - to protect the island
from Chinese retaliation.
Were Chen to declare independence in the run up to the 2008 games, Beijing would be presented with three stark choices
- To allow Taiwan to separate from the
mainland without military intervention. An option which would loose
Beijing the support of the Chinese people and the military; Potentially
bringing down the Hu Administration.
- To use force against the island
immediately. An eventuality which would certainly result in an
international boycott of the 2008 Olympic games; an event that China
hopes to use as an international showcase for itself.
- To wait until after the 2008 Olympics
before moving militarily. By which time American would have been able
to marshal its Pacific fleet in defense of the island; making a quick
and clean “war of reunification” impossible.
Original Article: Independence or Bust: Brinkmanship across the Taiwan Striates
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5.3.06 08:32
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What Kind of EX-Pat are you?
As anybody who has ever spent any time in China will know, there are many different types of Ex-Pat there.
There are those who can cope and those who can't. There are those who are quiet and respectful, and there are those who should be kept on a leash, and are only in China because somebody in their own country drugged them and put them on a plane to Beijing as a way of getting shot of them.
There are even ex-pats in China who fit in better there than they do at home, and who have gone entirely 'native'. Even to the extent that they no longer think of themselves as being foreign anymore.
If you are curious about what type of ex-pat you are, why not take this quiz.
The answer may surprise, shock, alarm, or even amuse you.
If you are having trouble loading the Quiz applet, simply follow this link to an HTML version. Feel Free to drop by and comment on how accurate your profile is, or to enter for your friend's details for a laught.
Beware though, hidden among these seemingly iinnocent questions are some that could lead you to the worst ex-pat profile imaginable, that of the infamous "Dashan".
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5.3.06 08:36
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Death from Above: The Sino-Israeli Equation
'Providing China with more effective ways to Kill US citizens',
it sounds dramatic, but that was how Washington angrily described a
2005 drive, by member states France, Germany and Britain, to lift the
EU arms embargo against China.
The issue made headlines around
the world, and saw a significant transatlantic tension rise between
American and its western allies. With the US, on one side; accusing the
EU of following a course of action that would endanger American lives.
The French, on the other side; accusing the Americans of maintaining an
arms embargo for political reasons, and bloggers in the middle;
questioning what Boeing might do to its republican campaign
contributions if its European competitors were given access to a
growing market that it was forbidden to enter.
Much to
Washington's relief, not to mention the relief of any Americans who
might find themselves in the firing line, this proposal was all but
abandoned, by the EU when Beijing passed a controversial
'anti-succession law' which authorized the use of force should the
disputed island of Chinese-Taiwan ever declare independence.
An event that scared the EU off of any controversial 'pro-China' activities for some time.
However,
just as that particular problem dies down, a similar one looks set to
rise up in its place, as another of America's waning list of allies
looks set to resume its own program of arms exports to China.
Arming China
In
an statements that is certain to cause concern in Washington, officials
with the Israeli Defence Ministry have announced that Israel is to
resume issuing export permits to companies wishing to sell high
technology arms and munitions to China.
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"Procedures for granting export permits is open again"
Official, Defense Ministry, Israel. |
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The great Export Fiasco
Israeli
arms exports to China were previously halted, under pressure from
Washington, after it was revealed that Tel Aviv had sold China a number
of Harpy 'hunter-killer' drones; Unmanned aerial vehicle designed to
lock onto an enemies radar emissions, and to either fire on them using
a conventional AA/AG missile, or launch a suicide attacked against them
using an on board warhead.
The sale of the drones was made public only after a number of them were returned to Israel for 'upgrades'.
Flood gates?
According
to Yaakov Torren, the Director of the Defense Department, the reopening
of the Sino-Israeli arms market won't be a free for all. Instead export
permits will be issued on a case by case basis. With each potential
sale being individually judged according to internal criteria decided
upon by the state, rather than by a set of distinct 'self regulatory'
guidelines.
This approach differs substantively from countries
like Japan, where companies must apply for technology export permits
themselves, based on a series of open guidelines governing so-called
'sensitive technology'. A situation which has lead to a number of
embarrassing oversights in recent years where companies have exported
good without first applying for permits to do so because they were not
specifically named as being restricted.
At present, it is not clear if Israel's criteria will be fully open, or if they contain undisclosed cut-off clauses.
In
addition to these announcements, made this Thursday, it was also stated
that Tel Aviv is to set up a special oversight department to monitor
and control permit issuances.
Allied Upset
While
the announcement, that Israel is to resume the issuing of military
export to China, is certain to be of concern to the US, which has
previously made numerous representations to Israel over the issue, the
situation is likely to be exasperated by the fact that the Israeli
Defense Ministry has openly stated that, although it will be working
with Washington in some cases, it reserves the right to issues military
export permits "with or without consultation with the United States".
