|
Angry Chinese Blogger (Mirror)
http://20six.co.uk/angrychineseblogger
powered by
20six.co.uk
|
Yasukuni Shrine: A Problem With No Single Solution
Yasukuni Shrine; the site of Japan's national war memorial, is probably
not only one of the greatest bumps on the road to peaceful
Sino-Japanese co-existence, but also one of the most controversial
shrine in the modern age, but, if the latest developments in Tokyo bear
fruit, its days might finally be number.
After
many years of public and private debate, and nearly 25 years of
protests by neighboring China, it has been announced that Tokyo is to
form a cross party committee of 100+ lawmakers, drawn from all sides of
Japan's political system, to once and for all deal with the thorny
issue of providing Japan with an internationally acceptable national
war memorial that is free of the controversies that have wracked
Yasukuni.
The formation of the new committee, titled the "group
of pushing forward establishment of national memorial facility" was
announced on Friday after Japan's ruling coalition, lead by Prime
Minister 小泉's (Koizumi’s) center right 自由民主党 (Liberal Democratic
party), met with the left leaning opposition 民主党 (Democratic Party).
The committee is scheduled to convene on 9 November to debate how best
to push forward the dream of creating of a war memorial that is
acceptable both to domestic and international audiences. However, as
with most contentious issues, the path to a resolution is not expected
to be easy.
Even as officials prepares to debate what should be
done to resolve 'the Yasukuni problem' some serious questions are being
asked by delegates and observers alike. Questions that stretch far
beyond the debate over what shape any new war memorial should take, and
which include whether would China ever be prepared to see whatever
'solution' eventually emerges as being acceptable, no matter what form
it took? And as to whether the construction of a new memorial might
actually make things worse, rather than better?
Three tenements
Though
there are many different issues to be debated, and many different
factions within Japan and China to be considered, in order to win the
approval of the widest possible audience, any solution to 'the Yasukuni
problem' would likely have to follow three basic tenets.
Tenet 1: Clean Break
The
new memorial should be 'clean' remembering only 'ordinary' soldiers;
Soldiers who were not convicted of committing or ordering war crimes.
Tenet 2: Clear Boundaries
The
new memorial should be secular so as not to fall foul of Article 20 of
the Japanese constitution; which prohibits the convergence of church
and state, and to give the state a greater measure of control over the
memorial; allowing memorial affairs to be linked to the need to
preserve international relation in a way not currently possible with
Yasukuni.
Tenet 3: Remembrance before glory
The new
memorial should be solely for the purposes of remembering the dead, and
the promotion of peace through the remembrance of loss and sacrifice.
It should not justify, glorify or otherwise promote acts of aggression
or those who perpetrated them.
Though apparently simple, each of
these tenets in turn raises many questions and potential pitfalls, and
must take into account the views of divergent groups with different
arguments as to what they see as a viable solution.
Remembering the guilty?
One
of the key hopes, voiced by proponents of a new national memorial, is
that by constructing a memorial that does not name convicted war
criminals, a clear line can be drawn between the remembrance of
‘ordinary’ war dead and activities that include, or are aimed at,
convicted war criminals: allowing people to perform acts of remembrance
that cannot be misrepresented as acts of glorification, and resulting
in a shrine that is free of much of Yasukuni's controversy.
Observers
have however pointed out that removing the legacy of war criminals is
not as simple as excluding the names of those convicted of war crimes
from war memorials. A situation that largely exists because there are a
number of different groups, within both in Japan and China, that hold
different individuals to be guilty or innocent, and which express
various contradictory opinions on what they see as an acceptable
solution.
Three clear examples of this complication are the
issues surrounding Chinese war crimes tribunals, American interference,
and Japan's hierarchical system.
After WWII, China conducted
thirteen war crimes tribunals. These tribunals tried a total of 650
cases and resulted in 504 convictions. 149 of which resulted in the
imposition of the death penalty.
Critics have however claimed
that China's tribunals were bias and that they required a lower
standard of proof from modern tribunals; leading them to have been
unfairly weighed against Japanese defendants and resulting in people
being wrongly convicted of war crimes, or being convicted of a crime
that they merely observed, but which they neither ordered nor could
have prevented.
Conversely, watchers of both China and Japan
have voiced that China's war crimes tribunals were hampered by a lack
of evidence in relation to who was guilty of what, by uneven access to
those accused of war crimes, and by poor accounts of some war crimes
brought about by poor communications and the fact that many of the
potential witnesses were dead. Leading to some Japanese war criminals
escaping punishment, and potentially being unjustly listed on a 'clean'
memorial alongside regular soldiers.
Another factor effecting
the definition of war criminals is the fact that the US is known to
have 'recruited' many Japanese into its ranks after the war; offering
them amnesty in exchange for often gruesome information that America
could use to further its own ends.
The most obvious example of
this was when Washington directly interfered in the process of post war
justice by illegally giving amnesty to several 'would be' notorious war
criminals who were part of Japan's chemical and biological warfare
units; offering them their lives and freedom in exchange for records on
the murderous campaigns that they had been conducting against the
Chinese. This interference allowed many war criminals to escape trial,
and would technically allow them to be named on a 'clean' memorial
despite their actual guilt.
Similarly, Washington is known to
have offered full or partial amnesty to a number of German war
criminals in exchange for their assistance in developing the rocketry
systems.
The last of the main complications is that wartime
Japan maintained a system that was split between the country's
traditional hierarchical and a conventional power based system. This
system meant that some of those convicted of criminals may have been
symbolic figures who existed only to 'sign and stamp' decisions made by
the power base, and that some of those who were convicted may have been
'stand ins' who took the blame in order to spare senior members of the
hierarchy or power base who committed war crimes. Both of which
arguably mean that any number of guilty men may have escaped the
tribunals, while innocent ones were found guilty in their place.
It
is throughout highly unlikely that China would fully accept a new
memorial if it believed that guilty men were named there, or that
Japanese nationalists and nationalist leaning moderates would fully
accept it if they believed that innocent men were excluded from it
because of these disagreements. Further complicating matters, and
making the finding of a solution that would be acceptable to all
parties almost impossible.
Contrary beliefs promulgated by some,
Japan and the Japanese Government bear no responsibility for war
criminals escaping justice. As a defeated nation that surrendered
unconditionally, Japan played no formal part in the trial of its own
war criminals. Guilt or innocence was determined by tribunals conducted
wholly by China and the western allies, and not by Japanese courts.
Similarly,
Germany war criminals were not tried by German courts, but by an
international tribunal over which Germany itself held no control.
Shrine or Memorial?
Over
the years, there have been many calls for Tokyo to deal with 'the
Yasukuni problem'. However, many of these calls, particularly those
from foreigners, failed to take into account the fact that the Yasukuni
war memorial was built inside a religious shrine, putting it, for the
most part, beyond direct state intervention.
This situation
exists because, after WWII, Japan adopted a strong pacifist
constitution that guaranteed the separation of Church and state.
Preventing one from interfering, or influencing, the running of the
other.
This clause, and a number of related laws outside of the
constitution, were originally written to prevent subsequent Japanese
governments from using religion as a political tool and religious
bodies from wielding political power, as had been done during WWII, as
well as to prevent the state from interfering in free religious
expression. Unfortunately, these laws have also prevented successive
Japanese administrations from imposing a solution on Yasukuni, or from
acting directly against nationalist minority agitators who sought to
infiltrate the shrine for their own ends.
The trouble caused by
this divergence of control was most recently highlighted in June of
2005, when senior lawmakers from Japan’s ruling coalition, speaking in
response to strong protests from China, tabled that the names of the
most notorious war criminals should be taken from the national war
memorial in Yasukuni and moved to a separate location.
Citing
laws prohibiting state interference in religious matters, nationalists
and religious elements within the shrine refused to comply. Leaving the
Government powerless to act.
Such a separation of church and
state is not unique to Japan. As Tokyo has no power to intercede in the
running of Yasukuni, so the governments of most western democracies
have no power over intercede in the affairs of churches, temples,
mosques or synagogues. As with Tokyo, most also have no ability to
replace religious leaders if they are found to harbor views that go
against national policy or harm foreign relations, and have no legal
authority with which they can demand the removal of a convicted war
criminal from a religious cemetery or memorial in their own countries.
Owing
to the problems caused by Yasukuni’s protected status, it is thought
highly likely that any replacement would take the form of a secular
memorial rather a new shrine. Allowing Tokyo to have the last word on
inclusion, leaderships and image.
Designating a new war
memorial as being secular, and placing it outside of a religious site,
would have the added advantage of creating a clear distinction between
religious and non religious activities that is not possible with
Yasukuni, and would additionally remove one of the main weaknesses in
the international perception of Yasukuni; that currently it is almost
impossible to determine who is visiting the shrine because it is an
prominent shrine, who is visiting it because it is a war memorial, and
who is visiting it with nationalist intents.
The suggestion that
a new national memorial might not be a shrine has predictably not been
without its critics. Some have questioning whether religious ceremonies
in remembrance of the dead would be permitted on a secular site, and as
to whether relatives, particularly older more traditional relatives, of
those named would be happy offering remembrance for the dead at secular
memorial rather than a religious one.
Suggestions of a secular memorial also do not to sit well with many of Japan’s Buddhist and Shinto priests.
Japan does one thing, but China sees another.
While
there are a great many physical problems with Yasukuni that must be
addressed in order to promote Sino-Japanese reconciliation, one of the
greatest problems is that Chinese perceptions of Yasukuni vary greatly
from Japanese perceptions of Yasukuni. Making it very difficult for the
two sides to see eye to eye; meaning that what China perceives as
happening does not always mesh with what Japan is doing, and the
symbolism of an event seen through Japanese eyes can appear to be very
different when seen through the Chinese understanding of events.
As
such, there are a great deal of misconceptions about Yasukuni in China,
and the task of ensuring that these misconceptions are not merely
transferred to the new memorial is likely to be a large hurdle for
Tokyo. Unfortunately, Japan has a very poor record in this direction.
When
faced with criticism based on ignorance or a cultural misunderstanding,
Tokyo has a tendency to withdraw and refuse to engage in any kind of
resolutionary dialogue. This often leads to the promulgation of myths
that could have been excised through dialogue, and to accusations that
a problem is being ignored or denied.
Tokyo also has a record of
basing any new apologies or rebuttals on prior statements which
themselves were not excepted at the time that they were made. A move
which seems logical and acceptable in Japanese culture because it does
not break consensus, but which brings leaves little room for diplomatic
manoeuvring and, again, leads to accusations that a problem is being
ignored or denied.
Additionally, owing to the Chinese concept of
face; under which form and image are considered to be as important, if
not more so, than substance, dealing with conflicts of understanding
with China it is often best undertaken from a lower stance that allows
China to gain face and to come away from any divergence of interests
with something that it can play to be a victory even if it is not.
Conversely to this logic, Japanese responses to Chinese issues over
Yasukuni and related issues have often been made using neutral Japanese
parlance and have often cited Japan’s current stance as being a version
of its past stance. Leaving China with few avenues to gain face except
to modify its tone to make it appear stronger than its opponent. This
leads to unnecessary confrontations and a poor resolution rate.
Owing
to this lack of constructive dialog, many Chinese harbor inaccurate
perception about Yasukuni that have been promoted by Chinese
nationalists, and reinforced by Japanese nationalists.
Current
Misconceptions include that Buddhist like ancestor worship is carried
out at Yasukuni and that the Shrine glorifies war dead, rather than
mourns their loss.
A lack of understanding of Japanese culture
and Yasukuni’s true purpose also means that many in China are also
either unable or unwilling to distinguish between shrine attendance for
festivals and religious reasons that are unconnected to war dead, and
those that are, and those that are aimed at ‘ordinary’ soldier but not
at the war criminals who make up a fractional minority of those named
there.
These misconceptions and misunderstandings are often
aggravated further because those who do speak up the most are often
from Japan’s discredited nationalist minority, who have a vested
interest in souring Sino-Japanese relations, so as to promulgate their
own combative ideologies, and Chinese nationalists, who have a similar
self serving agenda.
Counter Productive
Flying
in the face of many domestic and international opinions, that
addressing the issue of Yasukuni by building a 'clean' memorial would
help to ease tensions between the two Asian neighbors, some observers
have voice a strong fear that the dedication a new memorial may
actually end up inflaming the Sino-Japanese relationship rather than
improving it.