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"[Israel and America] are two independent countries which respect their relative interests"
Yaakov Toren, Director, Defense Ministry, Israel. |
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At this juncture it remains unknown if
"without Consulting" also means 'without informing'. A situation that
could not only potentially lead to Washington being 'cut out of the
loop' as far as Israeli arms sales were concerned, but could also means
that one of America's closest allies could be secretly shipping
sensitive military equipment to one of America's biggest strategic
competitors.
The Empire Strikes Back
While
the sale of arms to China has always been of concern to the US, because
of its potential to shift the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific
region away from the US, the sale of Israeli made weapons is a
particularly problematic issue for Washington.
Not only are
Israeli weapons some of the most advanced in the world, but many of
them are also based on 'cloned' technology: Technology that Israel
acquired by reverse engineering American military hardware, sold to by
previous US administrations under a US-Israeli 'special relationship',
or which was obtained direct from American defense establishments
through espionage.
As such, were China to arm itself with
Israeli made defense technology, it could, ironically, kill US citizens
with their own weapons.
Original Article: Death from Above: The Sino-Israeli Equation
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6.3.06 16:22
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Brothers in Arms
Describing
it as being a “just cause”, North Korea has, this weak, released a
strongly worded statement reaffirming Pyongyang's support for 一個中國
(The One China Policy), and denouncing any efforts to separate China
and its unwilling island sibling Chinese-Taiwan.
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"The
Korean people remain firm in their stand of opposing the moves of
secessionist forces advocating 'Taiwan independence' and supporting the
just cause of the Chinese people"
로동신문 ( Rodong Sinmun), North Korea. |
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The statement was made on Saturday
through the 로동신문 (the Rodong Sinmun), and comes in response to the 27
February announcement that Taiwanese President 陳水扁 (Chen Shui-Bian) had
authorized the dissolution of the contentious Sino-Taiwanese 國家統一委員會
(National Reunification Council); the body set up to manage 'eventual
reunification' with the Mainland China.
An act which North Korea's governing Central Committee described as being 'Criminal'.
Over Stretching?
Contentiously,
로동신문 ( Rodong Sinmun) also claimed that China had 'won enormous
sympathy' from around the world, for its commitment to maintaining its
territorial integrity under the one China principle. A view which many
China watchers emphatically dispute
로동신문 (Rodong Sinmun)?
로
동신문, (勞動新聞 ); Literally, "The Workers News", is a daily news sheet
produced in North Korea, and is the official publication of the
country's ruling Central Committee.
It usually consists of 5-7
pages, and carries only the official line of the North Korean
government. It is considered to be 'heavily censored' even by Chinese
standards.
Due to differences in dialect between North and South
Korean, and differences in romanization standards, 로동신문 can be referred
to as:
Rodong Sinmun
Nodong Sinmun
Nodong Shinmu
Original Article: Brothers in Arms
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6.3.06 16:24
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The Great Face Game: When is a banned film not a banned film?
As anybody who knows anything about censorship will know, the banning of a film by the Chinese government often means two things
1) That the film cannot be shown on TV or in theatres, and cannot be sold in stores
2)
That the film is thrown into a bottomless pit of censorship and
prohibitions that not only make it illegal to show it, but also to rate
it, review it, or report on it - unless of course such articles have
first been vetted by state censors.
For the Chinese government, this severe reaction serves as a Four fold form of protectionism, ensuring that:-
- The message or subtext of a banned film cannot be publicly, or objectively, discussed
- The message or subtext of a banned film cannot be spread from beyond the grave by such discussions
- The reasons behind the film's banning cannot be discussed, or disputed
- A banned film is remembered only “in the way that Beijing desires”, or is forgotten entirely
The Anatomy of a Banning
Usually,
the banning of a film begins with a blanket edict, from the Chinese
State Administration of Radio, Film & Television, that a film is
not to be released in theatres, shown on TV, or sold on DVDs or VCDs.
This
edict is then usually followed by a circular to various media groups,
prohibiting them from releasing any stories on the film that have not
first been cleared by the state. So as to ensure that only the
perspective that the government supports is aired, and that nothing is
available, for public consumption, that disputes the state line on the
film.
Lastly, any copies of the film within easy reach are then
ineffectively seized, and further copies are ineffectively prevented
from entering China from areas outside of state control.
If the government has anything particularly bad to say about the film, like it 'insult the feelings of the Chinese people',
or it has too many Chinese actresses playing Japanese women, there
might be a small amount of officially sanction outcry. But not all that
much.