In the deference of their views, observers have
advised that the dedication of a new memorial could potentially provoke
a serious backlash among Japanese nationalist who say that the new
memorial goes to far, and among Chinese nationalists who say that the
memorial does not go far enough.
Some observers have voiced that
that, if an alternative was constructed, Japanese nationalists would
likely step up their efforts to promote Yasukuni, and that the
construction of a new memorial could potentially act as a highly
effective recruiting call; lending apparent credence to nationalist
claims that Tokyo was 'surrendering Japanese dignity to appease a
hostile foreign power'.
Drawing from history, it has been proven
time and again, where nationalist elements are concerned, that the
banning or removal of symbols, or attempts to replace them with less
symbolic elements, often serves to fuel nationalism rather than to
reduce it. This particularly true if said nationalist symbols are
either with associated 'a time of pride and strength' or where they can
be associated with a loss that is being denied. Both of which could be
said to be true of Yasukuni.
This phenomena has been extremely
evident in post war Germany, where efforts to eradicate nationalism
have actually lead to its increase in some areas, and where efforts to
eradicate the Nazi legacy by banning its symbols, and acting to
suppress Nazi activities, have been used by as rallying cries to
recruit successive generations of Nazi.
Additionally, observers
have also warned that that Chinese nationalists, many of whom base
their arguments on the contorted perceptions that Japan is a hostile
nation, may reject any new memorial outright; saying that it does not
sufficiently address the problems created by Yasukuni, and that the new
site is little more than a smokescreen designed to allow Japan to fool
outsiders into thinking that it had acquiesced.
If this were to
happen, Sino-Japanese relations would not only be faced with the
spectre of Yasukuni, but also claims that Tokyo had tried to whitewash
the issue by creating an insubstantial replacement to allow it 'to
carry on as before' while saying that it wasn't.
Concerns over a
backlash form Chinese nationalists, who do not accept that a new
memorial is a clean break from Yasukuni, are seen as being particularly
valid by some because of the international opinion that many
nationalists in China have ‘internalized’ mindsets with regards to
Japan and Yasukuni; mindsets that would remain fixed regardless of any
action taken by Tokyo.
|
"Once your mind-set is internalized, you develop this twisted
conception of the world, and you select what you want to see to support
your [own] understanding,"
Yu Maochun, Professor, US Naval Academy, Speaking after Anti-Japanese riots in China. |
|
In
such cases, even an unconditional surrender to all demands may be seen
as insufficient or insincere by Chinese nationalists, and would hold
the potential to cause a volatile backlash similar in type and scale to
the anti-Japanese riots witnessed earlier in 2005.
Side Issues?
It
is not yet clear if any new national memorial would include only
Japanese soldiers, or it would include 'subjects of Japan'; soldiers
drawn from Chinese Taiwan (Then Formosa), and the Korean Peninsular,
during Japanese rule.
In some cases, the inclusion of ‘subject
of Japan’ in Yasukuni has been welcomed by relatives of the dead, and
in other cases it has been decried.
Nationalists and seperatists
in Chinese-Taiwan have additionally been known to have used the
inclusion of Taiwanese in Yasakuni in their effort to draw Japan in
between China and the island. Using the controversial shrine to try and
form links of solidarity between Chinese-Taiwan and nationalists in
Japan.
These moves have been decried as being 'dangerous' by some observers.
Coments
on this entry are restricted. Only reasoned
comments from people with open minds need apply. Those seeking to
propograte nationlist Japanese or Chinese view points, or to attack what
they do not understand, are not welcome.
|
5.11.05 11:57
|
|
China to America – 'We will choose our friends as we see fit'
There
is an old saying in Asia 類は友を呼ぶ:- Similarities call out to friends, and
in few places is this more evident the relationship between North Korea
and China., and if recent announcements and trends hold true, this
relationship looks set to evolve, into something much more solid and
much more sustainable, much to the distress of nationalist elements in
Washington.
Since the end of the Korean War, China has acted to
support its ideological partner in terms of military assistance,
civilian aid, and political recognition, in what has largely been an
‘aid provider-aid receiver’ relationship that has seen China assisting
North Korea for reasons of unity and political face. However, recent
moves by Beijing now show clearly that China intends to expand this
relationship to a new level, much to the chagrin America, which would
see North Korea isolated from the world and resigned to the status of
pariah state.
During a high level press briefing, welcoming
Chinese president 胡錦濤 (Hu Jintao) return from a three day ‘good will’
visit to North Korea, Wang Jiarui, the head of the International
affairs department of China’s ruling central committee that China
announced that China was now moving steadily to expand its dealings
with North Korea to cover a broad range of area, and indicating that
that Beijing soon hoped to develop the uneven Sino-North Korean
relationship into a full two way economic relationship that would bring
the two countries closer together than ever.
“China and the DPRK [are exchanging] views on developing domestic economy, science and technology and education.”
Wang Jiarui, Head, International Department of the Central Committee, China
Though
Wang’s pledge of support comes as no surprise to even the greenest of
China watchers, and mirrors numerous past statements of support for
North Korea, it is also indicative of an increasing trend in Beijing’s
foreign policy. Trends under which China is now increasingly seeking to
transform its unproductive Cold War era relationships into economically
viable relationships that see China gaining more than just face in
return for its support.
In line with this change, from face to
more tangible benefits, China recently moved to ‘restructure’ its
relationship with Zimbabwe. Offering it assistance in the developing
its economy in areas that China can either export to or import from,
while investing in its mining and agriculture sectors in return for
favoured access to Zimbabwe’s markets and produce.
Though still
in its early stages, and currently limited in some part by the poor
state of North Korea’s economy and industry, China’s future
relationship with the North is likely to be based on similar footings
to that which China is building in Zimbabwe, and has already been to
cemented at some level with the joint stamping of a number deals to
construct factories and conduct exchanges. Some of which have already
been completed.
| "China not only provides the DPRK with economic aid, but also helps it build factories.”
Wang Jiarui
|
|
During his briefing, Wang also
advised that China's intention, to take its relationship with North
Korea to a new level, shouldn't be viewed 'in a narrow way'. A
statement seen by some as a barely cloaked warning to the west, and in
particular to the US, that China intended to substantially expand its
relationship with North Korea regardless what other countries thought,
and that it would brook no interference from the international
community in the matter.
| "The policy can't be interpreted in a narrow way"
Wang Jiarui
|
|
Coexistence but not subservience
While
China has made substantial moves to integrate into the wider
international community over the last decade and, as such, has moved to
align itself closer to the broader international stance on a number of
issues, Beijing has fiercely defended its decision to maintain an
independent foreign policy. Stating that it has the indelible right to
position itself in accordance with its own world view, and that it will
choose its allies as it sees fit.