Otherwise, if the film is considered to be 'counterrevolutionary', 'seditious' or particularly 'unhealthy', it will usually cease to exist as far as the Chinese media is concerned, and you won't even hear that it has been banned.
There
are, however a few exceptions to this. A few rare cases of films that
are banned in China, but which Beijing is more than happy to advertise.
Unsurprisingly,
most of these instances usually occur when Beijing sees an opportunity
to gain face from said film, or to claim something that is successful,
but is decidedly foreign, as being uniquely Chinese.
Enter the seminal romance “Brokeback Mountain”; colloquially know as 'The gay cowboy film'.
A multi-award wining box office blockbuster that has won global
critical acclaim, and which has 'a Chinese heart'. At least, according
to the Chinese PR machine.
Breaking the Mold
Despite
having the dubious distinction of having been “Banned on the Mainland”,
the name “Brokeback Mountain” is all over the Chinese headlines this
week, as Mainland newspapers discarding their traditional avoidance of
censored films in their rush to be the first to congratulate renowned
Chinese Director李安 (Li Ang), known in the west as Ang Lee, on two
accounts.
- For walking away with the converted 'Best Director' award, at the 78th academy awards, for his work on said banned movie.
- For being the first Chinese director ever to be granted this most prestigious of accolades.
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"Ang Lee is the pride of Chinese people all over the world, and he is the glory of Chinese cinematic talent"
Headline, China Daily |
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Is Half a story is Better than None?
However, while both 李(Li/Lee) and “Brokeback Mountain” were plastered all over the headlines, some things never change.
Despite emphasizing that 李(Li/Lee) is a Chinese, and claiming his success with “Brokeback Mountain” as being akin to 'a victory for all Chinese, everywhere', most congratulatory Mainland news articles chose to gloss over the actual content of the film.
Quoting
people describing it as being 'touching' and 'simple but perfect', the
Mainland media carefully included only fringe references to the fact
that “Brokeback Mountain” is a film about the romance between two male
homosexuals, and even fewer references still to the fact that the
multi-award winning production remains on the Beijing's list of
prohibited movies.
Facts which have prompted a number of
observers to raise some interesting, and ironic, points: Not only has
“Brokeback Mountain” never been officially released in Mainland China,
but it could also never have been made their either. Making it less of
a victory for 'all Chinese', and more of a victory for one particular 'overseas Chinese'. With the emphasis being placed squarely on the word 'Overseas'.
Time Lapse
What
is perhaps more telling than the Chinese media's use of a banned film,
produced overseas, as a face gathering tool for the greater Chinese
people, was the fact that Beijing not only considered 李(Li/Lee)'s film
to be in need of stringent state censorship, but also his acceptance
speech too.
In order to allow for translations to be made, the
Oscar ceremony was broadcast, in China, using a 'time lag', only, when
the time came to translate 李(Li/Lee)'s acceptance speech into Mandarin
Chinese, the censors stepped in.
Although commentators made a
great play on 李(Li/Lee) being a Chinese, segments of his acceptance
speech mentioning homosexual love were glossed over or removed during
translation, as were parts in which he attributed his success to his
work with the Hong Kong and Taiwanese film industries.
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"They
taught all of us so much, not just about the gay men and women whose
love is denied by society but, just as importantly, about the greatness
of love itself."
李安 (Li Ang) Also known as Ang Lee, Director. |
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Indicating, in the eyes of some
observers, that Beijing desires to prevent a prominent Chinese from
appearing to advocate homosexuality; which the Chinese government still
publicly frowns on, and to gloss over the fact that 李(Li/Lee) remains
staunchly Taiwanese and has strong ties to his home, and is not a
Mainland Chinese, or 'a Loyal Chinese immigrant to the US, made good'.
Banned on the Mainland
While
“Brokeback Mountain” received critical acclaim, and played to full
houses, in both Hong Kong and Chinese-Taiwan, it was received very
differently on the Chinese Mainland.
Far from being the subject of official adulation in China proper, “Brokeback Mountain” was summarily “Banned on the Mainland”.
Reports
indicating that, upon viewing a pre release issue of “Brokeback
Mountain”, censors with the Chinese State Administration of Radio, Film
& Television, were so outraged by its open depiction of a same sex
relationship, that they decreed that the it could not be released in
China in any form. Not even if the more 'intimate' scenes were removed.
As a consequence, “Brokeback Mountain” is only available on the Mainland as a pirate video.