In this light, Beijing has
continued to maintain a strong political and national relationship with
North Korea in direct defiance of demands from Washington that alter
its ties with the North; crafting them into a form that is either more
in keeping America's own, or which do not hinder execution of America’s
own foreign policy towards the isolated communist state.
And North Korea Makes Three
Although
there are many long-standing differences of opinion between Beijing and
Washington, China's support for North Korea has long been a particular
stumbling block in Sino-American relationships. With Washington, and
elements close to it, often voicing that China's continued support for
its neighbor serves to artificially prop up a non viable North Korean
state, and that diplomatic and economic assistance from Beijing has
allowed Pyongyang to flout efforts to force it to reform through
sanctions, isolation and international pressure.
As such, Washington has made not secret of its desire to hasten the demise of North Korea by putting pressure on China.
| “The road to reform in Pyongyang goes through Beijing."
Michael Horowitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute (Conservative think tank).
|
|
Historically, Washington's
efforts have largely been centred on persuading Beijing to use its
influence to 'reign in' Pyongyang, and to bring it to the negotiating
table. However, in line with Washington's recent moves, under the Bush
administration, towards a far more combative foreign policy, US
Lawmakers, Lobbyists and think tanks have increasingly been taking the
view that China is an obstacle on the path to regime change; a
euphemism for the forced removal of a foreign Government that is at
odds with Washington, in North Korea, and that China must be made to
‘face the consequences’ in terms of its diplomatic and economic
relationship with America if it continues to support for the North in
its stand-off against Washington.
As such, Wang’s announcement,
that China was looking to expand its relationship with the North to
include sustainable economic ties, is not likely to be well received by
US conservatives, who see China’s assistance as allowing Pyongyang it
to defy Washington to the detriment of America's image and North
Korea’s population, and who have increasingly been voicing that China
should be actively punished for its actions.
| "China could produce regime transformation in 15 minutes
if it wants to but up to now, China has not yet paid a price in terms
of its relations with the U.S for supporting Kim Jong-il's gulags,
torture and gas chambers. It is our intention more and more to force
China to choose between full support for Kim Jong-il or good relations
with the U.S. We are going to work very hard to say that China can't
have both."
Michael Horowitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute (Conservative think tank).
|
|
A recent example of such
efforts is the proposed "Scoop Jackson National Security and Freedom
Act 2005", a bill that would allow Washington punish China with
economic sanctions if it continued to support Pyongyang by forcefully
repatriating North Korean refugees on the grounds that doing so assists
in the committal of human rights violations by Pyongyang.
| "One point on which everyone increasingly agrees is that
China must be held accountable for human rights violations of Pyongyang
regime"
Michael Horowitz, Hudson Institute, US
|
|
Some critics of the bill have
however voiced that ‘scoop Jackson’ and other similar measures may be
as much about keeping China; a substantial diplomatic, economic, and
ideological competitor to the US, 'down', as they are about reforming
North Korea.
Consistency
Wang's
statement in support for North Korea comes soon after Beijing’s
lawmakers angered Washington by striking down efforts to persuade China
to put stamp to the 'Proliferation Security Initiative; A
controversial, US backed, non-proliferation agreement under which a
signatories agree to aid Washington in the interdiction of
international cargoes that are believed to contain so called 'Weapons
of Mass Destruction' or other related materials and substances.
Publicly,
China stated that its decision, not to join PSI, was due to concerns
over the legality of the treaty stemming from the low burden of proof
and disclosure that it required, and concerns that the treaty ran in
contradiction to international charters that were designed to protect
vessels at sea from unlawful search and seizure.
| 'The PSI has so far failed to completely exclude the
possibility of interdiction operations beyond the framework of current
international law; that is where China and other countries concerned
lies, as well as the major reason why those countries have not joined
the PSI. We hope the participating countries to PSI will seriously take
into consideration these concerns and act with caution,'
Zhang Yan, director-general of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
|
|
Privately however, it is
believed that China's decision was heavily influenced by fears that the
treaty would be used as a tool to crack down on nations that are not on
friendly terms with Washington who try to obtain materials and
technology that would lessen the gap between themselves and the US, or
to aid others in obtaining such materials. Both of which North Korea
comes at the top Washigton's list for.
Were China to have joined
PSI, it could have been compelled to seize any or all North Korean
cargo vessels in the vicinity of China based on Washington's 'say so'
alone, or risk being labelled as a friend to international terrorism if
it refused to comply.
Despite US assurances that it is not
specifically targeted at any one nation, PSI was, incidentally, created
shortly after a incident in which the US was forced to release a
Cambodian registered ship carrying North Korean chemicals and missile
components to Yemen.
| "we had no legal basis to seize the cargo"
Ari Fleischer, White House spokesperson |
|
|
8.11.05 16:03
|
|
Forgotten voices: 60 years on, Japan's hidden victims win compensation
When you think about China and Japan, and the former's battle
for compensation from the latter, even a casual observer can
probably name at least half dozen issues of controversy, including
'comfort women', the butchery of the occupation of Nanjing, the use
of chemical and biological weapons on Chinese civilians, where claims
for compensation have been made. However, while these WWII related
compensation suits have been taking center stage, and claiming
Asia's headlines for their own, there has been another battle for
compensation being waged, one which has been unfairly eclipsed by
its more evocative siblings, and which has largely been ignored by
both the Chinese press and the international media.
Fortunately for those involved, this lesser known battle may now
finally be over.
- In a landmark ruling, made late last month (25 October), Judge
Kanno Hiroyuki of the Toyko district court announced that Chinese
who were forcefully interned in the Lo Sheng Leprosy hospital,
during the Japanese occupation of Chinese-Taiwan, are entitled to
the same level of compensation as Japanese Leprosy sufferers who
were themselves interned under brutal Japanese Leprosy containment
laws which ran from 1907-1996.
- A Victory for Taiwan, a Victory for Justice
-
- In his ruling, Judge Kanno stated that, because Taiwan's
internment facilities were run as a subdivision of the Japanese
state, those interned there should be eligible for the same
compensation as Japanese internees.
|
- "The [Lo Sheng] leprosarium in Taiwan qualifies as a
state-run institution authorized by the [Japanese] Health, Labor and
Welfare Ministry, which falls subject to the legislation that
compensates quarantined leprosy patients."
- Judge Kanno Hiroyuki, Japan
|
|
-
- Judge Kanno additionally made it clear that he could see no
viable reason why a 2001 commitment by Tokyo, to compensating
victims Leprosy laws, should only apply to those who were located
inside Japan at the time, and not apply to everybody who was
subjected to them.
|
- "It is difficult to interpret the law as limiting
compensation to certain areas in view of the law's nature,
- Judge Kanno Hiroyuki, Japan
|
|
- News of Kanno's ruling was greeted with relief from former
Taiwanese internees.
| - "I am happy that we won, but I am very sad when I think of
the past." -
- Huang Jinliang, Former Taiwanese Leprosy internee
|
|
- Internment
-
- Much of the contention revolves around controversial
legislation, brought in by the Japanese government in 1907, which
mandated that sufferers of Leprosy should be interned in specialist
facilities away from society, and that they should be prevented from
marrying non lepers and from bearing children. Legislation which was applied
both to Japan's home territories, and to its overseas colonies. -
- Under this legislation, Japan constructed the Lo Sheng hospital
in Xinzhuang, Taipei County, Chinese-Taiwan (formerly Formosa) in
1930. Where authorities forcibly interned Taiwanese Leprosy sufferers to
isolate them from the wider community. -
- Historically, Japanese courts had refused to compensate
Taiwanese internees on the grounds that they had been subjected to
identical rules as Japanese internees, who were similarly denied
compensation. The situation changed in 2001 May 2001 when, in a
landmark ruling, the Kumamoto District Court determined that
Japanese internees had been unjustly treated, and were due
compensation. -
- Soon after the Kumamoto ruling was made, Taiwanese internees
argued that, because they had been subjected to internment under the
same laws as Japanese Leprosy sufferers, they should be entitled to
the same compensation as Japanese Leprosy sufferers. A view that was
echoed by Japanese experts who were assigned to address the issue.
|
- “The plaintiffs are victims of Japan's wrong quarantine policy
and should be treated the same as former leprosy patients in Japan."
- Professor Hirofumi Uchida, Graduate School of Law, Kyushu
University, Japan
|
|
- Further Battles
-
- Though the battle to win compensation from Tokyo appears to be
over for Taiwanese internees, there remains one further battle to be
fought, that to win compensation from the Taiwanese government. -
- Despite Chinese-Taiwan's liberation from Japan in 1945, the
island optioned to continue to follow Japan's lead; isolating
leprosy sufferers in internment facilities until 1962 when Taiwan's
laws were amended. -
- As such, those who suffered internment from 1945- 1962, after
Chinese-Taiwan's liberation from Japan, are not eligible for compensation
from Tokyo.
- According to Wu Xuzhou, the head of the legal team representing
Taiwanese internees, Interned Leprosy sufferers now intent to press the the
island's de-facto government to put in place a compensation
structure, as now exists in Japan, to compensate those who suffered
internment in the post war period.
|
- "Thanks to Japanese lawyers, we've been inspired to become
more aware of patients' human right issues."
- Wu Xuzhou, Head legal representative for former Taiwanese Leprosy Interneees
|
|
-
- Cash Questions
-
- Since the initial compensation ruling, in favor of those who
suffered internment, Tokyo has paid out over a total of over 42
Billion yen to approximetly 3500 Japanese victims, with each victim
receiving up to 14 million Yen ($US119,000) each. -
- The amounts paid out to Taiwanese internees by Tokyo is expected to be
based on the same criteria used to award compensation to Japanese
nationals and, thought no concrete figures are yet available, each
Taiwanese victim is expected to be able to claim between between 8
and 14 Million Yen ($US68,000 - $119,000) in compensation, with the
exact amount depending on the specifics of their cases. -
- The Anti-Compensation Culture
-
- While an increasing number of countries either have , or are
developing, a US like compensation culture, prevailing attitudes
about compensation and culpability in Japan still make it
notoriously difficult to win any kind of compensation, particularly
from the state, even if the facts of a case are not in dispute.
-
- To complicate things further, problems in gaining compensation
in Japan are often magnified exponentially if those seeking
compensation are, as was the case with Taiwanese internees, not
resident in Japan.
|
- "There is often a view in Japan not to pay compensation to
people who live outside Japan, as well as different ways to
interpret the laws" -
- Hiroshi Itakura, Professor of Law, Nihon University
|
|
Though some progress has been made in recent years, there
remains a strong bias in the Japanese system against awarding
compensation for claims made by those living overseas. A problem
that not only impinges upon foreigners, but also Japanese nationals
who live overseas.
Leprosy?
Leprosy, also known as Hansen’s disease, is a disfiguring
condition caused by infection by the Mycobacterium leprae
(Actinobacteria phylus: Actinomycetale) of the Actinomycetale order of bacteria. It
effects the skin and nerves causing a loss of function and sensation
and making them liable to infection and brining about secondary
complications, including blood poisoning and gangrene.
Despite being widely feared, Leprosy is not highly contagious,
and its victims cease to become infectious soon after treatment has
begun. Its effects however can be long term as tissue destroyed by
Leprosy does not readily regenerate; often leaving victims who did
not receive treatment early enough with permanently disfigurements.
Though Leprosy became treatable in the 1940s with the increased
use of antibiotics, it is estimated that there between 1 and 2
million sufferers alive today who have been significantly disabled
or disfigured by leprosy because they either did not receive
treatment, or did not receive it soon enough.
In 2002, the WHO recorded 763,917 new cases of leprosy. Most in
the developing world.
|
10.11.05 18:51
|
|
Cause for Concern?: China Steps up its Probes of Japanese Air Defenses
In September of this year, China reacted with outrage and indignation
when a leading Japanese newspaper revealed that the Japanese Defense
Agency had, for the first time, officially labeled China as being a
'potential military threat'. However, according to newly compiled
records, it would appear that Tokyo might have reason to be concerned
about China’s military intentions.
According
to sources within the Defense Agency, Japan’s de-facto military
command, between April and September of this year, Air Defense Force
fighters were scrambled 30 times in response to approaching Chinese
aircraft.