Foreign Affairs
Drawing
on from the irony of Beijing celebrating the success of a film that it
banned, as being a credit to the talent of the greater Chinese people,
a number of observers also chose to bring attention to the fact that
much of 李(Li/Lee)'s success comes exclusively from his ability to
operate outside of the tightly controlled Mainland film industry, and
to take full advantage of the directorial freedom offered to him in
overseas markets.
As such, observers have described Beijing's adulation of 李(Li/Lee), because of his Chinese roots, as being 'fatuous in the extreme'
and have voiced that, had 李(Li/Lee) been a born a Mainland Chinese,
rather than an overseas-Chinese, he might never have had the
opportunity to reach his full potential as a film maker.
Creative Death Knell
In
line with comments on the restricted nature of the Chinese film
industry, observers have frequently accused Chinese state film and TV
regulators of using so-called 'grey-list'; list of banned topics, and the fear of state censorship, to 'limit the creative avenues open to the cinematographers', in an effort to prevent the Chinese film industry becoming a source of social and political commentary.
Similarly,
observers have warned that this politically motivated interference has
serious connotation for the Chinese film industry because it acts to
funnel Chinese productions into a small number of 'safe' genres.
An
situation which means that many Mainland directors have few routes left
open to them to bringing anything new to the industry, thus hampering
the Chinese film industry's ability to grow, or to attract interest
from lucrative external markets.
Still Banned?
When
contacted, shortly after the award ceremony, officials with the Chinese
State Administration of Radio, Film & Television, were either
unable or unwilling to comment on whether the administrative body might
be willing to change its decision in light of “Brokeback Mountain”'s recent wins.
Original Article: The Great Face Game: When is a banned film not a banned film?
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8.3.06 16:22
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The Crazy World of
When
it comes to the Sino-Japanese relationship, there are few things that
you can take for granted except for the fact that, just when you think
things are settling into a familiar pattern of acrimony, a new problem
is likely to emerge when you least expect it - And emerge one has.
Describing
it as being a "rude intervention in China's internal affairs", Beijing
launched a strong verbal attack on Tokyo this week, accusing a senior
Japanese official of making remarks that put Japan in breached of its
treaty obligations, under the so-called 一個中國 (“One China”) principle.
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"We
are quite shocked at the remarks made by the highest official in the
Japanese foreign service, which breaches the Sino-Japanese joint
declaration,"
Qin Gang, Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China |
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China's accusations were made
during a press conference held this Thursday, and come in relation
relation to remarks made by Japanese Foreign Minister 麻生太郎 (Aso Taro),
himself a figure of revile in China, on Wednesday. Remarks in which he
is reported to have referred to Chinese-Taiwan as if it were a
sovereign state.
He Says, She says, I Said
The
remarks in question were made during a representation to a
parliamentary committee, in which 麻生 (Aso) variously described the
disputed island of Chinese-Taiwan as being "a law-abiding country", and
stated that is was "a country that shares a sense of values with Japan".
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"[Taiwanese] democracy is considerably matured and liberal economics is deeply ingrained, so it is a law-abiding country"
麻生太郎 (Aso Taro), Foreign Minister, Japan |
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Although apparently a petty issue,
revolving around the use of a single word, Beijing considers
Chinese-Taiwan to be 'an immutable component of greater China' and
traditionally reacts with unbecoming indignation upon the use of any
language that suggests that the island is independent from the Mainland.
Beijing
also frequently denounces any intimations that a legal, cultural, or
historical, separation exists between the Chinese-Taiwan and the
Mainland, and denounces such intimations as being 'an interference in
its internal affairs'.
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"We are strongly protesting against [Foreign Minister 麻生 (Aso)'s] rude intervention in China's internal affairs."
Qin Gang |
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Time and Again
This
latest incident is not the first time that Japan has been accused of
'interfering in China's internal affairs' in relation to the status of
Chinese-Taiwan.
Just under a year ago, Chinese security forces
seized over 100 supplementary text books, bound for a Japanese
international school in 大連 (Dalian). The books were seized on the
grounds that they contained maps that displayed Mainland China and
Chinese-Taiwan using slightly different color schemes.
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"The Japanese textbooks showed China and Taiwan in different colors"
Liu Jianchao, Foreign Ministry spokesperson, China |
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The actual texts themselves were later
found to make no mention of Chinese-Taiwan being independent or
separate from the Mainland.
Although cleared up quickly, as
Sino-Japanese disputes go, the incident had some long consequences.
Raising, as it did, serious questions as to whether international
school in China were being forced to tow the state line, and leading to
fears that the children taught in them might be receiving a distorted
education in areas where Chinese accounts of social, political and
historical issues differ from internationally accepted norms.