This figure marks a substantial escalation in Chinese
activities, being more than double the number of scrambles against
Chinese aircraft recorded during the same period in 2004, and has lead
the Defense Agency to warn that the Chinese military is substantially
expanding the scope of its regional activities.
|
“China is expanding their scope of operations”
Spokesperson, Defense Agency, Japan |
|
Facts but No Answers
When
questions on the issue, officials from the Defense Agency said that,
while they were aware of the Chinese approaches, and their increased
frequency, they were not able to determine the reasons behind them.
|
- "We cannot make an analysis of what is behind this"
Spokesperson, Defense Agency, Japan
|
|
The Defense Agency also refused to reveal
whether the aircraft were fighters, bombers, or spy planes, and has
released few details in regard to the approaches. Though the 産経新聞
(Sankei News), one of Japan’s leading newspapers, has leveled the claim
that some of the aircraft were Chinese surveillance planes monitoring
Japanese activities in an area of the South China Sea that is currently
under Japanese jurisdiction, but which is claimed by Both Mainland
China and Chinese-Taiwan.
While acknowledging that they were
concerned by events, Defense Agency officials however stressed
vehemently that none of the incidents were regarded as being a
significant confrontation and that the approaching Chinese aircraft had
remained outside Japanese airspace at all times.
What’s Your Favorite Scary Movie?
Despite
Defense Agency claims not to know the purpose behind the increased
approaches, it is thought likely that China’s actions have largely been
‘probe’ mission; missions designed to gauge Japanese defense
capabilities, response times, and attitudes to a threat, by presenting
it with a target and then observing how it responds.
Such probing missions can server multiple purposes, including:
- General intelligence gathering
- To train and prepare pilots
- To train and prepare command and control operators
- As a show of force to remind demonstrate your preparedness to a potential opponent
- As a show of force to back up political ‘saber rattling’
- To gauge an opponents defensive capabilities in preparation for an attack
Such
‘probing’ is a well-known military tactic which was deployed
extensively by both the US and the Soviet Union during the cold war.
During which time either side would approach the others airspace and
calculate their ability to respond a threat based on their reaction,
and to determine how close an intruder can expect to get to a target
before it is intercepted.
It is a current tactic of the US
military to over fly sovereign nations; for example, Iran, with
unmanned drone, in an effort to force them to reveal the location of
their ground based radar installations and missile batteries.
Alarm Bells
While
worrying to Tokyo, the increased frequency of Chinese approaches to
Japanese airspace has also rung alarm bells in Washington, which has a
significant strategic interest in the Asia Pacific region, including a
sizable military force stationed on Japanese-Okinawa and the Japanese
Home Islands.
|
"The increasing frequency of Chinese military incursions
into Japanese territory sets a dangerous course and unnecessarily
increases the potential for a military clash in Northeast Asia"
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission |
|
Directed Media?
‘Coincidentally’,
news regarding China’s increasingly provocative aerial posturing
against Japan was released almost in tandem with a scathing annual
report from the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, an
influential right-wing US think tank, which branded China a ‘potential
military threat’ to America, and which urged Washington to take action
to prevent China’s forces in the Pacific from reaching parity with its
own.
During the delivery of its annual report, the US-CESRC
accused China of engaging on a combative program of military expansion,
and of expanding its “force projection capabilities”, to enable it to
go ‘toe-to-toe’ with the US and Japan in readiness for any future
conflict.
|
“China is in the midst of an extensive military
modernization program aimed at building its force projection
capabilities to confront U.S. and allied forces in the region.”
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Annual Report (2005) |
|
The commission also urged Washington to step
up its efforts to co-ordinate US, Taiwanese and Japanese forces in
preparation for a possible Chinese attack, and called on the US
Government to expand it offensive and defensive capabilities in the
Pacific region.
|
“The Commission believes that there is an urgent need for Congress to
encourage increasing U.S. military capabilities in the Western Pacific
in response to growing Chinese capabilities and deployments in the
area.”
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Annual Report (2005) |
|
|
11.11.05 10:20
|
|
Replacing Yasukuni : Tokyo Takes the First Step on a Long Road
Japanese
lawmakers took what is hoped will be a key step towards mending
Sino-Japanese relations this week, when they convened of a
groundbreaking cross party committee aimed at providing a solution to
one of the largest stumbling blocks on the road to peaceful
Sino-Japanese co-existence.
The committee, titled the "group of
pushing forward establishment of national memorial facility", met for
the first time on Wednesday, has been designed as working group
consisting of approximately 100 officials and lawmakers, drawn from
Japan’s most significant parties, including: the ruling 自由民主党 (Liberal
Democrat Party of Japan/LDP), its coalition partner 公明党 (New
Komeito/The Clean Government Party), and the opposition 民主党 (Democratic
Party of Japan/DPJ), and it has the unenviable task of providing Japan
with a national war memorial to replace the controversial Yasukuni
Shrine.
The leadership of the group is made up of some of Japan’s most influential politicians.
- Chairman: 山崎拓 (Yamasaki Taku) Former Vice President of the 自由民主党
- Vice Chairperson: 鳩山由紀夫 (Hatoyama Yukio). Secretary general of the 民主党
- Vice Chairperson: 冬柴铁三 (Fuyushiba Tetsuzo). Secretary general of the 公明党
Also included on the working group is 神埼武法 (Kanzaki Takenori), the leader of the 公明党.
Decision
to form the committee, to replace Yasukuni as the site of Japan’s
national war memorial, comes decades of formal representations from
Japan’s neighbors, and follows on from an incident in June 2005, when
senior Japanese lawmakers approached Yasukuni directly. Requesting that
it remove ‘class A’ war criminals from its primary memorial, and that
it cease activities considered to glorify Japanese colonial aggression.
Nationalist infiltrators at the shrine however refused to comply,
citing protection under laws that prevent state interference in
religious affairs.
These laws currently prevent Tokyo from
enforcing a decision on Yasukuni; which falls under religious, rather
than state, jurisdiction, and prevent the Japanese Government from
linking activities at the shrine to the need to maintain foreign
relations.
Three Tenets
While
much of the committee’s deliberations are likely to be held behind
closed doors; as is traditional in Japan. Its deliberations are likely
to focus on three basic tenets that form the core requirements for a
shrine to be acceptable to the widest possible domestic and
international audience, but which are also highly controversial.
Tenet 1: Clean Break
The
new memorial should be 'clean' remembering only 'ordinary' soldiers;
Soldiers who were not convicted of committing or ordering war crimes.
Tenet 2: Clear Boundaries
The
new memorial should be secular so as not to fall foul of Article 20 of
the Japanese constitution; which prohibits the convergence of church
and state, and to give the state a greater measure of control over the
memorial; allowing memorial affairs to be linked to the need to
preserve international relation in a way not currently possible with
Yasukuni.
Tenet 3: Remembrance before glory
The new
memorial should be solely for the purposes of remembering the dead, and
the promotion of peace through the remembrance of loss and sacrifice.
It should not justify, glorify, or otherwise promote acts of aggression
or those who perpetrated them.
Interested Parties?
Because
the controversy surrounding Yasukuni long ago ceased to be an internal
Japanese matter, at the very least in the eyes of those outside Japan,
the matter of a finding its successor is complicated by the need to
take into consideration the views held by a number of diverse groups,
both inside and outside of Japan. Groups which include:
Primary Groups
- The
Chinese right; who may see the new memorial as being insufficient, and
who would likely jump on any compromises made to appease other groups
being a sign of Japanese nationalism.
- Japan’s
discredited nationalist right minority; who would certainly see a new
memorial as being an insult unless it conformed almost exactly to the
pattern set by Yasukuni, and who would likely press the Government to
make compromises that are seen as being unacceptable by other groups.
- The
Japanese left; who would push along the same lines as the Chinese
right, but who receive less domestic and international press than the
either the Chinese or Japanese right.
Secondary Groups
- Chinese
moderates; who appreciate Japan’s need/right to remember its dead, but
object to the presence of right war criminals in Yasukuni and the way
that the shrine has been subsumed by the Japanese right, and who are
open to compromise in some areas, but not others.
- Japanese
moderates; who want a solution that is approved of by the largest
possible group, but who do not fully appreciate the strength of feeling
of Chinese and Japanese nationalists, and who would press for
compromises to be made by all sides.
- Japanese
moderates and religious groups who may see a secular memorial as
troubling, or who may take the view that the memorial and Yasukuni are
distinct and would support either, or both, at their discretion.
- Foreigners
and the international press; who hold a variety of views, and who range
from fully informed to ill informed, and who are seen as being likely
to side with the Japanese left and Chinese/Japanese moderates, but be
largely unaware of their existence because of the overwhelming
international attention given to the Chinese/Japanese right.
- Taiwanese
Nationalists: who sees Yasukuni as an issue that they can use to draw a
metaphoric dividing line between Chinese-Taiwan and Mainland China, and
who have been courting the Japanese right in order raise support for
Taiwanese independence in Japan.
Whatever
‘solution’ is reached it is unlikely to be soon, particularly as it is
a Japanese trait to avoid open conflict, and it certain that one or
more groups will be given to protest it; an expected eventuality that
could see the relationship between China and Japan becoming worse
before it becomes better.
|
12.11.05 07:56
|
|
Silence is golden
Given that China and Japan are currently engaged in a
raft of historical, territorial, political disputes, news that a
Chinese surveillance vessel was recently spotted in waters close to a
strategically important Japanese island didn’t come as a surprise to
China watchers, what did come as a surprise though, was Tokyo’s
reaction. Or rather the lack there of.
According to the sources within the Japanese Coastguard,the ship, identified as being Chinese surveillance vessel, was spotted in waters close to 久米島 (Kume-Island), 沖縄県 (Okinawa-Prefecture), at around 6 o’clock on Friday.
Reports
intricate that the ship was a 远望 (Long View)-class tracking ship
belonging to the Chinese navy, but operating under the banner of the
Chinese Marine Bureau, and that it left under its own power after a coastguard patrol aircraft
issued a radio challenge, eventually leaving Japanese waters at around
6: 50.
Muted Response?
While
the presence of a Chinese surveillance vessel close to Japanese-Okinawa
is not in itself particularly surprising given the island’s strategic
importance, proximity to disputed territory, and the presence of US
military personnel there, what has taken some China watchers by mild
surprise has been the overwhelmingly muted reaction that the sighting
received from state officials.
When questioned, shortly after
the event, representatives from the Japanese Foreign Ministry seemed
'overtly willing' to accept that the vessel’s presence in Japanese
waters may have been wholly accidental, and stated that, if the vessel
had strayed into Japanese waters by mistake, that it wouldn’t be
considered as a serious incident.
Officials from the Japanese
Coast Guard also expressed a similar sentiment, saying that the Chinese
vessel appeared ‘harmless’, and that they would take no further action.
Softly Softly?
Given
that the latest incident comes at a time of heightened Sino-Japanese
tension over history, territory and politics, which has been fueled by
recent reports claiming that China has been operating spy missions
close to the disputed Japanese-Senkaku islands, and the release of
statistics which show that the Air Defense Force was forced to scramble
fighters 30 times in the last six months, to intercept inbound Chinese
aircraft; more than double the number of such scramble during the same
period last year, a number of China watchers have pointed towards this
muted official response as a sign that Tokyo might be returning to its
former policy of quiet diplomacy and ‘not making a fuss’.
Until
recently, it was a Japanese policy to play down actions by China that
might have hostile overtones, so as not to rouse anti-Chinese sentiment
in Japan, and not to provide fuel for anti-Japanese sentiment in China.
This pseudo-policy, however, changed 2004, when a Chinese Han-Class
nuclear submarine violated Japanese waters; leading Tokyo to publicly
scold China for its actions, and to demand an apology form Beijing.
Forcing Chinese authorities to admit that they had been launching
provocative military incursions against a country that they were
accused of harbor aggressive intent, and putting Beijing in the
embarrassing position of having to apologize to Tokyo.
Though
quickly resolved, the publicity surrounding the December 2004 Han
incident lead to a rise in nationalist feelings and anti-Chinese
sentiment in Japan, while the loss of face resulting from being
publicly admonished, and from being forced into apologizing to Tokyo,
resulted in a rise in nationalist feeling and Anti-Japanese sentiment
in China. Both of which sent relations between the two countries into a
downward spiral from which it has yet to fully recover.