Bad News is Good News
While
Beijing has accused 麻生 (Aso), and by association the Japanese
Government, of 'interfering in China's internal affairs', this latest
diplomatic spat has also seen a number of China watchers hitting back
at China with their own accusations.
Observers have voiced the
opinion that, if China were serious about maintaining friendly relation
with Japan, it should have made its complaint in private, and through
diplomatic channels, rather than in public, during a press release; An
event that served little purpose other than to draw attention to the
issues because it provided no opportunity for Japanese authorities to
offer their side of the story, and no forum in which to resolve the
issue through through dialog.
In this light, some China watchers
have also accused Beijing of exploiting 麻生 (Aso)'s slip as part of a
'Bad new is good news' campaign, in which Chinese officials
purposefully over-inflated the incident in an effort to 'paint Japan as
a hostile nation', and to 'keep anti-Japanese stories in the
headlines', in order to rouse nationalist sentiment in China.
Though not shared by everybody, this feeling is, however, highlighted by a simple fact:-
Although
the Chinese media reported heavily on 麻生 (Aso)'s slip, they largely
chose to exclude the fact that he stopped and corrected himself while
speaking to the committee: Amending his description of Chinese-Taiwan
from "country" to "region", shortly after becoming aware of his error.
Well Made, But Not Well Received?
Shortly after receiving word of China's dissatisfaction, Japan's Foreign Ministry issued an direct apology.
Indicating
that 麻生 (Aso)'s choice of words should be considered a brief anomaly,
Tokyo reiterated its commitment to 一個中國 ("One China"), and offered
Beijing firm reassurances that the it did not represent any change in
Japan's recognition of Taiwan as a component of greater China.
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"There is no change in Japan's position on the Japan-China agreement of 1972 that stated there is One China"
Kamei Keiji, China division, Foreign Ministry, Japan |
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As is traditional, China has yet fully
accept Tokyo's apology in public, or that 麻生 (Aso) went on to change
his description of Chinese-Taiwan to being a "region".
A Cultural Note
In
Japan, the 'airing of dirty linen in public', as was done by China in
this instance, is considered to be shameful for both sides, as it
highlights differences and invokes conflicts. Politically, Japan
traditionally refusing to engage unless both sides begin at an equal
level, and negotiations are both neutrally toned and in private.
Conversely,
it is common in Chinese political circles to publicly admonish an
opponent to ensure that you start from a position of strength, and are
able to bring the opponents level of face as low as possible by airing
their apparent transgressions to a wide audience.
It has been
suggested that these two different styles of are one reason why few
Sino-Japanese political problems are ever resolved quickly.
ROC V PRC?
Although
China claims sovereignty over its unwilling sibling, the disputed
island has spent very little of the last century under Mainland rule,
and has never been within the active jurisdiction of China's communist
government.
The island was ceded to Japan under an unequal
treaty in 1985, and its status was never satisfactorily verified after
Japan's defeat in 1945. Leaving it in an apparent state of legal limbo
with a variety of claims being made on it, and by it.
In 1949,
Chinese nationalists, fleeing from the civil war on the Mainland, took
direct control of the island and set up their own de facto government
which was broadly recognized as being the legal successor to the
defeated Mainland government.
This continued until the signing
of various "One China" agreements, under which international
governments, most notably the US, switched their official diplomatic
recognition from Taipei to Beijing.
Currently, Japan recognizes
China's dominion over Chinese-Taiwan, under Clause 3 of the Joint
Sino-Japanese Communique (1972). Claus 3 binds Japan to recognize
Taiwan as a component of China, rather than as an independent state.
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中華人民共和国政府は，台湾が中華人民共和国の領土の不可分の一部であることを重ねて表明する。日本国政府は，この中華人民共和国政府の立場を十分理解し，尊重し，ポツダム宣言第八項に基づく立場を堅持する。
中华人民共和国政府重申：台湾是中华人民共和国领土不可分割的一部分。日本国政府充分理解和尊重中国政府的这一立场，并坚持遵循波茨坦公告第八条的立场。
The
Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is
an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China.
The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of
the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly
maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation.
Clause 3, Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China (1972) |
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Contentiously, the Joint Communique is
also the document under which China renounced all rights to
compensation and reparations for Japan's war time aggression.
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中華人民共和国政府は，中日両国国民の友好のために，日本国に対する戦争賠償の請求を放棄することを宣言する。
中华人民共和国政府宣布：为了中日两国人民的友好，放弃对日本国的战争赔偿要求
The
Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the
interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese
peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.
Clause 5, Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China (1972) |
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An fact that many Chinese remain unaware of.
Original Article: The Crazy World of "One China" Politics
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10.3.06 11:23
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