Observations
In
light of recent events, some observers have voiced that the fact that
Japanese officials all but dismissed the sighting of a Chinese
surveillance vessel as being an inconsequential accident of navigation,
may be a positive sign for things to come. Possibly signaling that
Tokyo now firmly sees its future relationship with China, and the
Japanese left, as being substantially more important than any capital
that it could gain from the Japanese and American right by exploiting
such incidents.
However, it has also been voiced that it remains
too early to tell if this response is part of a wider ‘no fuss’
strategy, or if it is a temporary effort to maintain a calm political
environment.
远望?
The
远望 is a class of Chinese long ranged tracking ships, designed to
monitor high altitude/space-borne objects, including satellites,
missiles and space debris.
Officially, China classifies the
远望-class as being "maritime aerospace survey vessels" and lists them as
being equipped with "transoceanic aerospace observation and control
technology". Previously they have been used to track the firing of
experimental long ranged missiles systems, and to track China’s manned
space flights.
There currently known to be four 远望-class ships.
The vessel encountered off of 久米島 believed to be the 远望 2.
|
14.11.05 12:48
|
|
China to America – Tibet is an internal issue, but trade isn’t
As
anybody who has been observing China for some time will know well that
it is a common trait for Beijing to react to any situation that losses
it face by either pretending that it didn’t happen, or by attempting to
project an image of strength over the top of its losses. Such was the
situation ,late last week,
when Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao issues an angry
rebuke to Washington, in an attempt to salvage face after US President
George Bush met with the Dalai Lama, in direct defiance to demands made
by Beijing that foreign nations should pretend that the exiled
spiritual leader of Tibet does not exist.
However, despite
China’s complaints over the visit, it would appear that there will be
no sting in the tail to follow for Washington. Part of a growing trend that had lead
some to suggest that China may now be being forced to put prosperity
before pride, at least where external audiences, and the large western
powers, are concerned.
The Rebuke
Describing
Bush’s meeting with the exiled Lama as being an ‘interference’ in
Chinese affairs, Liu warned Washington not to become involved in the
dispute between Mainland China and the formerly sovereign Tibet, and
condemned the US leader for drawing further international attention on
China’s troubled relationship with its unwilling province.
|
"Other leaders should not provide a platform for [the Dalai Lama] to separate the country"
Liu Jianchao, spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China
|
|
All Bark, No Bite
While
it is not yet clear what repercussions Bush’s audience with the Dalai
Lama will have, it is thought likely that Beijing will do little that
would endanger Sino-American trade relations. Which have now become a
significant factor for Chinese progression.
A school of thought
that comes backed up by a simultaneous statement from the spokesperson
issuing the rebuke, stating that Bush’s meeting with the Tibetan retinue would not be seen as an impediment to his forthcoming three day visit to China, secluded to begin on 19 November.
|
"The importance [of President Bush’s forthcoming trip to
China] will not be diminished by a single incident. The visit will
achieve its planned goals."
Liu Jianchao |
|
Similarly, Britain received near identical
criticism from China, when it earlier extended a state level welcome to
the Dalai Lama, without suffering any noticeable damage to its trade or
diplomatic relations with China.
Additionally, an earlier
meeting between the Tibetan retinue, and members of the British Crown
family, did not apparently anger China sufficiently for leader Hu
Jintao to call off his coveted royal audience, which was held earlier
this month.
Some China watchers have pointed to this pattern of
rebukes, that are not matched by action, or even a noticeable souring
of relations, as a sign that China may now be in a state where its
reliance relations western trade and investment, mean that China now
more often having to limit itself to verbal actions so as to not
jeopardize the countries international interests, and that Beijing
having to swallow its pride and put the maintenance of the Chinese
economy before the maintenance of Chinese face.
Isolation
Ever
since the communist army entered Tibet, shortly after WWII, and brought
the once independent state directly under Beijing’s control sphere, it
has been Chinese policy to isolate the state from the international
community, and to prevent those calling for independence from being
heard. Either within Tibet, or outside of it.
As such, Beijing
frequently opposes any meetings between the Dalai Lama, or his
representatives, and has reacted with staunch indignation each time
representatives of Tibet have been welcomed as state guests in other
countries.
|
"The Dalai Lama is not a simple or a pure religious
figure. He is a political exile who undertakes secessionist activities
abroad….. We oppose meetings between him and other leaders."
Liu Jianchao |
|
Paradox
While
western nations do not recognize Tibet a being independent at the state
level, it remains a paradox of affairs that it is common for world
leaders to meet with the Tibetan representative at a high level.
Affording the Lama and the Tibetan exile Government similar status to a
retinue from a sovereign state.
This recognition comes in stark
contrast to the west’s treatment of other territories that have been
subsumed/are claimed by Mainland China. Territories which include East
Turkistan; which currently has no substantive recognition from the
west, and Chinese-Taiwan; which is recognized through ‘interchange
agencies’ that serve as de-facto embassies, but whose representatives
are rarely afforded high level status because of the ‘One China’
principle signed between Beijing and all western governments.
Fact and Fiction
According
to Beijing, Tibet is an inherent and immutable component of the PRC,
which enjoys full religious and cultural autonomy within greater China.
|
“In the past 40 years or so, Tibet has inherited and
developed its cultural heritage, Tibetan customs and religions have
been fully respected, and people have enjoyed full freedom of religious
faith”
Xinhua, State Controlled media agency. |
|
In reality, China routinely bans any aspects
of Tibet’s indigenous culture that separate Tibetan and Chinese
identities, while often actively encouraging aspect of Tibetan heritage
that can be seen as being ‘relicts of the past’ that can be used to
promote tourism and the idea that Tibet is advancing by discarding its
traditional practices in favor of elements of Han culture that have
been imported form China, and that such epitaphs are merely being
maintained as ‘curiosities’ which are irrelevant to modern day life.
Additionally,
it is currently Chinese policy to encourage Han Chinese to relocate to
the Tibetan region, where they are offered jobs that are unobtainable
to Tibetans and land confiscated from Tibetans, in an effort to
repopulate Tibet with Han.
‘Coincidentally’ an unusually large
proportions of the Han who are offered land or senior positions in
Tibet are former soldiers or members of the PSB.
It is currently illegal for a Tibetan to possess an image of the Dalai Lama or a recording of his voice.
|
16.11.05 09:11
|
|
[next page]
|
